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Abstract 
A vast majority of prior empirical studies exclusively investigates the 
determinants of capital structure and earnings management of private and public firms 
in developed and developing economies, but there is a shortage of works related to 
private firms in  least developed countries with transitional economy.  This empirical 
study attempts to extend the existing literature and fill the gap by examining financing 
decision and earnings management activities of private enterprises in the transitional 
economy environment from a centrally-planned regime to a market-oriented economy 
of Laos. 
 This study uses previous empirical works and theoretical principles related to 
private and public companies in developed, developing and other transitional 
economies to uncover the financing decision and earnings management activities of 
Lao private enterprises. The works and principles are used as a fundamental 
framework to understand previous related works and to formulate six hypotheses of 
this investigation. This study relies on two capital structure theories, the Pecking-Order 
theory and Trade-Off theory to explain the financing decision of the firms. Agency 
theory is also applied to explain the earnings management activities in relation to 
financial leverage of the enterprises. The earnings management is measured by using 
the Modified Jones Model and the Performance-Augmented Model. In conjunction, 
this study employs multiple linear regression models to statistically test the six 
formulated hypotheses under three research questions. The statistical data used in this 
study are drawn from annual financial reports of 224 private enterprises in Laos, 
containing 674 observations for five-year period of 2009-2013. The financial reports 
were prepared under the Lao accounting manuals and instructions. 
This study contributes to several findings that reflect an under-developed 
transitional nature of the Lao business environment to the existing knowledge. First, 
the modern Pecking-Order and Trade-Off theories as well as the firm-specific 
determinants and industry factors of capital structure derived from the developed and 
developing countriesare partially portable to financing decision of private enterprises 
in Laos. As in other countries, larger firms in Laos can easily access to external debt 
than smaller counterpart, whereas profitable firms are more likely to have less leverage 
and their retained earnings are primary source of investment. Empirically, the 
financing choices of Lao private firms seem to follow a limited Pecking-Order – 
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retained profit, and total-debt. In addition, in line with the Trade-Off theory, Lao 
private firms across industry sectors differently adjust their capital structure to seek 
for an optimum level of debt-equity ratio. Second, with regards to the main 
determinants of earnings management, larger enterprises in Laos are more likely to 
engage in earnings management than smaller firms, whereas enterprises with higher 
level of tangibility and profitability tend engage in less earnings management. In 
addition, this study finds that sole-traders enterprises with more operating cash flow 
engage more in earnings manipulation. Further, the influence of firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, total revenue, and trade receivables on earnings management vary across 
industry sectors. Finally, earnings manipulation has a positively significant impact on 
financial leverage of Lao private enterprises, implying that the firms use financial 
leverage as a governance mechanism to mitigate opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
 
 
Keywords: capital structure, earnings management, private enterprise, transitional 
economy, least developed country 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The capital structure decision and earnings management activities of firms are 
frequently discussed issues in managerial finance. On the one hand, it is necessary to 
understand the important determinants that can influence financing decisions when 
firms seek for an optimum level of capital structure to maximise their profit and share 
value (Harris & Raviv, 1991). On the other hand, earnings management of firms can 
be harmful for users of financial information, such as regulators, analysts, academics 
and practitioners (Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005).   Understanding the driver forces 
of earnings management is beneficial to public users when misleading financial or 
untrue information are used in their decision. However, prior works extensively 
explore the contexts of listed firms in developed and developing countries. Therefore, 
this study attempts to uncover the determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management of private companies in different economic environments, such as Laos 
which is one of the least developed countries during the transitional economy. This 
study becomes an extended analysis which is relatively unexplored in the literature.  
 This chapter presents background, objectives, research questions, motivations, 
scope, delimitation, and the contributions of the study. It also provides an overview of 
subsequent chapters of this thesis. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 1.2 provides the background of the study by focusing on the related studies on 
determinants of capital structure and earnings management, as well as the relationship 
between financial leverage and earnings management. This section briefly reviews 
prior literature for the justification of this study. Section 1.3 presents the research 
objectives and questions. Section 1.4 provides a brief overview of research 
methodology. Section 1.5 explains the motivations for undertaking the study. Section 
1.6 describes the contributions of the study to the literature, academics and 
practitioners. Section 1.7 illustrates the scope and delimitation of the study. Section 
1.8 briefly provides an overview of each chapter in this study. Finally, section 1.9 
concludes this chapter with a summary. 
1.2 Background of the Study 
  Laos has been changing from a central-planned regime to market-oriented 
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economy over the past two decades. Private enterprises are particularly recognised as 
a significant driving force to boost the success of the transitional economy of the 
country. Over the period, Lao government has introduced a number of strategic 
policies to promote economic activities of the private firms in an important private 
sector. According to the national statistics until the end of 2014, there were totally 
98,962 registered private enterprises throughout the country (Ministry of Industry and 
Commerce, 2014). In 2011, the private sector contributed 16% of annual GDP, which 
was the significant contributor to the economic growth. Even though Laos is 
characterised as a bank-based economy, private commercial banks are still small in 
size and have limited services to provide financial support for the firms. Accordingly, 
Lao private enterprises still face the difficult issue of external financing for their 
business operation and future development. This raises a question as to what factors 
influence financing decision of the enterprises in the country. Further, there is always 
another concern, particularly the government and lenders, about earnings management 
among the private enterprises in Laos. Since earnings play a vital role in firms’ 
financial performance, their financial managers commonly have incentives to manage 
in earnings to protect their private benefits (Charoenwong & Jiraporn, 2009). The 
plethora of this research interest on earnings management could lead to a mitigation of 
negative effect to stakeholders or lenders of the firms. Therefore, not just to seek 
evidence on earnings management of the firms in this study, understanding the 
underlying factors that motivate financial managers is also necessary for preventing 
future occurrences (Erickson, Hanlon, & Maydew, 2006).   
  Although there is a large number of previous literature on the factors 
influencing capital structure decision (Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc‐Kunt, & 
Maksimovic, 2001; Degryse, de Goeij, & Kappert, 2012; Lemma & Negash, 2014). 
There is also a great amount of investigation on earnings management activities 
(Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014; Marques, Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011; J. N. Myers, Myers, 
& Skinner, 2007), earnings management’s determinants (Erickson et al., 2006), as well 
as the association between leverage and earnings management (Anagnostopoulou & 
Tsekrekos, 2017; Carter, 2013; Jelinek, 2007). Those prior studies relate to only 
private or public firms in developed and developing countries. But there is a limited 
number of empirical studies on financing decision and earnings management activities 
of private firms in least developed countries with transitional economy. In comparison, 
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developed and developing countries are different from least developed countries in 
term of institutional structures, such as the immature and incomplete of legal and 
institutional framework. For example, Laos is one of the least-developed countries 
ruling by only one political party, called the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP). 
The party remains a typical communist party of the former Soviet model (Stuart-Fox, 
2006). Lao economy is in the transitional period from the central-planned regime to a 
free-market oriented system. Laws and regulations in the country are being developed 
and often amended. The country’s financial institutions are highly controlled by its 
central government, especially state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) which are 
acting as key lenders providing financial support for local businesses. Collectively, 
loans of the SOCBs in 2010 accounted for 60.5% of total assets in the banking sector 
(Keovongvichith, 2012). The country has a gradual progress in macroeconomic 
stabilization, commercial banking, state-owned enterprise privatization, financial 
market development, subsidy reductions, and tax system effectiveness. Under such 
different political and economic condition, this study attempts to fill the gap by 
investigating not only the determinants of capital structure and earnings management 
but also the association of capital structure and earnings management of the private 
enterprises.  
  The following sub-sections present brief reviews to an important role of 
optimum capital structure decision and its determinants, prior practices on earnings 
management, determinants on earnings management, and the relationship between 
financial leverage and earnings management. The reviews in each sub-section will lead 
to this doctoral project as a case study of private enterprises in Laos. 
1.2.1 Capital Structure Decision  
  Capital structure is a contemporary issue considered as one of the essential 
parts of firm’s financial management in a market-oriented economy since the 
development of irrelevance principle of Modigliani and Merton (1958). Decisions of 
financial manager on capital structure can affect public firms’ liquidity (Morellec, 
2001), cost of capital (Modigliani & Merton, 1958), profitability (Titman & Wessels, 
1988) and their overall value (Masulis, 1983). There are also various factors that 
influence the value of a firm, such as industry-specific and institutional factors (Donald 
R Fraser & Chek, 2006; Li, Yue, & Zhao, 2009). If a firm relies on internal equity, 
growth is more likely limited through a lack of sufficient external funds to enhance 
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business activities and future growth. In contrast, if a firm relies on external financing, 
it may encounter debt covenant violation or higher risk of bankruptcy. As a result, 
firms have to make a correct decision on managing their capital structure. Public or 
private firms can choose different levels of financial leverage in their effort to 
maximise firm’s value or net profit. Although empirical research suggests that an 
optimal level of capital structure is in existence, there is no specific level and 
successful methodology for managers to achieve their goals (Donald R Fraser & Chek, 
2006). At best, financial theories provide guidance on deciding the financial mix to 
adjust financial leverage for the best value for a firm. One of the previous studies on 
financing decision of enterprises has suggested that firm-specific determinants are 
more important and contribute most the variation of capital structure (Balakrishnan & 
Fox, 1993). Industry sectors can also affect leverage level of firms. Degryse et al. 
(2012) document that not only firm-specific determinants contribute to the variance of 
capital structure, but also inter-industry effects. Consistently, Showalter (1999) reports 
that unobservable characteristics of a particular industry sector may influence the 
levels of leverage within that sector. For instance, service firms are less likely to meet 
the required criteria for bank loans, often due to a lack of tangible assets to be used as 
collateral (Hisrich, 1989). Correspondingly, transportation, construction, and 
manufacturing businesses are highly capital intensive, so that the companies are more 
likely to rely on external debts. In case of Laos during the time of economic transition, 
understanding the determinants of capital structure of private enterprises is essential 
and crucial for financial managers or business owners to settle their optimum financing 
decision. 
1.2.2 Earnings Management Activities 
 Managers may employ earnings management by several approaches for some 
reasons such as the use of accounting methods, the use of discretionary accruals or the 
change in capital structure choices. For that reasons, earnings management has been 
attempted to define in various ways. However, there has been no consensus of 
agreement on earnings management definition. It depends on the purposes of using 
earnings management. Each of definition has been defined in their own way by 
academic practitioners and researchers as in following samples: 
1) Earnings management is “an alternative tool relating to the use of 
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discretionary accounting accruals to influence reported income” (Jones, 
1991). 
2) Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368) define earnings management as “managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in restructuring financial 
transactions to alter financial reports either mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence 
contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting practices”. 
3) Earnings management is “a purposeful intervention in the external financial 
reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain” (Schipper, 
1989)  
  Generally, there are five aspects of discussion to the use of earnings 
management, including objective, motive, managed account, magnitude and 
frequency, and economic consequences of earnings management.  The objectives of 
earnings management from the definitions above are different. The definition of 
earnings management of Jones (1991) is “to influence reported income” by reducing 
firms’ earnings only before the year of import relief investigation, so that firms benefit 
from import protection, which is regarded as a motive provided by the government.  
Whereas the definition of earnings management of Healy and Wahlen (1999) is for the 
consequence of the changes in financial transactions to mislead stakeholders about the 
financial performance of firm. For instance, managers believe that some outside 
stakeholders are not accessible to all information that is available for insiders. The 
outsiders already expect a certain magnitude of earnings management in the financial 
report. Thus, earnings management is not transparent to the outside investors. The third 
definition defined by Schipper (1989) is for obtaining intended private gains of firm’s 
managers, such as maximizing bonuses, by purposefully intervening in the external 
reporting process to oppose a neutral outcome. However, those three definitions of 
earnings management share two important similarities. First, managerial intends to 
manipulate earnings to obtain private benefits. Second, rational managers would not 
engage in earnings practices without personal expected benefits.   
 Literally, earnings management is commonly viewed as the use of accounting 
methods to disguise financial information of public listed firms in developed countries. 
It can be beneficial or harmful to users of the information. Alternatively, business 
managers employ earnings management strategies by using discretionary accounting 
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accruals to influence reported earnings (Jones, 1991). Business managers may also 
alter earnings to communicate information for the benefit of shareholders and public 
(Subramanyam, 1996). Subramanyam (1996) contends that managers exercise 
discretionary accruals to enhance their earnings ability and to reflect the true 
fundamental value of shares. Further instance, earnings management has a relationship 
with corporate tax avoidance (Desai & Dharmapala, 2009; Lin, Lu, & Zhang, 2012). 
In case of Laos, for instance, as one of the least developed countries, enterprises’ 
managers may use earnings management for their own benefit under tax incentives or 
other possible factors. If firms report their earnings upward, even though they are more 
accessible to external financing but have higher tax deduction to the government. On 
the contrary, if firm managers alter discretion accruals on earnings to decrease income 
or even to report losses, this lowers taxable income. Hence, the government bases 
income-tax collection from unreflected financial earnings. Reasonably, earnings 
management is anticipated to be employed by Lao private enterprises’ financial 
managers or owners.  
1.2.3 Determinants of Earnings Management 
  Financial managers (as insiders) of firms can manage their earnings in different 
dimensions in relation to accounting choices or real activities manipulations. Several 
different factors can motivate the managers. Understanding the driving forces of the 
earnings management is essential to prevent future occurrences (Erickson et al., 2006) 
due to earnings manipulation could have consequential effects on related stakeholders.  
 Prior literature considers firm and industry factors as important factors in 
determining accountings choices (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). On the one hand, a 
number of studies attribute firm-specific factors, such as size, as a heterogeneity in 
earnings management activity (Burgstahler, Hail, & Leuz, 2006; Lemma, Negash, & 
Mlilo, 2013; Othman & Zeghal, 2006). The results regarding the relationship between 
firm size and earnings management are mixed, firm size may have a positive or 
negative impact on earnings management for several reasons. For example, larger 
firms have more budget to pay for better audit quality than smaller counterparts, which 
help to prevent earnings misrepresentation (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 
2000; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). In contrast, larger firms have greater bargaining 
power with auditors that the auditors are likely to waive earnings management attempts 
but require an adjustment in identified material with small clients (Nelson, Elliott, & 
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Tarpley, 2002). On the other hand, a particular industry has more incentive for the 
manager to manipulate earnings than the others. For instance, Guadalupe and Pérez-
González (2006) suggest that aggressive earnings management is reduced due to 
competition among industries weakens managerial control over their private benefits 
through the enhanced flow of specific information from firms. Likewise, firms in more 
regulated industries tend to have lower agency costs than the others, and hence are less 
likely to manipulate their earnings (Warfield et al., 1995). Similarly, firms in more 
competitive industries are less likely to engage in earnings management and the 
industrial competition reduces agency problems (Markarian, 2014). Therefore, firm-
specific and industry-specific factors are included in this study to see whether the 
factors influence earnings management activities of private enterprises in Laos.    
1.2.4 Capital Structure and Earnings Management 
  Prior studies have documented that financial leverage is correlated with 
earnings management. Leveraged firms alter their earnings to satisfy and not to violate 
debt covenant (Beatty & Weber, 2003; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994). In the year 
preceding debt violation, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find an evidence of altering 
abnormal working capital accruals after certification by an external auditor. 
Consistently, Jelinek (2007) reports that increased leverage is related to earnings 
management, and leverage changes and levels may affect differently on earnings 
management. Accordingly, this study also examines the linkage between financial 
leverage and earnings management of Lao enterprises.  
1.3 Research Objectives and Questions 
 The general objective of this  study is to provide an insight into the business 
financing decisions and earnings management activities of Lao private enterprises. 
More spectificly, this study breaks down the general aim into three sub-objectives.The 
first one is to explore the determinants of capital structure decision of private 
enterprises in Laos. The second purpose is to investigate the main determinants of 
earnings management of the firms. The last objective is to examine the association 
between financial leverage and earnings management. The three following research 
questions are formulated in according to the contexts of interest discussed in the 
previous section: 
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1. What are the firm-specific characteristics and industry sectors that influence 
capital structure decision of Lao private enterprises? 
2. What are the main determinants of earnings management of Lao private 
enterprises? 
3. What are the relationships between earnings management and leverage of Lao 
private enterprises? 
1.4 Brief overview of Research Methodology 
  In order to answer the above three research questions, this study employs 
quantitative methods and adopts multiple-linear regressions to statistically test 
formulated hypotheses on financial leverage and earnings management. Basically, 
dependents and independent variables in the study are regressed in a baseline empirical 
regression model for the determinants of capital structure and earnings management, 
and the relationship between financial leverage and earnings management. This study 
uses two proxies to measure earnings management of Lao private enterprises, 
comprising of the absolute value of the residuals from Modified Jones Model 
(Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995) and the Performance-Augmented Discretionary 
Accrual Model (Kothari et al., 2005).  
   This study uses secondary data from the annual financial reports of 224 private 
enterprises for a five-year period from 2009 to 2013 to be able to empirically examine 
the capital structure decision and earnings management activities. The sample firms 
consist of 123 limited companies and 101 sole-trader enterprises operating in five 
different industry sectors. The sectors include consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples, industrials, materials, and utilities. The financial reports of the enterprises are 
randomly collected from taxation offices, tax division, and tax department in the 
capital city of Laos, Vientiane Capital. 
1.5 Motivations of the Study 
  This section discusses four main factors that motivate the research undertaken. 
Firstly, there is a dearth of study on corporate financing decision and earnings 
management activities of private firms in least developed countries with transitional 
economy, such as Laos which has a unique institutional environment. Although, many 
researchers have focused on this issue in developed and developing countries but it 
seems to be less common in the least developed countries during transitional period. 
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Therefore, this study attempts to fill the gap. Secondly, this study investigates the 
financial data taken from annual reports of private firms that are commonly 
unavailable for external users because the reports are only used for taxation purpose 
by tax authorities. thirdly, there is a need to enhance the understanding of capital 
structure decision and earnings management activity of Lao enterprises. The results of 
this study will benefit potential users. Lastly, the financial reports investigated in this 
study are under Lao accounting standards which are not fully compatible to accounting 
standards in developed and developing countries, such as the International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) or Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP). 
Thus, the results of this study are based on accepted financial reports under the Lao 
accounting standard, which is known as Lao Accounting Manuals and Instructions.  
1.6 Contribution of the Thesis 
  This project contributes to the existing literature on corporate financial 
management of firms in transitional environments and provides an insight for 
corporate managers, academics, policy makers, and other potential users due to the 
following reasons:  
 This study is an early provision in response to a shortage of empirical evidence 
of corporate financing and earnings management in least developed countries. It is 
because most of prior studies on the capital structure decision and earnings 
management activities relate to private or public firms in developed and developing 
countries. Particularly, this study seeks an extended evidence of private firms in Laos, 
which has a least developed status during the time of transitional economy from a 
centrally-planned regime to one based on a market-oriented mechanism. The transition 
had generated high GDP growth of over 7.5% annually over the last ten years (Bank 
of the Lao PDR, 2007; National Economic Research Institute, 2014). However, the 
concerns on financing decision and earnings management activities of private firms in 
the country have never been empirically explored.   
  This study also contributes to the ongoing research in accounting or finance 
literature. It provides a quantitative insight knowledge of capital structure decision and 
earnings management for private firms’ managers, policymakers and other 
stakeholders. The managers may want to know how firm-specific determinants and 
industry factors that can influence their firms’ capital structure. As a result,  they can 
seek for an optimum level between  debt and equity for their maximum profit. For 
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policymakers, it is beneficial to their future planning for improving business financing, 
preventing earnings management assurances of private firms so as to mitigate potential 
effects to the government. In addition, lenders may want to know how firm-specific 
charactoristics and industry sectors influence financing decision and earnings 
management behaviour of Lao private enterprises. On the one hand, important firm-
specific factors and industry influence found in this study can help the creditors in their 
future lending considerations. On the other hand, an understanding of the factors that 
motivate earnings management and the existence of earnings management level across 
industry sectors can help creditors to minimise credit risks. 
1.7 Scope and Delimitation of the Study 
  This study focuses on determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management, and the relationship between earnings management and financial 
leverage of private enterprises in Laos. The investigation of the capital structure of the 
enterprises is based on two theories of capital structure, consisting of the Pecking-
Order theory (POT) and Trade-Off theory (TOT). An agency theory is also used to 
explain earnings management activities in relation to financial leverage of Lao private 
firms. The determinants of capital structure and earnings management are firm-
specific characteristics and industry sectors. The sectors are classified in accordance 
with global industry classification standards (GICS), including five industry sectors: 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, materials, and utilities.  
  The data used in this study are taken from the annual financial reports of private 
enterprises in Vientiane Capital of Laos. The financial reports are formulated under 
Lao Accounting Mannuals and Instructions, and the Accounting Law (National 
Assembly, 2007). The reported data in the reports is in the local currency of Laos or 
Lao Kip (LAK). The reports are annually submitted to tax authority for taxation 
purposes. 
  In relation to the sample, this study only covers non-financial private 
enterprises and excludes public listed companies on Lao Securities Exchange. This  
because the public firms are required to report their financial information under IFRS 
which is different from Lao accounting standard in some aspects. Financial firms 
(commercial banks, insurance companies, leasing firms, and microfinance institutions) 
are excluded from the sample due to balance sheets of financial service companies are 
different from those of non-financial enterprises, such as the differences in the profit 
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and loss statement.  Small to Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) are also excluded 
because SMEs in Laos pay income tax under the “presumptive” system; they are not 
required to submit income statement and balance sheet to taxation office like the 
private firms. The SMEs are defined in the Decree on the Promotion and Development 
of Small to Medium-Sized Enterprises (Prime Minister's Office, 2004).  In addition, 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) are omitted because state-owned firms behave 
differently from privately owned companies in term of overall benefit to the whole 
society during an economic circumstance. For example, SOEs may be more sluggish 
to reduce costs as a reaction to new demand during the time of economic crisis (Hart, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997).   
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 
  This thesis consists of six chapters, including Chapter: 1 Introduction, Chapter 
2: Institutional background of Laos, Chapter 3: Theories and Literature review, 
Chapter 4: Research method, Chapter 5: Results and discussion, and Chapter 6: 
Conclusions and implications. The content of each chapter is briefly explained in Table 
1.1 as follows.  
Table 1.1 Organisation of the thesis 
Chapter 1 This chapter is the foundation of this doctoral thesis. It begins with the 
introduction to the study, followed by the background to this study, and 
the importance of optimum capital structure decision and the effects of 
earnings management. It also provides a historical background of 
capital structure, earnings management, determinants of earnings 
management, and their impact of earnings management on financial 
leverage. In addition, this chapter explains the objectives and the 
questions, an overview of the methodology, the motivation of the 
study, the contributions of the study, scope and delimitation, and the 
outlined structure of the thesis. 
Chapter 2 This chapter mainly focuses on an insight institutional background of 
Laos. Specifically, the chapter presents the country background, the 
overview of politics and government, macroeconomic condition, 
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capital market, portfolio investment, and private sector. It also provides 
a brief overview of financial sector and business financing in the 
country, including the banking sector, non-bank financial institutions, 
and the stock market.  In addition, accounting standard, financial 
reporting, auditing and accounting professional are briefly explained. 
Chapter 3 This chapter provides the theoretical principles of capital structure 
decision, consisting of the early capital structure theory, the POT and 
TOT. The two theories will be used to explain the financing decision 
and earnings management activity of Lao private enterprises. In 
addition, an agency theory in business for explaining the relationship 
between financial leverage and earnings management is presented. The 
chapter also reviews previous literature on capital structure decision, 
earnings management activities, determinants of earnings 
management, and the relation between financial leverage and earnings 
management. The prior literature help in identifying the shortage of 
prior studies and supporting the justification of this study. It is also the 
basis of hypothesis development. 
Chapter 4 This chapter describes the research method of this empirical study. The 
conceptual framework is firstly presented in order to outline each 
individual research questions with capital structure and earnings 
management, followed by the formation of hypotheses basing on the 
literature review in previous chapters. Secondly, this chapter describes 
the data and collection process. Thirdly, it explains the measurement 
of related variables, both dependent and independent variables. The 
empirical methodology is explained in the later section. Specifically, 
the methodology on determinants of capital structure decision and 
earnings management’s practices, as well as the relationship between 
leverage and earnings management are separately explained. Lastly, 
this chapter explains the employed techniques to mitigate bias issues 
from the data analysis. 
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Chapter 5 This chapter presents the descriptive results and the test results of six 
hypotheses developed in Chapter 5. It starts with the explanation of 
descriptive statistics for dependent, independent, and control variables 
as well as a correlation matrix.  This is followed by the presentation of 
the main results from the empirical tests of the hypotheses. The chapter 
also provides a discussion of robustness checks. 
Chapter 6 This chapter summarises the results from a statistical test of the six 
hypotheses under three research questions in Chapter 1. It also 
interprets and provides a discussion of the statistical tests on the 
implication of the results. In addition, contributions and limitations of 
the study, and recommendation for future research are exlained. 
 
1.9 Chapter Summary 
  This chapter is the introductory chapter of this doctoral thesis. It presents the 
historical background of the study.  It discusses the importance of optimum capital 
structure decision and the reasons behind the use of earnings management of firms that 
leads to the formation of research objectives and questions. Further, this chapters 
explains the research methodology and motivations as well as the contributions, scope 
and delimitation of the study. At the end of the chapter,  there is an outline of the 
structure and provides a brief content in each chapter of the thesis. 
  This study is an early investigation of financing decision and earnings 
management’s pratices of private enterprises in Laos, where the business environment 
is in a  transitional period from the central-planned mechanism to a market-oriented 
economy. In realising the importance of financing decisions and the effects of earnings 
management, this study aims to increase the understandings of the determinants of 
capital structure and earnings management of the private firms the country. In doing 
so, this study adopts an empirical method to investigate the data taken from the 
financial reports of 224 private firms in Vientiane Capital of Laos.  
  This study is motivated by the apparent shortage of research on financial 
leverage and earnings management of private firms in the least developed countries 
during the transitional period. Most of the prior studies are those of public or private 
  
27 
firms in developed and developing countries. Further, a better understanding of 
determinants of financial leverage and earnings management of private enterprises will 
be helpful for financial managers or owners to seek an optimum level of capital 
structure for maximum profit as well as to increase an awareness and the effects of 
earnings management for related stakeholders.  Thus, this doctoral thesis does not only 
contribute to the existing literature on capital structure decision and earnings 
management activities but it is also beneficial to regulators, analysts, academics, 
practitioners, and other potential users.   
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CHAPTER 2 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF LAOS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
  This chapter provides an overview of institutional environment of Laos for the 
investigation of the collected data in Chapter 5. The institutional factors are explained 
in this chapter because the factors can possibly impact on the results from the 
investigation of the financial data of private enterprises to be used in this study. 
Specifically, this chapter provides the geographic, politics, government, and 
macroeconomic information of the country. Capital markets, portfolio investment, 
financial sector, business financing, and private sector are also presented in this 
chapter. Further, it highlights accounting standard, financial reporting, and auditing 
underlining the financial reports of Lao private enterprises to be used for the analysis 
of empirical results in Chapter 5.  
  The detailed sections of this chapter are organised as follows. Section 2.2 
presents the general overview of the country. Section 2.3 provides the background of 
politics and government. Section 2.4 presents macroeconomic condition with a 
particular focus on GDP growth of neighbouring countries and developing Asia in 
comparison to Laos. This section also presents the value of foreign direct investment, 
changes in GDP components, foreign trade of exports and imports, revenue from 
tourism and number of tourists, and credit growth. Section 2.5 explains briefly about 
capital market and portfolio investment. Section 2.6 briefly describes the private 
sector. Section 2.7 outlines the financial sector and business financing, including the 
banking sector, non-bank financial institutions, insurance companies, the stock market, 
and credit protection. Section 2.8 describes accounting standards and financial 
reporting. Section 2.9 clarifies about auditing and accounting professional. And 
section 2.10 concludes this chapter with a summary. 
2.2 Country Overview 
  The Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR) or Laos has a total land 
area of 236,000 square kilometres, which is landlocked, mountainous and largely 
tropical forested. From north to south, Mekong River forms a large part of its western 
boundary with neighbouring Thailand. Laos locates at the centre of Indochina and is 
bordered by other four countries comprising of the People’s Republic of China, 
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Vietnam, Cambodia, and Myanmar. Compared to the neighbouring countries, Laos 
has a lower population of 6.76 million people (World Bank, 2016). The population are 
diverse among 49 officially recognised ethnic minorities with their traditional culture 
and indigenous knowledge. Young people cover over 70% of the total population but 
are potentially energetic and productive to economic development (National Statistic 
Centre, 2014). The country is traditionally seen as a Buddhist country, two third of the 
population described themselves as Buddhist (Morev, 2002). 
  Laos was an independent country before becoming a colony of France in the 
late nineteen century and later recovered its sovereignty again in 1955. The country 
had been in conflict during Indochina war for 20 years before it was in complete 
control of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (LPRP) in 1975, which is an only 
political party in Laos. The country is divided into 18 provinces, roughly from north 
to south, namely Phongsali, Louang Namtha, Bokeo, Oudomxay, Louangphabang, 
Houaphan, Xaignabouri, Viengchan, Xiangkhuang, Bolikhamxay, Khammouan, 
Savannakhet, Saravan, Xekong, Champasak, Attapeu and the capital city at the central 
part of the country, called Vientiane Capital.  
2.3 Background of Politics and Government 
  Laos has been known as a country of colonisation with foreign occupations, 
civil wars, and political instability during the last two centuries. Until 1975, following 
the US withdrawal of military forces from Vietnam during the Vietnam War, Lao 
Communists consolidated the country under the assistance of Vietnamese Communists 
and brought the end of the monarchy in Laos, and established the Lao PDR on 2nd 
December 1975. Lao PDR remains one-party state under the LPRP following of 
nominally Marxist-Leninist regime. Lao government considers the country political 
stability as a paramount importance. The president, the head of the state, is elected by 
the parliament, known as the National Assembly of Laos, for a term of five years. The 
president also acts as the secretary-general or the head of the political party. The 
president internally and externally represents the state, supervises the implementation 
of the government’s affairs, and preserves the soundness of the national legislative 
framework as well as protects the autonomy and regional honesty of the country. In 
supervising the members of the party, there is also a central committee of the LPRP, 
called Politburo Committee. Nine members drawn from the Politburo are the key body 
of making decisions.  The powerful Politburo and 49-central committee determine 
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government policies under the supervision of the president. All-important government 
decisions are assessed by the Council of Ministers (ASEAN, 2014). The head of the 
government is the Prime Minister, appointed by the President and with the approval of 
the Lao national assembly. The assembly has three types of sessions, including the 
opening, ordinary, and extraordinary session (National Assembly, 2014). The opening 
session is convened no later than sixty days after the election of a new National 
Assembly. The ordinary session is convened twice a year; the first session at the end 
of each fiscal year between June and July, and the second session at the beginning of 
each fiscal year between November and December. The extraordinary meeting may be 
convened between the two ordinary sessions to consider and decide important or 
necessary issues. Members of the national assembly are those people from a list of 
candidates approved by the party and responsible for scrutinising and approving 
proposed legislation. The national assembly is the representative body of the rights, 
interests and powers of all ethnic peoples in the country. It has legislative right to judge 
fundamental issues and to monitor the activities and implementations of executive 
organs of the government. It has also the right to oversee the activities of the people's 
courts and the office of the public prosecutor. 
  Even though the country is divided into 17 provinces as well as the capital city 
but there are no representative institutions at the lower level of provincial 
governments. Each province is divided into a number of districts which are made up 
of numerous villages. Provincial governors and the heads of districts and villages are 
appointed by the central government (World Bank, 2010).  
2.4 Macroeconomic Condition 
  Over the last four decades, Laos has been committed to long-term development 
and set a national vision to progress from the status of being the least developed 
country to become a developing country by the year 2020. To achieve such ambitious 
vision, the Lao government has developed and implemented seven consecutive 
strategic plans for the future sustainable development of the country. The adoption of 
the New Economic Mechanism in 1986 is an important turning point of the country to 
encourage private-owned enterprises to global markets. Consequently, Laos has been 
gradually developing from a centrally-planned regime to a market-oriented economy 
(Bourdet, 2000). As a result of the decentralised government and encouragement of 
private enterprises, the country has experienced an economic transition with a dramatic 
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increase in infrastructure projects, foreign tourists, trade and foreign direct investments 
(Phouxay, Malmberg, & Tollefsen, 2010). In 2011, the World Bank partially raised 
the status of Laos from a low-income economy to a lower-middle-income economy 
(World Bank, 2014). In 2016, a gross national income per capita was USD 2,150. 
Nevertheless, the World Bank still views Laos as a least developed country for several 
reasons, such as lack of infrastructure and human capacity. Lao macroeconomic 
performance was substantially high and relatively stable during the last decade.  Lao 
GDP growth from 2008 to 2015 represents an average of 7.8% per annum which is 
considered as one of the fastest growing economies in East Asia and in comparison to 
other parts of the world (Figure 2.1). The continuous growth reflects a number of 
improvements in the monetary and fiscal discipline. The Lao government has also 
accelerated and integrated reforms across multiple areas, including public financial 
management, trade and private sector development, natural resources management, 
governance and anti-corruption throughout the country.  
Figure 2.1 Comparison of Laos’ GDP growth with China, Japan, European 
Union, United States, and the world 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), *The Bank of Lao PDR  
  Even though, Laos  is rich in natural resources such as timber, rattan, 
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capacity. Laos’ population substantially depend more on agriculture. A large 
proportion of the population (80%) relies on subsistence agriculture, largely peasant 
farming (Australian Centre for International Research, 2014). The overall 
competitiveness of agricultural sector is relatively weak. 
 The economy of Laos is primarily driven by Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
to support its continued economic expansion (Figure 2.2). For the period of 2008- 
2015, the FDI reached an all-time high in 2015 with a total value of USD 1,421.17 
million. The country has a strong potential of rapid economic development for a long 
term due to the wealth of natural resources and the combination of favourable 
geographic location as land-locked country. Over the period, investment projects in 
the areas of hydropower production and the exploitation of mining resources 
represented leading sectors of the accumulated value over the term. Transportation 
infrastructure, manufacturing, agriculture, tourism, hotel and restaurant are also highly 
attractive to new foreign investors.  Among the foreign investors, Laos’ neighbouring 
countries are the main sources of the FDI, including Vietnam, China and Thailand. 
Korea, Japan and France are also among the largest sources of FDI in recent years. 
Figure 2.2 Value of foreign direct investment 
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2014 
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contributed the growth from 2.20% in 2008 to its peak of 4.17% in 2010. Laos’ annual 
household income per capita had been rising gradually every year from 2008 to 2015. 
Over the eight-year period, the income per capita had increased more than three times 
from USD 719 in 2018 to USD 2,408 in 2015. 
Figure 2.3 Changes in GDP components and income per capita 
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2017 
  Laos has been continuously promoted and integrated its economy with 
international economic communities. The country is a member of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) regional 
trade blocks in 1997, and a permanent member of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
on 2 February 2013 (World Trade Organization, 2014). Laos has additionally held free 
trade agreements with ASEAN dialogue nations in Asia, including Japan, Korea, 
China, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Moreover, Laos is also a party to other free 
trade agreements, including Lao-Vietnam Trade Agreement and the Asia-Pacific 
Trade Agreement (APTA) (Lao Trade Portal, 2014). 
  Laos currently gains benefits from being a member of ASEAN markets 
primarily to neighbouring country Thailand with total exports amount of USD 516 
million in 2012 (Lao National Statistic Centre, 2012), followed by Vietnam and 
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Singapore, amounting to USD 119 million and USD 44 million, respectively. Laos 
also exports to ASEAN dialogue partners including Australia, China, European Union, 
Japan and South Korea with exporting items such as agriculture produces, handicrafts, 
garments and non-timber forestry products.  The Chinese market was the largest 
market for Laos, with the total amount of USD 337 million, and followed by the 
European Union as the second-largest importer, with a total value of USD 169 million. 
  As can be seen in Figure 2.4, the total value of exports from Laos to ASEAN 
and the rest of the world approximately increased from USD 1,053 million in 2009 to 
USD 2,769 million in 2015, except a slight decrease of the total exported value in 2013 
when it is compared to previous year. The major components of the total exports are 
accounted from agricultural produce, garment, wood, prepared foodstuff, electricity, 
and extracted metal from the mining industry, such as copper and gold. On the other 
hand, the total value of imports was significantly higher than exports, accounted 
approximately for USD 1,461 million in 2013 to USD 5,233 million in 2015. The key 
components of the imported products are derived from raw materials and capital goods 
such as food and beverage, fuel, vehicle and mechanical equipment. In comparison, 
the trade balance recorded a common deficit to Laos in every year, accounted for 
between USD 311 million to USD 2,464 million during the same period.  
Figure 2.4 Foreign trade of exports and imports 
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2017 
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  The tourism industry in Laos has been booming since 1999 after the 
government opened the country to foreign visitors in 1986. Laos has stunning scenery 
from Limestone Mountains to dense forests and numerous spectacular waterfalls. 
Adventure and ecotourism are also attractive to the tourists to visit ethnic minorities 
and other best places which are difficult to reach. The number of foreign tourists from 
around the globe increased from approximately 1.74 million in the year 2008 to 4.36 
million in 2015 (Figure 2.5), mainly the tourists from neighbouring countries. In 2015, 
for example, tourists from Thailand covered 51.6%, followed by Vietnam, China, and 
South Korea which accounted for 24.2%, 9.9% and 2.8% respectively. The revenue 
from the tourists made a significant contribution to the development throughout the 
country, which represented USD 275.52 million in 2008 and had steadily increased to 
reach USD 679.39 million in 2015. 
Figure 2.5 Revenue from tourism and the number of tourists 
 
Source: Ministry of Information, Culture and Tourism, 2017 
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more money to infrastructure projects. However, agriculture, manufacturing and 
handicraft remained in high demand for external credit. 
Figure 2.6 Credit growth 
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2017 
2.5 Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment 
  Realising that capital market plays an important role in mobilising financial 
resources to facilitate and promote economic activities and growth, the Lao 
government sets an ambitious vision to industrialise and modernise the country. To 
achieve such a goal, both public and private capital mobilisation are essential for long-
term development. Currently, a well-developed capital market does not exist in Laos, 
although the government has legalised support policies for the information of capital 
and the free flow of the financial resources. 
  The rapid growth of the financial market in Laos during the last decade urged 
a large amount of capital to meet the demands of investment and business expansion. 
In respose, the Lao government has included and focused on the development of 
money market and capital market in their 6th Five-Year Development Plan 
(Government, 2006) for the fiscal years for 2006 to 2010 and 7th Five-Year Social 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
-20%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Industry and handicraft Construction
Materials and technical supplies Agriculture
Trade Transportation
Service Other sectors
Credit growth to GDP (RS)
  
37 
Economic Development Plan  for 2011 to 2015 (Government, 2011). The main sources 
of fund for businesses in Laos are drawn from commercial banks for only short-term 
borrowing (Songvilay L., 2011). This financial constraint limits the sustainable 
development over the long-run of the country. Therefore, financial sector reform is 
one of the country’s priority initiatives (Asian Development Bank, 2012). The focus 
of the government is to reform the banking sector and the equity market. In the early 
stage, this change includes reinforcing the operation and oversight capacity of the 
central bank, the Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL), and restructuring state-owned 
commercial banks by enhancing managerial and financial performances on lending 
and formulating risk management systems. 
  The capital market structure in Laos is comprised of Lao Securities 
Commission (LSC), Lao Securities Exchange (LSX), listed companies, securities 
companies, and external auditors (Lao Securities Commission, 2015). The LSC 
supervises the securities activities in the LSX to ensure the effectiveness and 
continuous development. Shares of the listed firms are traded in the LSX through three 
of four existing securities companies, namely Lanxang Securities, BCEL-KT 
Securities, and Lao-China Securities. The mentioned securities intermediaries operate 
in full-function licensed by the LSC. Whilst the fourth securities firm, called APM Lao 
Securities, provides only financial advisory service to an unlisted firm to become listed 
company in the LSX. In any case, financial statement of a public firm is required to be 
audited and certified by an external auditor who has been widely accepted before 
disclosing the financial information to public users. Currently, there are four external 
audit firms, namely PricewaterhouseCoopers (Lao), KPMG Lao, Ernst and Young Lao, 
and Deloitte (Lao). 
2.6 Private Sector 
 Private sector have become a key driving force of economic transition and engine 
of  economic growth since Lao government adopted a market oriented policy in 1986. 
Although the government still controls the main industrial sectors through state-owned 
enterprises, domestic and foreign direct investments of private sector have been 
increasingly promoted to stimulate growth, employment, income generation, and poverty 
reduction. Favorable business environment is also created in the major provinces of Laos, 
such as special economic zones. Total investment in the private sector accounts for over 
80 percent of the country’s GDP (Asian Development Bank, 2011). In response to the 
  
38 
promotion on  domestic investment and foreign-direct investment (FDI), private sector 
growth has been concentraded in resource-based industries of mining and hydropower 
over the last decade. Mostly, foreign-owned companies hold a large share of total 
investment in the two industries (Asian Development Bank and the Government of 
Australia, 2016). This is because foreign companies can own 100% of a domestic 
company and no legal distinction is made between foreign and domestic ompanies 
(National Assembly, 2009). However, the foreign-owed firms provide a small share of 
total employment and few opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  Meanwhile, investment of private companies in non-resource sector 
(services, agriculture, light manufacturing, and processing industries) is relatively 
small in term of value. Private domestic investment has been stagnant at reound 5% of 
gross domestic product, three times less than FDI (Asian Development Bank, 2011). 
Private exports outside the resource-based sectors have very low product 
diversification. Labor productivity has stagnated at low levels and is not competitive 
internationally. SMEs dominate economic activity and account for substantial 
employment. Totally, more than 98,962 enterprises of all types were registered 
(Ministry of Industry and Commerce, 2014). Official figures show that small firms (1-
19 employees) account for 99 percent of the total registered enterprises. These small 
enterprises remain informal and struggle to grow into medium-sized and large 
companies with subtantial employment opportunities for Lao citizens. 
2.7 Financial Sector and Business Financing in Laos 
  Lao government has adopted periodic strategies for the development of  
financial system after commencing economic reform in 1986. The primary focus of 
the strategies is to create favourable conditions for commercial banks and non-bank 
financial institutions to mobilise and allocate efficient resources through the use of 
varied-financial products and services with modern technology. In line with the 
financial demands, the periodic reforms are also set and implemented. Commercial 
banks, Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFI), and equity market have been 
established and regulated to stimulate economic expansion throughout the country. 
This section summarises banking system, NBFI, and equity market in conjunction with 
their financing services. 
  
  
39 
2.7.1 Banking Sector 
  Laos is considered as a bank-based economy. Its banking system consists of 
the Central Bank (known as the Bank of Lao PDR), state-owned banks, private banks, 
joint-stock banks, branches of foreign banks, and non-bank financial institutions 
(Keovongvichith, 2012). Commercial banks play a significant role in mobilising and 
allocating financial resources to local business enterprises. The number of commercial 
banks in Laos has rapidly increased over the past ten years because of the government 
policy to facilitate investment in the banking sector.  The government allows foreign 
investors to play a role in the banking business as joint ventures and branches. 
Nevertheless, the service activities of the foreign banks are restricted in the capital city 
of Laos, Vientiane. By September 2017, the banking system comprises of 41 
commercial banks with their head offices solely based in Vientiane. These banks can 
be characterised as policy-based banks, specialised banks, and general commercial 
banks. Among the banks, there are 7 private commercial banks, 4 state-owned 
commercial banks which two of them are specialised banks and policy-based banks, 3 
joint state-commercial banks, 9 subsidiary banks, and 18 foreign branches (Figure 2.7). 
At the end of 2014, the total assets of the commercial banks were estimated to be worth 
USD 6.8 billion, representing 98% of total assets in the financial sector. 
 The state-owned banks act as key providers of credit loans and banking 
services to local businesses in the competitive banking sector. The policy-based bank, 
Nayoby Bank, operates as a poverty reduction bank for defined areas in accordance 
with the government policy. Specialised banks, such as the Agricultural Promotion 
Bank, were established to facilitate finance for specific sectors and individual business 
areas in case of the general banks cannot fully supply monetary demands. In the 
meantime, the general banks deal with deposits and provide short-term and long-term 
financial supports for business firms as well as the supply of working capital to 
production activities of  private businesses. 
  The Lao banking sector is relatively in an early period of development and 
comparatively unsophisticated. The commercial banks can only provide basic 
financial services such as deposit-taking, lending, foreign currency exchange, 
payment, and clearing. Even though there are different types of commercial bank, the 
banking services of the specialised banks are recently similar to those of the general 
banks. Legally, most of the commercial banks in the system are required to maintain 
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reserve funds at a specified rate set by the BOL. In addition, the banks are obliged to 
offer commercial loans for the agricultural sector at least 15% of their total deposits.  
Figure 2.7 Structure of Lao banking system 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2017 
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 With the unavailability of the bond market for private enterprises, there are 
three possible options for business firms to finance their investment projects. The first 
one can be stock issuance through Lao Securities Exchange (LSX) which is only a 
single stock market in the country. This method has an advantage in providing a 
consistent and considerable amount of capital for the firm development in the long-
term plan but it is limited for public listed companies in the LSX. The second possible 
way is to finance their business operations by taking a loan from the commercial banks 
or other non-bank financial institutions, which are accessible for all private companies. 
Although credit from the commercial banks is aimed to raise liquidity of businesses 
for both short and medium term, the cost of borrowing from the banks is relatively 
higher compared to the equity market. In response to interest rate policy of the Bank 
of Lao PDR, the average annual lending rate of Lao Kip had been cut significantly 
from 17.65% in 2008 to 10.94% in 2015 but slightly fluctuated from 2011 to 2014 
(Figure 2.8)1. In 2015, a new interest rate policy was introduced for the commercial 
banks by determining the spread on a weighted average between loan and deposit rates 
within the range of 4%. As a result, annual lending rates dropped averagely from 
12.99% in 2014 to 10.94% for Lao Kip. Unlike most other Southeast Asian countries, 
deposits and lending in foreign currencies, particularly Thai Baht and US Dollar, can 
be made with the commercial bank in Laos (National Assembly, 2008). Lending rates 
of US dollar and Thai Baht responded to the government policy in the same pattern 
with Lao Kip for the same period. The credit rate of US dollar decreased from 10% in 
2008 to 7.82% per annum in 2015. Whilst Thai Baht lending rate in Laos dropped from 
11.34% in 2008 to 9.12% in 2009 and then slightly swung over the period of 2010 to 
2014 between 9.04% to 9.56% per annum but dropped to 8.37% in 2015. During the 
same period, taking a loan from microfinance institutions as the last resort had 
significantly higher cost compared to the lending rates of the commercial banks.  
  
                                                 
1 Although the Lao Kip is an official national currency, Thai Baht and US dollar are two foreign 
currencies used domestically for transactions.  
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Figure 2.8 One-year-nominal lending rates of commercial banks  
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2017 
2.7.2 Non-Bank Financial Institutions 
  Non-Bank Financial Institutions (NBFIs) are under the supervision of the Bank 
of the Lao PDR (BOL). The NBFIs comprise of postal savings institution, deposit-
taking MicroFinance Institutions (MFIs), non-deposit taking microfinance institutions, 
saving and credit unions,  and pawnshops (Asian Development Bank, 2010). Most of 
these financial institutions are located in the capital city of Laos and the populous cities 
where better economic conditions and infrastructure exists (Bank of the Lao PDR, 
2014). As the end of 2016, there were 17 deposit-taking microfinance institutions, 59 
non-deposit-taking MFIs, 28 savings and credit unions, 31 leasing companies, and 32 
pawn shops. The total accumulated assets of the non-banks were LAK 2,646.53 billion, 
composing of LAK 204.46 billion and LAK 622.59 billion in total deposit and credit 
respectively (Bank of the Lao PDR, 2016). 
 The BOL promotes the MFIs countrywide so as to provide an access to 
diversified financial services for local businesses. Consequently, the microfinance 
industry has been growing over the last years. Although the total number of the MFIs 
reaches 123 in 2014, there is still a large unmet demand for financial services as the 
outreach of the existing providers is very limited and scattered because of low-density 
population. Moreover, the sector faces multiple challenges from their risky portfolio 
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investment, the low capacity and governance level of their staffs, and poor 
infrastructure which leads to higher transaction costs. Most of the MFIs are small in 
size and not profitable but rely on donor support. The lack of awareness of 
microfinance good practice combined with challenges in improving stakeholder 
cooperation and coordination are also hampering this sector development 
(Microfinance Association, 2017). However, the MFIs enjoyed their better operations 
in 2012  (Bank of the Lao PDR, 2014). Their savings and loans increased by 28% and 
LAK 10 billion over 2011’s. The figures imply that saving and borrowing with the 
MFIs became more attractive to members and clients.  
Figure 2.9 Financial status of microfinance institutions  
 
Source: The Bank of Lao PDR, 2014 
2.7.3 Insurance Companies 
  Apart from the commercial banks, insurance sector also plays an important role 
in driving and sustaining continuous growth of the cross-border and domestic 
businesses in Laos. Legally, not only domestic but also foreign investors are allowed 
to invest in the insurance business. The sector is regulated by the Ministry of Finance. 
Although there are ten insurance companies currently operating in Laos under the 
Insurance Law (National Assembly, 2011) this industry is uncompetitive. Only a few 
of the existing companies are really active due to the insurance sector is relatively 
small. The existing companies comprise of Allianz General Laos, Lao-Viet Insurance, 
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Lao, APA Insurance, Tokojaya Lao Assurance, Dhipaya Insurance Lao, and Lanexang 
Assurance. The companies provide both life and non-life insurance, such as health, 
life, car, property, and construction insurance. The demand for the insurance products 
remains relatively low for local residents but derives primarily from foreign residents 
and commercial enterprises throughout the country. Laos had one of the lowest overall 
per capita insurance premium in Asia (Lord, 2010) due to the insurance premium is 
relatively high compared to the local residents’ incomes.  
2.7.4 Stock Market 
  The development of equity market is another priority in the financial sector 
reform. Lao government implements various administrative changes to support the 
development of the financial sector, such as the law on commercial banks, the decree 
on foreign currency, securities law, and other regulations related to the roles and 
responsibilities of stockbrokers and market operations. Consequently, the stock market 
in Laos, called Lao Securities Exchange (LSX), had been established in collaboration 
with the Korea Exchange in 2010 and started its first trading in January 2011. This 
direct market aims to lower cost of capital for local business enterprises but also 
promotes sustainability, efficiency, fairness, transparency and growth of the LSX (Lao 
Securities Commission, 2015).  
Table 2.1 Listed companies in Lao Securities Exchange  
Ticker Company Industry 
IPO  
year 
IPO price 
(LAK) 
BCEL Banque Pour le 
Commerce Exterieur Lao 
Banking 2011 5,500 
EDL-gen EDL Generation Utilities 2011 4,300 
LWPC Lao World Public 
Company 
Property,  
Conglomerate 
2013 10,200 
PTL Petroleum Trading Lao Petroleum 2014 4,000 
SVN Souvanny Home Center Hardware 2015 3,100 
PCD Phousy Construction and 
Development  
Construction 2017 1,200 
Note: *Lao Kip is the currency of Laos. It is coded as LAK and the currency symbol is ₭.  
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  As of October 2017, six public companies from different industries have been 
listed in  the LSX (Table 2.1), comprising of  Banque Pour Le Commerce Exterieur 
Lao (BCEL), Electricite du Laos-Generation (EDL-Gen), Lao World Public Company 
(LWPC), Petroleum Trading Lao (PTL), Souvanny Home Center (SVN), and Phousy 
Construction and Development (PCD). 
 The BCEL and EDL-Gen were the first two listed companies in the Lao stock 
market. The initial public offerings of BCEL and EDL-Gen raised USD 140 million in 
combination in 2010. Trading shares in the LSX were substantially high during the 
first month of market establishment in comparison to a later stage (Figure 2.10). The 
average trading volume was higher than 400,000 shares per day (Songvilay L., 2011).  
In the first day of trading, the share price of EDL-Gen increased by 9.3% and BCEL 
surged by 45%. Over the four-year period after the establishment of the LSX, daily 
trading was dominated by the stocks of BCEL and EDL-Gen. EDL-Gen being the 
largest accounts for 78% of the market capitalisation and BCEL accounts for 12% of 
the market capitalisation during the first four years (Lao Securities Exchange, 2014). 
Nevertheless, the restrictions of capital flows and low domestic savings are the main 
concerns of low liquidity in the LSX. In 2015, the government projected to list more 
firms in the LSX up to 20 companies, and to establish a bond-trading platform in order 
to raise more funds for both public and private sectors but was partially able to meet 
the target number.  
Figure 2.10 Lao securities composite index and share prices  
 
Source: Lao Securities Exchange, 2017 
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  Since the opening of the LSX in 2010 until 2015, all listed companies have 
totally raised their capital of LAK 7,584 billion (Figure 2.11).  The total raised fund 
was over LAK 1,237 billion in every year, except in 2013. In 2015, the total amount 
of fund drawn from domestic and foreign investors had reached the recorded high of 
LAK 2,832 billion. Whilst market capitalisation of the LSX during the first month of 
trading accounts for 3.46% of GDP (Songvilay L., 2011). The market capitalisation 
increased from LAK 4,638 billion in 2011 to LAK 12,047 billion in 2015. 
Figure 2.11 Raised capital of listed companies from Lao Securities Exchange  
 
Source: Lao Securities Commission, 2017 
2.7.5 Creditor Protection 
  The Bank of Lao PDR (BOL) has introduced a number of measures to monitor 
credit market and to protect creditor and borrower in case of payment defaults. In 2010, 
the BOL has officially opened a credit information bureau with a modern system that 
provides credit information service to commercial banks and other non-bank financial 
institutions. The credit-information bureau system acts as a crucial tool to gather and 
distribute reliable credit information for the financial institutions in order to improve 
creditor and borrower protection and enhance the competition in the Lao credit market 
as well as to increase the accessibility of credit for businesses. The system is helpful 
for the financial institutions in evaluating their customers’ creditworthiness and 
minimising credit risks before releasing their loans. Law on bankruptcy is another legal 
tool aiming at solving an enterprise’s financial failure situation (National Assembly, 
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1994). The law is designed to protect the creditor’s interests and provides a process 
that enables the enterprise to sort out their financial affairs by providing a bankruptcy 
mechanism through which the firm’s creditors can be paid. The law also allows the 
borrower the right to request for mediation in order to preserve the business operation. 
2.8 Accounting Standard and Financial Reporting 
  The Lao PDR has its own accounting standards which apply to all types of 
businesses. The Ministry of Finance is only a public authority supervising and 
monitoring the business enterprises in maintaining accounting records and preparing 
financial reports. There has not yet been a comprehensive set of accounting standards. 
Lao Accounting Standards (LAS) is currently under the development of the Lao 
Institution of Certified Public Accountant (LICPA). The legal basis for business 
enterprises is the law on Enterprises Accounting issued on 17 July 2007 (No. 146/PO) 
for maintaining their economic transactions and preparing their financial reports. In 
addition, Lao business enterprises also apply Lao Accounting Manual (LAM) issued 
by the Ministry of Finance, as a set of instructions basing on an accrual basis of 
accounting to guide their financial records and reports for local taxation purpose. The 
standard set of instructions is partially consistent with internationally recognised 
standards or principles. On 13 July 2014, the new amended Accounting Law (No. 
47/NA) has become into force and replaced the former law. The new law prescribes 
accounting formalities for international enterprises. This law aims to reform the old 
LAS and is a part of legislative reform process before the establishment of the ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) in 2015. The newly amended law is aligned with 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) and International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). Since the adoption of the new accounting law, business enterprises 
in Laos are permitted to use IFRS in maintaining accounting records and preparing for 
the financial reports. Previously, many legal entities doing business internationally had 
to keep two sets of accounting records – one that conforms to the Lao Accounting 
Standards and another for the IFRS. 
  According to the Accounting Law (National Assembly, 2007)2, business 
enterprises must prepare accounting entries, books of accounts and financial 
                                                 
2 The Accounting Law which is a Presidential Decree issued in 2007 sets out principles, rules and 
measures of accounting for all private enterprises, state-owned enterprise, and not-for-profit bodies. 
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statements in the Lao language, dominated by Lao Kip. The financial statements are 
annually are required to submit to both the business registration’s office and taxation 
authority. Practically, except for banks and insurance companies, taxation offices 
under the Ministry of Finance are responsible for the financial reports from the 
enterprises. The basis of Lao accounting is that records must be accurate and 
reasonable. All types of companies, as well as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are 
required to report their financial statements. The standard financial reports are 
comprised of balance sheets, profit and loss statements, sources and uses of funds, tax 
returns, depreciation schedules for fixed assets, statement of changes in equity, cash 
flow statements, and explanatory notes of the accounting principles and methods used. 
The reporting period covers twelve months from 1st January to 31st December of the 
same calendar year. Business enterprises must prepare accounting records under 
double-entry bookkeeping. All recorded items must be evidenced by supporting 
documents which are obliged to retain for 10 years. Balances are recorded under 
historical cost. Assets must be revalued if the enterprise intends to decrease the scope 
of its business or to dissolve. The valuation basis must be consistent.  
2.9 Auditing and Accounting Professional 
  Both local and foreign-owned firms operating in Laos are required to engage 
in a financial audit of their financial health. Accounting standards and regulations in 
Laos differ from International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and the United 
States Generally Accepted Auditing Principles (USGAAP) in some extends. Public 
listed firms and private companies with registered capital at least LAK 100 million are 
legally required to have their financial accounts audited by an independent auditing 
firm (National Assembly, 2007). However, the requirement can be practically enforced 
due to the shortage of qualified certified public accountant (CPA) amongst local 
private-owned enterprises. For that reason, foreign companies and listed firms 
operating in the country prefer to have multinational auditing firms to perform their 
accounting audit. According to the regulation of Lao Securities Exchange, the external 
auditors must be approved by Ministry of Finance and legally licensed by Ministry of 
Industry and Commerce. They also need to be certified by the Lao Securities 
Commission (LSC) in order to provide their auditing service in the capital market.  
  Formal education of accountancy in local technical colleges and Universities 
is limited to fundamental bookkeeping and theoretical concepts of accounting, with 
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little or no practical application. The Lao Chamber of Professional Accountants and 
Auditors (LCPAA) is only a public body that provides a nine-month training course to 
develop accounting professionals as one of the requirements for registration to become 
a public or private auditor (ASEAN Federation of Accountants, 2011). The intensive 
course mainly aims for accountants to conduct their auditing in compliance with 
accounting law and regulations. Unfortunately, the training course has been ceased 
since 2011. Alternatively, multinational accounting and auditing companies send their 
staff to head offices or overseas branches for further training. 
2.10 Chapter Summary 
  This chapter has presented the overview of Laos, politics and government, 
macroeconomic condition, capital markets and portfolio investment, financial sectors 
and business financing in the country. It also described auditing standard, financial 
reporting, auditing and accounting professional. 
  Laos is a least developed country and one of the remaining communist states 
in the world. The country has a mixed market economy during the transitional period 
from a centrally-planned regime to a market-oriented mechanism. To stimulate 
economic growth, the Lao government introduced a number of strategic reforms 
designed to guide the economy towards capitalism. After liberalising the banking 
sector and the opening of a stock market, and financial resources were mobilised and 
allocated to private sectors for their investment projects throughout the country. Non-
financial institutions had also been expanding and contributed to the development of 
the country. As a result, the Lao economy had been gradually developed with annual 
rates of GDP among the fastest growing economies in East Asia over the last decade.  
  Private firms in Laos record and report their financial transactions basing on 
accounting manuals and instructions provided by the government due to the lack of a 
comprehensive set of accounting standards. Whilst public listed and foreign companies 
are allowed to maintain their accounting records and preparing financial reports in 
compliance with IFRS. Legally, private or listed firms are required to have their 
financial reports audited by an independent auditor but practically financial reports of 
the public listed firms were audited by multinational companies operating in Laos.   
  After providing an overview of the institutional setting, the next chapter will 
present theories of capital structure decision and the agency theory for the literature 
review in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3 THEORIES AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
  This chapter provides the theoretical principles and the literature reviews on  
capital structure decision, earnings management, and relationship between leverage 
and earninings management. It also present the agency theory in business, which will 
be used as a theoretical framework to describe financial leverage in relation to earnings 
management of Lao private enterprises in Chapter 5. In addition, the chapter explains 
the research gap of this study.   
 The principles of capital structure are widely used to explain capital structure 
decision of private and public firms in prior studies  discussed in this chapter. The 
principles consist of  two applicable theories of capital structure to the sample firms in 
this study, consisting of  POT and TOT. The sample firms are private and and not 
publicly-listed on Lao Securities Exchange. Therefore, the two theories are viewed as 
theoretical principles that can explain financing behaviour of Lao private enterprises. 
 The literature reviews in each section of this chapter are used as the 
fundamental supports for the formation of several hypotheses in Chapter 4. The 
hypothesises will be formulated in according to the research questions developed in 
Chapter 1, including the hypotheses on the determinants of capital structure, 
determinants of earnings management, and the relationship between financial leverage 
and earnings management of the sample firms.   
 The remained detail sections of this chapter are structured as follows. Section 
3.2 presents the theories used in this study. It includes the development of corporate 
finance theory in sub-section 3.2.1, the capital structure theories (the early capital 
structure theory, TOT, and POT) in sub-section 3.2.2, and the busisness’ agency theory 
in sub-section 3.2.3. Section 3.3 provides literature reviews on capital structure 
decision, earning management, and relationship between leverage and earnings 
amagement. Sub-section 3.3.1, dicussed firm’s specific factors and industry influences 
on capital structure decision. It also summarises the implications and empirical 
evidence on financing decision of firms in developed, develping countries as well as 
in developing countries with transitional economies. Sub-section 3.3.2 reviews on 
earnings management, including definitions of earnings management, motivations to 
  
51 
manage earnings, beneficial and harmful effects of earnings manipulations, methods 
of earnings management, empirical evidence on earnings management, determinant of 
earnings management, and the impact of leverage on earnings management. This sub-
section also provide a summary of empirical studies on earnings management. Sub-
section 3.3.3 presents the impact of financial leverage on earnings management. 
Section 3.4 provides research gap in the literature. Finally, section 3.5 summarises the 
main themes of this chapter. 
3.2 Theories 
3.2.1 Corporate Finance Theory 
  The theory of corporate finance has been developed for over a century. Jensen 
and Smith (1984) review about the development of the modern theory of corporate 
finance. They contend that corporate finance theory has been developed since the early 
period of the 20th century but was riddled and debated with logical inconsistencies.  
After the early 1950s, a large part of ad hoc theories has been systematically 
modernised. The three major areas of concerns in the modern corporate finance are 
capital budgeting, capital structure and dividend policy. The capital structure theory, 
as one of many hotly-debated issues, tries to explain the determinants of financial 
leverage or the factors that influence manager’s decisions on choices between debt and 
equity financing for a real investment project of a firm. 
3.2.2 Capital Structure Theories 
  Amongst competing theories, capital structure has no universally accepted 
definition in the prior literature, but has been variously measured according to its 
purpose of analysis. The theories have different implications for different measures of 
financial leverage that can produce different results (Lemma & Negash, 2013). 
Importantly, the general theory of capital structure is not in existence and several 
conditional theories are available (Harris & Raviv, 1991; S. C. Myers, 2001). Thus, 
important factors for an empirical study should be identified in various circumstances. 
Keeping in mind, this study applies existing capital structure theories in relation to 
financial data of private enterprises in Laos. The country has a unique economic 
environment, institutions, legal factors, politics, and cultures as examples that may 
influence on operating activities of the firms and can possibly impact the results 
predicted by the theories. 
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  Capital markets provide a variety of financial instruments to meet financial 
demands of business companies. Firms can alternatively raise their external funds by 
borrowing from commercial banks, issuing equity, or other securities such as from 
corporate bonds. There are several motivations for firms to issue the various types of 
financial securities that are available. The type of securities impacts on leverage level 
of firms. Management can consider several trade-offs when choosing the type of 
securities available to them for debt-equity optimization. Since the 1950s, the theories 
clarifying capital structure decisions have been based on Pecking-Order, Trade-Off, 
agency costs, asymmetric information, signalling, tax-shield, and market timing. The 
existing theories of capital structure have different implications of different measures 
that can produce different results but the central objective tries to explain the 
determinants of corporate financial leverage or choice between debt and equity 
financing for real investment. This part discusses only the fundamental concepts from 
the theories of capital structure that can possibly explain the capital structure of Lao 
private enterprises which are private companies. The theories comprise of the early 
capital structure theory, POT, and TOT. 
  Capital structure has long been a central issue of discussion for over five 
decades since the most important foundations of capital structure theory with the 
famous irrelevance principle developed by (Modigliani & Merton, 1958). Modigliani 
and Merton (1958) propose that the capital structure of a firm in a perfect capital 
market is autonomous from its value, but dependent on the expected cash flows to 
receive in the future from the firm’s operations. The market can discount the cash 
flows by using an appropriate rate from a perceived riskiness to value the firm. The 
restructuring of cash streams between debt and equity does not affect the value of the 
future cash flows. Unfortunately, no any capital market is perfect and choices between 
debt and equity obviously matter the firm’s value in reality.  
  Modigliani and Miller’s model is under very restricted assumptions including 
frictionless capital markets, firms issue only risk-free debt or risky equity, individuals 
can borrow and lend at a risk-free rate, there are no bankruptcy costs, taxes, 
information asymmetry and agency problems. In their model, investors increase the 
expected rate of return from equity as the firms add more debt to capital structure. 
Under these assumptions, investors identically value-levered and unlevered firms. The 
3.3.2.1 The Early Capital Structure Theory 
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value of a firm will be affected only if investors violate at least one of the assumptions.   
3.3.2.2 Trade-Off Theory 
  Modigliani and Miller (1963) later relax their own irrelevance principle by 
adding corporate tax to their original assumptions because the tax deductibility of 
interest expenses creates a tax-shield or tax savings.  All other thing being equal, if a 
firm obtains more debt to its capital structure, the tax-shield increases the value of the 
firm. Under the tax-shield or Trade-Off theory (TOT), firms are assumed to decide 
their financial leverage by comparing marginal benefits and the costs of external debts. 
The optimal capital structure in the TOT theory exists when a firm increases its debt 
to 100% or when the benefits and shortfalls of debt offset each other at an equilibrium. 
This does not imply that corporate tax is the only determinant of the optimal capital 
structure of a firm. The Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions were later relaxed and 
clarified to the ideal capital structure in the following studies.  
  If personal taxes are added into account, the gain from debt is reduced. And, if 
bankruptcy costs are significant, there is a possibility to obtain an optimal capital 
structure as the trade-off between the tax-shield from debt and the likelihood of 
incurring bankruptcy costs (Miller, 1977). The optimal debt ratio to equity is at the 
equilibrium as the debt amounts increased until the marginal benefit from debt is equal 
to the marginal expected loss from bankruptcy costs. The optimal level of capital 
structure is the point that firm has maximum value and minimum cost of capital. 
  DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) extend Miller's by investigating the impact of 
non-debt tax-shields rather than interest expenses on debt, for example, non-cash 
expenses such as depreciation or amortization and investment tax credits. They 
anticipated that firms will choose a leverage level that is adverse to the level of tax-
shield substitute such as depreciation. Besides, if more debt is added to capital 
structure, profitability will decrease or negative earnings will increase, this causes the 
interest tax shield to decline. They further showed that if there are positive bankruptcy 
costs, marginal benefit from interest tax shield is traded-off to the marginal cost of 
bankruptcy.  
  Applying the TOT to Lao private enterprises raises two questions. The first 
question is how to define an optimum capital structure for maximum enterprise’s profit 
(not firm’s value) and for a minimum cost of capital. This is not easy to measure in the 
Lao enterprises or it may be the primary goals of the enterprises’ owner or financial 
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managers. The second question is how the advantage of debt or tax-shield be accessed 
in the case of private enterprises in Laos where enterprise income tax is taxed as 
personal income, including those companies in the form of sole-trader enterprises, 
which are legally owned by one person. 
3.3.2.3 Pecking-Order Theory 
 The Pecking-Order theory (POT) is regarded an influential concept in 
determining financing choices. S. C. Myers (1984) and S. C. Myers and Majluf (1984) 
originate the POT by basing on asymmetric information between internal managers 
and outside investors.  According to the Pecking-Order perspective, firms have three 
alternative sources of available funding: retained earnings, debt, and equity. The firms 
prefer a lowest level of asymmetric information due to the cost of borrowing increases 
with lenders who receive insufficient information from borrowers. While retained 
earnings are subject to no adverse selection problem, debt has only a minor section 
problem, but equity has a serious selection problem. From the perspective of firm’s 
managers, retained earnings are considered as the best source of internal funds, while 
debt is a better deal than equity financing. For that reason, the retained earnings are 
the first priority of source of funds followed by an issuance of external debt where 
equity is taken as a last resort. Hence, new investment projects will be firstly financed 
by the internal retained earnings, if more funding is needed, the debt will be used as 
the first external source of funding. In case that firms with normal operation, equity 
financing will never be used because the supply of fund from debt already meets the 
firms’ demand. In the POT, an optimum level of capital structure is not well identified. 
3.2.3 Agency Theory 
  The agency theory is a branch of financial economics that explains the conflict 
of interests between related parties with different desires of interest in the same assets, 
for example, the conflict between shareholders and company’s manager. The main 
focus of the theory is on the agency relationship. Although, there are many 
predecessors such as Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Ross (1973)  who have 
discussed the agency theory to explain the agency problem emerging from the 
separation of shareholders’ ownership and manager’s control, but the credit for the 
development of the agency theory is given to  Jensen and Meckling (1976). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) define the agency relationship as “a contract under which one or 
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more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to 
the agent” (p. 308). The agency relationship is commonly referred as principal-agent 
relationship which depends on the assumption that when there is a separation of 
ownership and control, manager (the agent) may be driven by own self-interest and 
not have significant interest in the firm’s stock ownership that could be unfavourable 
to the economic welfare of the principle (s), unless restricted from doing so (Deegan, 
2006, p. 225). Such relationship may lead to the conflict of interest between the 
principle (s) and the agent as both may act in their own self-interest that may be 
unaligned. The result of the conflict is regarded as an agency problem.   
  In case of a public listed company, the general goal of the firm is to maximise 
the shareholders’ wealth, but managers attempt to act for their own self-interest. The 
managers may not make decisions in line with the goal but attempt to benefit 
themselves, for instance, in terms of higher salary or other perquisites at the 
shareholders’ expenses. This usually results in the potential conflict of interests arising 
from the separation of ownership and control, when the managers act on behalf of 
shareholders and the firm (Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Since 
managers engage in business activities on a daily basis, they know more than 
shareholders about the quality of the firm because they have more information than 
the investors. As a result, an information asymmetry exists between shareholders and 
managers, which leads to an agency conflict. Therefore, voluntary disclosure of the 
firms’ information in the form of periodic or annual reports on websites is used to 
mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and managers. Shareholders have 
to incur the costs of restructuring, monitoring (in case of financial audit), plus residual 
loss incurred as an indirect cost to ensure that managers act in line with the 
shareholders’ interest (Jensen, 2005; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The internal 
restructuring and monitoring costs, as well as the indirect costs, are regarded as agency 
costs arising from the agency problem. In the agency relationship, any other potential 
loss emerging from under-performing or managerial misconduct are considered to be 
direct agency cost (Deegan, 2006, p. 218). The agency conflict is not only between 
shareholders and managers, but also classified on the basis of conflict between 
shareholders through managers and debtholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The 
debtors may impose certain restrictions on the firm, which is known as an agency cost 
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of debt arising from the divergent of shareholders and managers’ interests (Deegan, 
2006, p. 86). 
3.3  Literature Review 
3.3.1 Capital Structure 
  The proportion of debt and equity in the financial structure of a firm is known 
as its capital structure. The capital structure can be affected by several factors, not only 
the firm’s specific characteristics but also the industries which it operates, institutional 
and macroeconomic environment (Antoniou, Guney, & Paudyal, 2006; De Jong, 
Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Lemma & Negash, 2013; López-Iturriaga & Rodriguez-Sanz, 
2008; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). In this section, only firm’s characteristics and industry 
influences are reviewed. The institutional and macroeconomic factors are excluded 
from this study. 
  This part discusses two main theoretical approaches of financing decisions, 
which comprise of the POT and TOT. The approaches are used to identify the capital 
structure’s determinants of private enterprises in Laos and formulate hypotheses 
related to firms’ specific characteristics and industry sectors. The two theories become 
applicable to predict financing decision of the enterprises because the sample firms for 
this investigation are not publicly listed companies and their financial information is 
not publicly available. Previous theoretical and empirical studies have shown that the 
specific characteristics of firm influence its capital structure components, such as size, 
tangibility, profitability, tax, non-debt tax shields, growth opportunities, and volatility 
(Frank & Goyal, 2009; Harris & Raviv, 1991; Lemma & Negash, 2013; Wald, 1999). 
Harris and Raviv (1991), for example, summarise a number of empirical studies related 
to public firms in the US developed economy. They contend that debt level increases 
with firm size, asset tangibility, investment opportunities and non-debt tax shields, but 
decreases with probability of bankruptcy, research and development expenditures, 
advertising expenditures, volatility, and uniqueness of the product. This study uses 
only firm size, tangibility, and profitability as proxies for the determinants of the 
capital structure (J. J. Chen, 2004; Huang, 2006; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; Marsh, 
1982; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). To test the POT and TOT, it is necessary to judge the 
connections between observable data with the theories. In the effort to empirically 
3.3.1.1 Capital Structure and Firm-Specific Determinants 
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verify the research objectives, the theories of capital structure are applied to Lao 
private enterprises in order to develop testable hypotheses that examine the 
determinants of capital structure from two different perspectives in terms of firm 
characteristics and industry sectors. Here, this study summarise the results of prior 
theoretical and empirical studies on the relationship between firm’s specific 
characteristics and leverage.  
• Leverage and Size 
  Firm size is commonly considered as a potential explanatory determinant of 
capital structure. Firm size is very closely related to the risk of bankruptcy. Large firms 
are more diversified and thus bear less risk in comparison to smaller firms. For that 
reason, large firms have a lower risk of default. Furthermore, large firms are more 
attractive to creditors due to their higher diversification and large amounts of requested 
funds when compared to those for smaller firms.  Large firms can also reduce 
transaction costs associated with long-term liability. As a consequence, lenders can 
issue long-term debt with a lower interest rate to the large firms. 
  The TOT predicts that large firms are more mature and tend to have more debt 
than small firms because large firms are more highly geared due to their higher 
diversification and stable cash flow. Thus, the large firms have a lower tendency to go 
bankrupt and also have lower transaction costs from long-term liabilities (Ang, Chua, 
& McConnell, 1982; Gruber & Warner, 1977). Generally, outside investors usually 
use size as a proxy for the information about the firm (Huang, 2006). Fama and Jensen 
(1983a) and Rajan and Zingales (1995) argue that large firms tend to provide more 
information to creditors than small firms. Marsh (1982) supports the TOT in his 
literature survey that large firms rely on long-term debts while small firms prefer short-
term debts. Large firms can benefit from taking advantage of economies of scale in 
issuing long-term debt, and also have greater bargaining power with lenders. 
Therefore, the cost of debt is negatively-related to the firm’s size. Similarly, Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) contend that firm size is an important factor of capital structure in G-
7 countries. In Japan and United States, firm size is positively correlated with leverage; 
as the standard deviation of size increases, the book value of leverage also increases. 
In the United Kingdom, large firms depend more on long-term liabilities, whereas 
small companies rely on short-term debts (Marsh, 1982). Accordingly, many prior 
studies including Harris and Raviv (1990), Wald (1999), Booth et al. (2001), and 
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Huang (2006) also support that leverage increases with the value of the company.  
  On the other hand, the POT of capital structure choices is usually assumed that 
firm size has an opposite direction to the level of leverage; large firms are better known 
and have a less asymmetric information problem. In addition, large firms are old and 
have an opportunity to retain their earnings (Lemma & Negash, 2013). Thus, large 
firms tend to raise more equity rather than debt and thus have lower leverage.  
  In summary, the TOT predicts that firm size has a positive relationship with 
debt, while the POT is assumed that firm size has an inverse relation with leverage. 
• Leverage and Tangibility 
  Tangible assets owned by a firm, such as property, plant and equipment, are 
easier for outsiders to evaluate their value than intangible assets, such as the value of 
goodwill from a company’s acquisition. The collateral value of assets acts as the main 
component of the firm. If the firm has a high fraction of tangible assets, then the assets 
are usually used as debt collateral to minimise lender’s risk. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) suggest that collateral protects creditors from the moral hazard emerging the 
conflicts between shareholders and the creditors. Hence, a high level of the tangibility 
is expected to associate with a high fraction of debt. Most of the empirical studies in 
this area have confirmed that tangibility affects financing decision of firms (J. J. Chen, 
2004; Drobetz, Gounopoulos, Merikas, & Schröder, 2013; Friend & Lang, 1988; 
Huang, 2006; Marsh, 1982; Rajan & Zingales, 1995).  
  On the other hand, the TOT contends that firms with high level of tangibility 
have lower costs of financial distress in case of bankruptcy. Further, outsiders can 
easily assess the value of tangible assets. This would lead to lower agency problem 
and information asymmetry. Thus, asset tangibility in the TOT is expected to have a 
positive relationship with debt capital as in case of shipping companies investigated 
by Drobetz et al. (2013). Rajan and Zingales (1995) and J. J. Chen (2004) also have 
the consensus finding that tangibility is positively related with long-term debt, and the 
long-term liability is expected to accumulate over time due to less severe information 
asymmetry. 
  Under the Pecking-Order perspective, firms use large amounts of tangible 
assets as a stable source of return on investments. These firms are more internally 
dependent and less likely to depend on external financing, as confirmed by Allen 
(1995), and Michaelas, Chittenden, and Poutziouris (1999). In case of firms with less 
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level of tangible assets to be used as collateral, the firms face higher costs of 
information. Thus, the firms have to raise more equity instead of debts, as this scenario 
has been proven by V. A. Dang (2013), reporting that tangible asset is negatively 
related to leverage. 
  In summary, the POT recognises that lower tangibility has a negative 
relationship with leverage, while the TOT proposes that high holding of tangibility has 
a positive relationship with financial leverage. 
• Leverage and Profitability 
  Although a number of theoretical and empirical studies has been done since 
Modigliani and Merton (1958), but there is no consistent relationship between 
profitability and leverage of firms in emerging and developed economies (Booth et al., 
2001; Chakraborty, 2010; Chang, 1999; Huang, 2006; Kayhan & Titman, 2007; 
Michaelas et al., 1999; Yazdanfar & Öhman, 2015). 
  The POT (S. C. Myers, 1984; S. C. Myers & Majluf, 1984) assumes that 
retained profit is regarded as the primary source of internal fund and then followed by 
debt and new equity respectively if necessary. Thus, profitable firms tend to have less 
financial leverage from external debt. The retained earnings are firstly used to finance 
the new project because to reduce the cost of the debt. External lenders often require 
higher interest rate from borrowers to compensate for the risks arising from 
information asymmetry between the firms’ managers and lenders. For that reason, 
managers prefer internal sources of funds rather than external debts. Even if profitable 
firms have a higher potential to access to external debts than less profitable firms, they 
still meet their financial demands by avoiding higher cost for external liabilities. 
According to the POT, if investments and dividends are fixed, then more profitable 
firms will become less levered over time.  Empirically, this prediction is confirmed by 
Chang (1992) and Michaelas et al. (1999), suggesting that leverage is negative related 
to profitability. Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Booth et al. (2001) also support the 
idea that leverage has a negative relationship with profitability because retained profits 
are passively accumulated over years. However, an optimal level between business 
insiders and outside investors can be interpreted as a proper combination of debt and 
equity, and more profitable firms tend to have lower leverage (Chang, 1999). Likewise, 
this is also confirmed by Huang (2006) in the case of transitional economy of China 
that leverage decreases with profitability. 
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  On the contrary, the TOT predicts a positive relation between leverage and 
profitability because profitable firms have strong incentive to obtain more debt in order 
to benefit from tax-shield  (Modigliani & Miller, 1963). Chakraborty (2010) confirms 
the Trade-Off perspective with the same evidence. Accordingly, debt is regarded as a 
discipline device to ensure that the firms’ managers will pay out profit to shareholders 
rather built empires; firms with high profitability or free cash flow, high leverage can 
retain management discretion (Jensen, 1986).  
  In summary, the POT predicts a negative relationship between profit and debt, 
and the TOT predicts a positive correlation amongst the two factors. 
• Summary of Expected Signs from the Theoretical Predictions 
Table 3.1 Expected signs from the theoretical predictions 
  
 A larger number of prior empirical studies has attempted to test the explanatory 
Determinant Theory 
Predicted 
sign 
Sample empirical evidence 
Firm size Pecking-Order  - Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999), 
and Lemma and Negash (2013) 
Trade-Off + Harris and Raviv (1990), Wald 
(1999), Booth et al. (2001), Huang 
(2006), Rajan and Zingales (1995), 
and Marsh (1982) 
Tangibility Pecking-Order - Allen (1995), Michaelas et al. 
(1999), and V. A. Dang (2013) 
Trade-Off + Drobetz et al. (2013), Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) and J. J. Chen 
(2004) 
Profitability Pecking-Order - Chang (1992), Michaelas et al. 
(1999), Kayhan and Titman (2007), 
Booth et al. (2001), and Huang 
(2006) 
Trade-Off + Jensen (1986), Chakraborty (2010), 
and Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
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determinants of capital structure models on corporate finance behaviour in developed 
and developing countries. The main determinants, for example, include size, 
tangibility, profitability, growth opportunity, cost of financial distress, and tax-shields 
effects. The following table (Table 3.1) summarises the expected signs between capital 
structure (debt-equity ratio) and its determinants from the predictions of the POT and 
TOT.  The determinants in the table are only three factors of firm-level to be 
statistically tested in the empirical model of this study. 
3.3.1.2 Capital Structure and Industry Influence 
  Prior empirical studies on capital structure choices commonly use industry 
dummies to test the effect of different industries on financial leverage. Some of the 
formal tests have proven that leverage ratios vary significantly across industries 
(Hovakimian, Opler, & Titman, 2001; Lemmon, Roberts, & Zender, 2008; MacKay & 
Phillips, 2005). Different debt ratios can be interpreted in several possible meanings. 
One interpretation is that managers can use a leverage median of an industry as a 
benchmark of their firms’ capital structure. Thus, the median is often used as a proxy 
for target debt ratio (Faccio & Masulis, 2005; Flannery & Rangan, 2006; Hovakimian 
et al., 2001). Hovakimian et al. (2001) provide support evidence that firms actively 
adjust their debt-equity ratios towards the industry leverage median over time. Another 
possible interpretation is that industry effects reflect a set of correlated, but otherwise 
omitted, factors (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Firms in an industry usually face common 
forces that affect their financing decision. The industry effect also reflects product 
market interactions or competition nature (Brander & Lewis, 1986; Chevalier, 1995). 
In addition, the effect could also reflect industry heterogeneity in business risk, firm’s 
asset types, regulation or technology. Therefore, industry effects do not have a unique 
interpretation. 
  The TOT of industry influence predicts that firms restructure their debts and 
equities to seek an optimum level of capital structure, and these optimum debt-equity 
ratios vary across industries. Suto (2003) confirms the TOT that each industry has 
different capital structure due to levels of liquidity and fixed investments are diverse. 
Empirically, specific characteristics of a given industry may have more influence than 
other industries (Frank & Goyal, 2009). Consistently, Showalter (1999) reports that 
unobservable characteristics of a particular industry sector may influence the levels of 
leverage within that sector. There are a number of consensus-based sources of 
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evidence from previous studies that financial leverage of an industry may be different 
from other industries (Delcoure, 2007; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Suto, 2003). For 
example, manufacturing, telecommunication and heavy industry are likely to depend 
more on long-term liabilities due to their nature of the investment. On the contrary, the 
service sector is not substantially relying on tangible assets to be used as collateral 
when applying for debts, so this industry is less likely to have low leverage. Titman 
and Wessels (1988) support the idea that industry classification is significantly 
associated with leverage, particularly long-term debts.  
3.3.1.3 Summary of the Empirical Studies on Capital Structure Decision 
 Appendix 5, Appendix 6, and Appendix 7 summarise the implications and 
empirical evidence of various capital structure theories on the relationship between 
each of the above determinants and the level of financial leverage of firms in 
developed, developing and transitional economies. The theoretical and empirical 
foundations in the prior studies on determinants of capital structure will help to identify 
a research gap and will be helpful in developing the research hypotheses on financing 
decision of this study. 
3.3.2 Earnings Management 
  The causes and consequences of earnings management have been active 
research areas of financial accounting since the early 1950s (Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & 
Sloan, 2012; Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). Prior empirical studies in recent years 
have witnessed a broad range of earnings management behaviour, including 
motivations, techniques, and economic consequences (Dechow et al., 2012).  This part 
of the thesis reviews aspects of earnings management: definitions of earnings 
management, motivations to manage earnings, beneficial and harmful consequences, 
methods of detecting earnings management as well as major findings in earnings 
management.  
3.3.2.1 Motivations to Manage Earnings 
  There is a large number of archival research that examines the motivations of 
managers to manage earnings (e.g., Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014; Coppens & Peek, 
2005; Hepworth, 1953; Lin et al., 2012; Marques et al., 2011; Ronen & Sadan, 1981; 
Stockmans, Lybaert, & Voordeckers, 2010; Trueman & Titman, 1988; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1978). Earnings management in firms has several different motivations, 
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such as income smoothing, bonus, equity issuing, taxation burden, debt covenant, and 
socio-emotional wealth, and political incentives. The followings factors are only some 
incentives for managers to engage in earnings management. 
• Smoothing Income 
  Smoothing income is an example of the motive to use earnings management 
(Ronen & Sadan, 1981). Hepworth (1953) also shows that a smooth income stream 
allows creditors and owners of the firm to feel more secure about the management 
performance. The objective of smoothing is to reduce the variability of the firm’s 
earnings (Moses, 1987). By shifting income across time periods, firms can reduce the 
unpredictability of reported earnings thus appearing less risky and may have the 
capacity to obtain more debt with a lower cost of capital (Trueman & Titman, 1988). 
Firms can also be motivated to smooth earnings prior to security issues to lower the 
cost of capital and possibly in so doing, increase the firm’s value. Trueman and Titman 
(1988) contend that firms have an incentive to smooth earnings prior to debt issues. 
Smoothing income leads management to reduce the fluctuation of reported earnings 
and. When the variance of reported earnings is reduced, debt holders lower their 
assessment of the variance of the true economic earnings for the firm. The probability 
of a firm for bankruptcy is directly related to this variance. A lower probability of 
bankruptcy leads to a potentially higher selling price for the firm’s debt. Therefore, 
firms that manage earnings to present a smooth income stream might be able to lower 
the cost of newly issued debt and increase the value of the firm. The incentive to 
smooth earnings is not limited to firms issuing debt. 
• Bonus 
  Healy (1985) suggests that short-term bonus schemes create incentives for 
managers to use discretionary accruals and accounting procedures to maximise their 
bonus awards. Healy infers that the upper and lower threshold for bonus payments 
basing on the bonus plan in the proxy statements. Healy uses total accruals as a proxy 
for discretionary accruals. Healy reports that accrual policies of the managers are related 
to the income reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, meaning that when managers 
plan to have no bonus potential, they are more likely to make income-decreasing accruals. 
On the contrary, managers are more likely to have income-increasing accruals when those 
accruals contribute to higher current year bonuses. 
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• Equity Issuing 
  Firms issuing equity also have the incentive to smooth earnings (Dye, 1988). 
The purchase price of equity is influenced by previous earnings announcements. 
Investors will look at the variance of reported earnings to determine the economic risk 
of the firm. Firms with a lower variance in reported earnings will have a lower 
perceived risk by the market, which leads to a higher price for the equity. Another type 
of earnings management that can increase the market price of equity is to increase the 
mean level of earnings prior to an equity issue. Firms can adjust the mean level of 
earnings prior to equity issuing through the use of accounting accruals. By inflating 
the level of earnings through accruals adjustments, the firms can lead investors to 
believe that inflated reported income is representative of the true level of earnings for 
the firms. Purchasers of the new equity using the inflated level of earnings will pay at 
the over value for the new shares. Overpaying for the new equity causes a wealth 
transfer from the investors to the sellers. This is supported by Doukas, McKnight, and 
Pantzalis (2005) that firms manage their reported earnings upward before issuing new 
equity in order to obtain financing easily.  
• Taxation Burdens 
  Taxation burden is another motive of earnings management. Prior studies 
found significant evidence that taxation can motive managers to engage in earnings 
manipulation. In Belgium, business groups exercise their earnings in response to tax 
incentives because the holding companies have more opportunities and tools than 
those of independent firms (Beuselinck & Deloof, 2014). Precisely, discretionary 
accruals of the business groups are more relying on marginal tax than a stand-alone 
company. In line with the holding companies in Belgium, Lin et al. (2012) find that 
earnings management is significantly induced by the marginal tax rate in the 
transitional economy of China. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 33% to 
25% influences short and long-term behaviour of Chinese listed companies. 
Accordingly, Marques et al. (2011) contend that Portuguese private firms with higher 
income tax rates decrease their profit to almost zero and are more likely to manipulate 
their earnings than firms with lower income tax rates. Conversely, Coppens and Peek 
(2005) contend that taxation of some European private firms is not a motive to the use 
of earnings management but tax regulations strongly influence financial reporting. 
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• Debt Covenants 
  Creditors often place some restrictions over debt covenants to protect their 
interests. This results in limiting the management’s ability to benefit shareholders at 
the expense of creditors. The restrictions would include interest coverage, dividend 
payouts, and debt-equity ratios. The restrictions on dividend payouts can be easily 
complied with since firms can simply cut back the dividend payouts when necessary. 
As such, there is some existing evidence of earnings management to comply with the 
restrictions of dividend payouts (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Skinner, 1996; Healy & 
Palepu, 1990). However, some other types of debt covenant are more difficult to 
violate. Heflin, Kwon, and Wild (2002) contend that managers are motivated to 
optimistically use of discretions in accounting choices to relax constraints on 
contractual obligations. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) find significant evidence of 
earnings management upward in the periods just prior to violating the debt covenants. 
• Socio-Emotional Wealth 
  Publicly listed family firms behave differently from non-family firms. 
Prencipe, Markarian, and Pozza (2008) provide empirical evidence on the motivations 
for earnings management in publicly listed family firms, highlighting the differences 
from public non-family firms. They find that family firms are less sensitive to income-
smoothing motivations than are non-family firms, while firms are similarly motivated 
to manage earnings for debt covenant and leverage-related reasons. For private family 
firms, Stockmans et al. (2010) suggest that socio-emotional wealth may play a role as 
a motive for upward earnings management when firm encounters poor performance. 
Under this circumstance, first-generation and founder-led private family firms appear 
to have greater incentive to engage in upward earnings management due to the 
preservation of their socio-emotional wealth. 
• Political Incentives 
  Political factors for earnings management can also motivate managers to 
reduce costs to comply with regulations in order to gain benefits derived from 
complying with the regulations (Healy & Wahlen, 1999). Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978) develop a “political cost hypothesis” basically stating that firms have a strong 
incentive to manage earnings downward to avoid the cost of government agencies’ 
intervention. Jones (1991) finds that firms manage earnings downward to reduce the 
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impact of import relief investigations. In New Zealand, Navissi, Bowman, and 
Emanuel (1999) also provide evidence that managers of manufacturing firms 
manipulate their earnings to reduce the impact from two sets of price regulations issued 
in 1971 and 1972.  
3.3.2.2 The Beneficial and Harmful Effect of Earnings Management 
  Earnings management typically relates to alternative accounting procedures to 
deter reported earnings for the purposes of firms’ managers or stakeholders. Some 
information in financial reports may reflect or underestimate the true financial 
performance and future prospects of firms. Users of the report may have the possibility 
to get the benefit or make a wrong decision. For that reason, earnings management can 
be beneficial or harmful to users and it is crucial to ensure that the reported figures are 
the true financial information of firms.  
  Benefits from earnings management may be in existence for some reasons. 
Managers may exercise alternative discretion over earnings to disseminate their 
financial information for the benefit of both shareholders and public users to enhance 
share value (Healy & Palepu, 1993). Accordingly, Subramanyam (1996) empirically 
supported that managers exercise their discretions to enhance the earnings ability to 
reflect fundamental value. Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1996) also contend that 
managers manipulate their earnings because firms are more attractive to external 
capital at low cost.  
  On the harmful consequence, Marques et al. (2011) find that Portuguese private 
firms with higher tax rate gain benefit from lower profit tax after using earnings 
decrease to nearly zero. Stockmans et al. (2010) suggest that the founder and the first 
generation of private family firms exercise their earnings to preserve their socio-
emotional riches. By contrast, several studies discover the incentives of firms’ 
managers to manipulate earnings in relation to their compensation contracts. Healy 
(1985) finds evidence that executive managers use bonus schemes as incentives to 
select accounting procedures and accruals to increase their compensation awards. 
Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan (1995) also suggest similar evidence that job security 
of top management is another motive to manipulate earnings.  
  Thus, earnings management is regarded as a financial reporting phenomenon 
in association with managers’ intentions that can be either harmful or beneficial to 
users. 
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3.3.2.3 The 3 Methods of Detecting Earnings Management 
  There are a substantial number of studies that identify various techniques or 
methods used to manipulate earnings (Beaver, McNichols, & Nelson, 2003; 
Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991). Earnings management can be 
detected by three different methods through the use of discretionary accruals, specific 
accruals, and income distribution. Each of the methods has its own advantages and 
disadvantages as follows.  
• Discretionary Accruals 
  The first method is the use of discretionary accruals models, initially created 
by Jones (1991), which separate total accruals into discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals. This method uses discretionary accruals to proxy for earnings 
management and used as a synonym for earnings. The advantage of the discretionary 
accruals models is that magnitude of earnings management in almost any scenarios 
can be estimated easily. However, the discretionary accruals models have no 
theoretical background and are criticised in producing biased estimates.   
• Specific Accruals 
  The second method is the use of specific accruals to detect earnings 
management. For example, Beaver et al. (2003) study earnings management in relation 
to discretionary loss reserves. The advantage of the model in their study is that 
researchers can better identify key factors influencing the accruals.  The disadvantage 
is that it is only suitable for specific industries and requires researchers with a good 
institutional knowledge.  
• Income Distribution 
  The third method is the use of distribution in earnings management  
(Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Kasipillai & Mahenthiran, 2013). The advantage of this 
method is the criticised estimation of discretionary accruals can be avoided and the 
disadvantage of the model is unable to identify the magnitude of earnings 
management.  
3.3.2.4 Empirical Evidence of Earnings Management 
  Previous research has shown that earnings management is a common practice 
of all firms. Managers of public listed firms inflate earnings through accruals 
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manipulation prior to seasoned equity offerings (Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998b), 
stock-financed acquisitions (Erickson & Wang, 1999), and initial public offers (Teoh, 
Welch, & Wong, 1998a). Earnings are managed to meet analysts' forecasts 
(Burgstahler & Eames, 2006). Earnings management is used to prevent falling short 
of management earnings’ forecasts (Kasznik, 1999).  
  Jones (1991) documents that import relief regulations provide an incentive for 
firms’ managers to alter their earnings to increase the possibility of obtaining import 
relief or relief granted amounts. In the investigation of cable television industry, Key 
(1997) find that firms in the industry tend to reduce net income during congressional 
hearings to mitigate the effects of political scrutiny and potential industry reregulation. 
Cahan (1992) studies the effect of monopoly-related anti-trust investigations on 
discretionary accruals. He reports with evidence that firms vulnerable to anti-trust 
violations reported income-decreasing accruals during the years under investigation. 
  Debt covenants are often considered as an incentive to alter earnings 
management because lenders use accounting information to assess and monitor their 
debtors. Sweeney (1994) finds that managers of firms with high potential in debt 
default respond their lenders with a significant increase of income and impose the 
default costs to the lenders. Consistent evidence is also reported by DeFond and 
Jiambalvo (1994) to support the debt covenant violation by using earnings 
management. Collectively these studies of public companies show that earnings 
management is common behaviour around a variety of financing and informational 
events.  
  Earnings management is used beyond accruals and adjustable components to 
meet predetermined income. Phillips, Pincus, and Rego (2003) show that deferred tax-
expense is a useful tool to manage earnings for firms in the US to avoid a reduction in 
earnings. Accordingly, Kasipillai and Mahenthiran (2013) find that Malaysian public 
listed companies, and use not only the accruals of revenue and expenses but also 
valuation adjustment components of deferred tax liabilities to avoid earnings decline. 
Chung, Firth, and Kim (2005) argue that low-growth companies with high free cash 
flow manage their discretionary accruals upward to offset negative or low earnings 
from their accompany projects that inevitably generate negative net present values. 
  Stockmans et al. (2010) examine the preserving of socio-emotional wealth as 
a motive for earnings management in specific types of private family firms by 
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investigating at the generational stage, the management team, and the CEO position. 
Their results suggest that socio-emotional wealth may play a role as a motive for 
upward earnings management when firm performance is poor. Under this condition, 
first-generation and founder-led private family firms seem to have greater incentive to 
engage in upward earnings management because of the preservation of their socio-
emotional wealth.  
  In comparison between public and private firms, Burgstahler et al. (2006) find 
that earnings management is more employed in private companies. Both European 
public and private firms exercise more earnings in countries where legal enforcement 
is weak. They also report that those private and public firms react differentially to 
different tax and accounting rules. Accordingly, Abdolmohammadi, Kvaal, and Langli 
(2010) compare earnings management priorities of private family and private non-
family firms. They find that private family firms are likely to manage earnings 
downward than private non-family firms. They also report that CEOs representing 
controlling families promote earnings management, and independent board members 
somewhat mitigate it. By contrast, Beatty and Harris (1999) report the differences in 
their comparison of public and private banks on realizations of securities gains and 
losses. They find that public banks consistently use more earnings management than 
private banks, and that the portion of securities gains and losses resulting from earnings 
management in the current period has a positive relation with next period’s earnings 
before securities gains and losses.  
  However, Jiambalvo (1996) discusses the constraints on earnings management 
and lists six aspects: auditing, internal controls, governance structure, probability 
manipulation, costs imposed after revealed manipulation, and prior decisions. Klein 
(2002) shows evidence that the characteristics of the board of directors and the auditing 
committee are related to earnings management. Especially, large increases in abnormal 
accruals are accompanied by a small percentage of external directors in the board or 
audit committee. Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam (1998) also present 
evidence that firms with higher audit quality or big-6 auditors have lower earnings 
management. Non-Big Six auditors report discretionary accruals higher than the 
discretionary accruals reported by firms of Big Six auditors. They also indicate that 
lower audit quality is associated with higher earnings changes. Rangan (1998) suggests 
that auditors may have a constraint effect on earnings management due to quarterly 
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reports has an obvious earnings management than annual reports. Barton and Simko 
(2002) find that the previous and accumulated earnings management in balance sheets 
has limited the managers’ impact on future earnings management. K. W. Lee, Lev, and 
Yeo (2007) suggest that managers of leveraged firms face difficulty to alter their 
earnings due to lenders try to control and monitor their management over time. 
3.3.2.5 Determinant of Earnings Management 
  A number of growing research has determined the relationship between 
determinant and earnings management policy. Many of the prior studies use firm size 
as a proxy for information asymmetry in the market (Becker et al., 1998; Koh, 2003; 
Lobo & Zhou, 2001; Michelson, Jordan‐Wagner, & Wootton, 1995; Moses, 1987; 
Siregar & Utama, 2008). Firm size is a determinant that could influence a firm’s 
tendency to engage in earnings management because smaller firms are likely to 
manage earnings to avoid reporting losses and able to retain their private information 
more successfully than large firms (B. B. Lee & Choi, 2002). Relatedly, information 
on large firms is more publicly available and can be obtained at a lower cost in 
comparison to small firms’(Bhattacharya, 2001). But, Moses (1987) and Michelson et 
al. (1995) demonstrate a consensus evidence that large firms have a greater incentive 
to smooth earnings than small firms. However, the existing literature has predicted a 
mixed relationship between size and earnings management.  
  On the one hand, the size of the firm may have a negative influence on earnings 
management activities for some reasons. First, large firms are more likely to have more 
sophisticated and effective internal control systems by comparison with smaller firms, 
thereby reducing the likelihood for managers to manipulate their earnings (Beasley et 
al., 2000). Second, large firms have more advantages over smaller firms in term of 
their being larger budgets available for better audit services in comparison to smaller 
firms (Becker et al., 1998). Third, as large firms are likely to be under the closer 
scrutiny by a large number of investors and analysts, which potentially reduce the 
opportunities of managers to exercise their accounting discretion (Koh, 2003; Lobo & 
Zhou, 2001). Forth, large firms face stricter regulatory requirements which discourage 
them to manipulate their earnings and decrease information asymmetry (B. B. Lee & 
Choi, 2002). 
  On the other hand, some prior studies have reported that firm size is positively 
associated with earnings management for following possible reasons. First, due to high 
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expectations from analysts and creditors, this pressure acts as an incentive for larger 
firms to adopt more aggressive accounting policies (Barton & Simko, 2002; 
Richardson, 2000). Second, larger firms have a wide range of accounting treatments 
to manoeuvre their accounting numbers (Subramanyam & Wild, 2009).  Third, 
auditors are more likely to waive an attempt of earnings management practiced by 
larger firms due their larger clients having greater bargaining power in comparison to 
smaller firms (Nelson et al., 2002).  
3.3.2.6 Summary of the Empirical Studies on Earnings Management 
 Appendix 8 summarises the empirical research on earnings management 
discussed above. The empirical foundations of the prior studies will help to identify a 
research gap on earnings management and will be helpful in developing the hypotheses 
of this study. 
3.3.3 The Relationship between Leverage and Earnings Management 
  Debt generally acts as a motive for a firm’s manager to employ earnings 
management. Much of prior empirical work has highlighted two views of the 
relationship between leverage and earnings management by using discretionary 
accruals because of firms’ closeness to restrictive covenants of debt.  
  On the one hand, some of the previous studies generally find that leverage is 
positively associated with income-increasing discretionary accruals (An, Li, & Yu, 
2016; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Rodríguez-
Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010; Sweeney, 1994). DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) examine 
abnormal accruals of firms known to have debt covenant violation by using both time 
series and cross-sectional models. They find that debt contracts have an influence on 
earnings management. Precisely, debt has a positive relationship with earnings upward 
because firms try to avoid the possibility of debt covenant violations and to improve 
their bargaining power to access to more loans during the time of debt negotiations. 
Othman and Zeghal (2006) find the same evidence for firms in France but not for firms 
in Canada. Klein (2002) and Sweeney (1994) also show positive relationships between 
debt and income-increasing earnings management with the same reason to ensure 
satisfaction in debt covenants. Accordingly, An et al. (2016) report in their cross-
country analysis that firms with high financial leverage are associated with high 
earnings management activities. Similarly, Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen (2010) 
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show a support of the positive relationship that marginal increases in debt level 
motivate managers to manipulate earnings. 
  On the other hand, some other works have shown a negative relationship 
between leverage and income-increasing accruals (Jelinek, 2007; Zhong, Gribbin, & 
Zheng, 2007). Jelinek (2007) documents that increased leverages are linked to a 
reduction in earnings management. Jensen (1986) suggest that the increase in debt 
level reduces the opportunistic earnings management for two reasons: (1) due to debt 
required repayment to creditor at a later date, this leads to lower cash flow available to 
management; (2) when firm acquires more debt, lenders put more restrictions on the 
firm’ spending.   Similarly, Zhong et al. (2007) argue that managers of leveraged firms 
may face control from outside debt-holders that make it difficult for them to engage in 
earnings management. They also find that debt is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals of firms with declining predetermined earnings. 
  Most empirical studies on earnings management in relation to leverage have 
conducted on listed firms, partially those firms in developing and developed countries. 
There is a limited number of studies on private firms in the least-developed countries.  
Private firms are more closely held and monitored by owners than listed companies. 
Owners are often managers or board members. Their lenders have direct access to 
inside information and an influence on decision making of the firms.  In relation to 
public firms, private companies depend less on statutory of financial statements for 
information, thus they have fewer constraints on earnings management. For instance, 
Abdolmohammadi et al. (2010) find that private family firms with high debts make 
more income-increasing accounting choices than private non-family firms with high 
debts. 
3.4 Research Gap in the Literature 
  From the review of prior empirical studies on capital structure decision and 
earnings management activities, this study can identify two main reasons underlining 
the research gap as follows.  
  Firstly, it is found that most of the previous studies on financing decision and 
earnings management are limited to private and public firms from developed and  
developing countries during transitional periods but not firms, particularly private 
companies, from least developed countries with transitional economies.  For example, 
the prior research on financing decisions of firms from developed and developing 
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countries are: Marsh (1982), Michaelas et al. (1999) and V. A. Dang (2013) on the 
UK; Antoniou et al. (2006) on France, Germany and the UK; Drobetz et al. (2013) on 
G7 countries; Friend and Lang (1988) and Frank and Goyal (2009) on the US; 
Chakraborty (2010) on India; Wald (1999) on France, Germany, UK, Japan and US;  
Suto (2003) on Malaysia; Huang (2006) and J. J. Chen (2004) on China; Delcoure 
(2007) on Czech Republic, Poland, Russia and Slovakia; and Nguyen and 
Ramachandran (2006) on Vietnam. The examples of the existing literature on earnings 
management of firms in developed and developing countries include: Kasipillai and 
Mahenthiran (2013) on Malaysia; Burgstahler et al. (2006) on EU countries; Klein 
(2002), Becker et al. (1998), Burgstahler and Eames (2006), and Zhong et al. (2007) 
on the US; Koh (2003) on Australia; An et al. (2016) on countries worldwide; Othman 
and Zeghal (2006) on Canada and France; and Rodríguez-Pérez and van Hemmen 
(2010) on Spain. 
  Secondly, institutional factors across countries have some differences and can 
differently affect corporate financing decision and earnings management of firms. A 
number of prior studies have confirmed the influence of institutional and regulatory 
factors on capital structure decision (Antoniou et al., 2006; Booth et al., 2001; De Jong 
et al., 2008; Lemma & Negash, 2013; Li et al., 2009; López-Iturriaga & Rodriguez-
Sanz, 2008; Nguyen & Ramachandran, 2006) and on earnings management 
(DeAngelo et al., 1996; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Jones, 
1991; Navissi et al., 1999; Watts & Zimmerman, 1978). In case of Laos, financial 
institutions and regulatory are in the early stages of development during the transitional 
period. The level of development of financial institutions and regulatory are important 
factors that can affect capital structure decision and earnings management of Lao 
enterprises. Laws and regulations exist while their enforcement in the market are not 
effective as practiced in the developed and developing world.  
3.5 Chapter Summary 
 This chapter provided a theoretical background of capital structure decision, 
including the early capital structure theory, TOT, and POT. The two theories will be 
used to explain capital structure decision of the sample firms in this study. In addition, 
it also presented the agency theory in business that will be used as a theoretical 
principle to explain earnings management activities of Lao firms in Chapter 5. This 
chapter also provided a comprehensive review of capital structure decisions, earnings 
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management activities, earnings management’s determinants, and the relationship 
between corporate financial leverage and earnings management. 
  The early capital structure theory stated that the capital structure of a firm in a 
perfect capital market is independent from its value, but is dependent on future cash 
flows from the firm’s operation.  The TOT suggested that optimal level of capital 
structure exists when firm balances the combination of debt and equity at the point that 
the firm has maximum value and minimum cost of capital. The POT posits that the 
cost of firm’s financing increases or decreases with the level of asymmetric 
information. According to the POT, retained earnings of a firm is the first priority 
source of fund, following by debt and then equity. The Agency Theory is a 
supposition that explains the relationship between principals and agents who act on 
behalf of the principals in business. The theory is concerned with resolving potential 
agency problems arising from the agency relationship due to the agents’ attempt to 
benefit themselves and recognising that the goal of the agents may be unaligned with 
the principals’ interests. To reduce the agency problem, the principals have to incur 
the agency costs of monitoring the agents. 
 The literature reviews of this chapter help to identify the research gap and build 
a theoretical and empirical foundation of the hypotheses that underpin this study. To 
do so, it firstly reviews related prior studies on the determinants of capital structure, 
including firm-level determinants and industry influence. Secondly, there is a review 
on previous empirical evidence on earnings management. This section also provided 
the definitions, motivations, beneficial and harmful effects of earnings management, 
details three methods used to detect earnings manipulation, explained the determinants 
of earnings management, and the linkage between financial leverage and earnings 
management. In addition, it presented a summary of prior research on earnings 
management. Finally, this chapter concluded the research gap from the comprehensive 
review.  
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CHAPTER 4 RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1 Introduction 
  This chapter explains research methods employed to test six formulated 
hypotheses for the investigation of the factors that determine capital structure decision 
and earnings management practices, as well as the exploration of the impact of 
earnings management on financial leverage of Lao private enterprises. 
  This chapter outlines the conceptual framework, dataset, variable 
measurement, methodology, and bias issues of the study. The chapter is organised as 
follows. Firstly, section 4.2 explains the conceptual framework that outlines the 
relationship between each research question with determinants of capital structure and 
earnings management. Secondly, section 4.3 develops six testable hypotheses for the 
proposed research questions in Chapter 1. Thirdly, section 4.4 explains the data 
collection process and the description of the statistical data and sample. This section 
also highlights the difficulties in collecting the data for this empirical study.  Fourthly, 
section 4.5 defines all the dependent and independent variables used in developing 
models of this study. It also provides the measurement of the variables related to 
capital structure and earnings management. Fifthly, section 4.6 describes the research 
methodology for main empirical tests. The models and details for statistical analysis 
are also outlined in this section. Sixthly, section 4.7 deals with estimation of bias issues 
that would incur from the statistical tests.  Finally, section 4.8 closes this chapter with 
the summary of its contents.  
4.2 Conceptual Framework 
  The conceptual framework (Figure 4.1) outlines the relationship of each 
individual research question such as the determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management of private enterprises in Laos. The research question (Q1) examines the 
influence of firm-specific characteristics and industry sectors on capital structures by 
employing two capital structure theories; including the TOT and POT. The factors at 
firm level comprise of size, tangibility and profitability. Research Question Two (Q2) 
investigates the main determinants of earnings management by testing the Modified-
Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) and Performance-Augmented Model (Kothari et 
al., 2005). Research Question Three (Q3) explores the relationship between leverage 
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and earnings management of the enterprises.  The relationship is explained by using 
an agency theory in business. This study uses firm size as the main proxy for earnings 
management (Booth et al., 2001; Fama & French, 2002; Huang, 2006). The study 
controls all years and industry sectors while examining the above three research 
questions. The main industry sectors comprise of consumer discretionary, consumer 
staples, industrials, materials, and utilities.  
Figure 4.1 Conceptual framework of capital structure and earnings management 
for Lao private enterprises 
  
4.3 Research Hypotheses 
  This study aims at examining the main determinants of capital structure and 
earnings management, as well as the relationship between financial leverage and 
earnings management of private enterprises in Laos. It particularly examines firm-
level determinants and industry sectors in relation to capital structure. It also measures 
earnings management by using discretionary accruals and examine the main 
determinants of earnings management of the enterprises. Finally, this thesis explores 
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the relationship between the residual coefficients from discretionary accruals and the 
leverage.  The research questions developed in Chapter 1 are gradually formulated into 
testable hypotheses in accordance with the capital structure theories along with the 
empirical literature discussed in Chapter 3. The following subsections will help in 
formulating the hypotheses of this empirical study.   
4.3.1 Capital Structure Decision 
  The first Research Question (Q1) developed in Chapter 1 is: “What are the 
firm-specific characteristics and industry sectors that influence capital structure 
decision of Lao private enterprises?” As discussed in Chapter 3, financial leverage of 
a firm can be affected by firm-level determinants and industry sectors. This section 
provides a summary of predictions on how firm-level characteristics and industry 
factors influence financing decision of Lao enterprises. Based on the existing 
theoretical and empirical studies and the availability of data (J. J. Chen, 2004; Frank 
& Goyal, 2009; Huang, 2006; Michaelas, Chittenden, & Poutziouris, 1998; Nguyen & 
Ramachandran, 2006), this study considers four independent variables for firm-
specific determinants and industry factors, including firm size, asset tangibility, 
profitability, and industry affiliation. The definition and measurement of the variables 
as well as references are presented in section 4.5. The other control variables, 
comprising of total revenue, trade receivables, and operating cash flow from operation, 
are not included to test for the determinants of financing decision of the enterprises. 
This is because the three variables have no significant influence on the results from  
preliminary tests. The following subsections explain the development of the 
hypotheses’ formation. 
• Leverage and Firm Size 
Based on the TOT, firm size has a tendency to be positively associated with 
debt capacity (Booth et al., 2001; Fama & French, 2002; Huang, 2006; Rajan & 
Zingales, 1995), though the nature of this association has been controversial. On the 
one hand, large firms experience fewer problems related to moral hazard, information 
asymmetry, financial distress and bankruptcy risk (Fama & French, 2002; S. C. Myers, 
1984; Rajan & Zingales, 1995). This may motivate larger firms to rely more on long-
term liabilities because lenders lower their monitoring and reduce residual costs related 
to the financing for the firms.  On the contrary, smaller firms have a tendency to use 
  
78 
short-term debt as a substitute for long-term debt to minimise the impact of the 
problem from information asymmetry (Hall, Hutchinson, & Michaelas, 2000; 
Michaelas et al., 1998). Therefore, the financing pattern of small and large firms are 
relatively different. The expected effect of size is to be negative to short-term debt and 
positive to long-term liability for large firms. Accordingly, the hypothesis about the 
size and financial leverage is formulated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1a: Firm size is positively related to long-term debt (H1a) 
• Leverage and Tangibility 
  Based on the TOT, asset tangibility is expected to have a positive relationship 
with external debt due to the tangibility is related to moral hazard, agency costs and 
information asymmetry (J. J. Chen, 2004; Drobetz et al., 2013; Hall, Hutchinson, & 
Michaelas, 2004). Firms with a higher level of tangible assets are more likely to 
increase their debts from banks and other financial institutions because their tangibility 
can be used as collateral (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Titman 
& Wessels, 1988). However, the level of collateral-based assets is not connected with 
short-term liabilities but, instead, in line with the POT (Hall et al., 2000; Jordan, Lowe, 
& Taylor, 1998). Accordingly, firms with less level of tangibility as collateral are more 
likely to rely on equity instead of debt financing (V. A. Dang, 2013). Therefore, the 
tangibility of Lao private enterprises is assumed as follow: 
Hypothesis 1b: Asset tangibility is positively related to long-term debt (H1b) 
• Leverage and Profitability 
  According to the POT (S. C. Myers, 1984; S. C. Myers & Majluf, 1984), 
retained earnings is expected to be the main financial resource for new projects instead 
of using external debt or new equity. The assumption has been supported by a number 
of prior empirical studies (Booth et al., 2001; Chittenden, Hall, & Hutchinson, 1996; 
Hall et al., 2004; Huang, 2006; S. C. Myers, 2001). For that theoretical and empirical 
reason, profitable firms tend to lower their agency costs of debt by reducing their 
leverage ratio. Therefore, profitability is assumed to be in opposite direction with 
financial leverage. Accordingly, the historical profitability of Lao private firms is 
formulated as follow: 
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  Hypothesis 1c: Profitability is negatively related to long-term debt (H1c) 
• Capital Structure and Industry Influence 
 A number of previous studies often employ dummy variables to control 
industry effect on firm’s financial leverage (Hovakimian et al., 2001; Huang, 2006; 
Lemmon et al., 2008; MacKay & Phillips, 2005). The industry dummy variables are 
employed to capture the impact of industry-specific effect on leverage across different 
industry sectors. Based on the TOT, firms restructure their debts and equity ratios to 
seek an optimum level of capital structure, and the ratios vary across different industry 
sectors due to several factors, for example, the demand of labour and capital, type of 
technology (Chittenden et al., 1996; Frank & Goyal, 2009; Jõeveer, 2013; Jordan et 
al., 1998). Besides, firms in the same industry sector with identical environment 
conditions experience the same variance of financial leverage. Based on the TOT and 
the prior works, this study, therefore, sets hypothesis for the relationship between 
capital structure and industry classification as follows: 
Hypothesis 1d: Lao private enterprises’ capital structure has a diverse 
relationship with industry sectors (H1d) 
4.3.2 Determinants of Earnings Management 
  The second research question (Q2) is “What are the main determinants of 
earnings management of Lao private enterprises?” Conforming to prior studies (B. B. 
Lee & Choi, 2002; Michelson et al., 1995; Moses, 1987; Siregar & Utama, 2008), this 
thesis only uses firm size as an important determinant of earnings management of the 
enterprises in Laos. Other control variables, comprising of tangibility, profitability, 
total revenue, trade receivables, and operating cash flow from operation, are also 
included in the additional tests for main determinants of earnings management in 
Chapter 5. As discussed in Chapter 4, firm size is an important factor that could have 
a negative or positive relationship with earnings management for several reasons. 
Based on Barton and Simko (2002), Subramanyam and Wild (2009) and Nelson et al. 
(2002), large firms are likely to manage earnings upward because large firms have a 
wide range of accounting choices to manoeuvre, a greater bargaining power with 
auditors, and high expectations from analysts and creditors. Therefore, to answer 
Research Question Two, this study sets the hypothesis for the influence of firm size on 
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earnings management of the firms in Laos as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: Large private firms are more likely to engage in earnings 
management than small firms (H2) 
4.3.3 Relationship between Capital Structure and Earnings Management 
  The third research question (Q3) is “What are the relationship between capital 
structure and earnings management of Lao private enterprises?” To predict the effects 
of earnings management on financial leverage of the enterprises, this study set a 
hypothesis on the relationship by following prior studies. As argued in Chapter 4, there 
are some direct and indirect studies on the impact of earnings management on 
corporate financial leverage. For instance, Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) argue that 
firms with high financial leverage tend to engage in more income-increasing 
management in order to alleviate accounting constraints in debt contracts, and have 
more income-decreasing behaviour during the time of financial distress to facilitate 
debt renegotiations. Similarly, Beatty and Weber (2003) find that debt contracts with 
banks influence firms to manipulate their accounting choices. The firms change their 
accounting methods to make more income-increasing changes when the accounting 
changes affect their contract calculations. The likelihood of the income-increasing 
activities depends on the expected costs of a technical violation. The firms’ accounting 
change is lower when the costs of violation are also lower. DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) support the relationship between the two variables that leverage level increases 
the tendency of using earnings management due to levered firms have an incentive to 
meet debt-covenants satisfaction. In summary, a higher demand for debt relates to the 
possibility of the income-increasing behaviour of firms as external lenders have the 
control power for the costs of financial leverage. Therefore, in line with the previous 
findings, this study sets the hypothesis of the relationship between capital structure 
and earnings management of Lao private enterprises as in the following: 
Hypothesis 3: Lao private firms with higher financial leverage are expected to 
have higher earnings management (H3) 
4.3.4 Summary of the Hypotheses 
  The six hypotheses developed above can be summarised in Table 4.1 below. 
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The hypotheses will be tested by using statistical analysis in conjunction with the 
statistical software, called STATA, in Chapter 5. 
Table 4.1 Summary of hypotheses  
 
4.4 Data 
  In order to achieve the main objectives of this study, this section provides an 
explanation of the data set used in the statistical analysis as well as the description of 
the dataset. It also explains the process of data collection. 
4.4.1 Data Description 
  Based on the availability of the secondary data, this study uses the data set from 
annual reports of 240 private enterprises in Laos for the period from the year 2009 to 
2013. The data are collected from firms in different industries. After dropping missing 
Relationship Hypothesis Sign 
Leverage and firm size H1a: Firm size is positively related to long-
term debt 
+ 
Leverage and tangibility H1b: Tangibility is positively related to 
long-term debt 
+ 
Leverage and 
profitability 
H1c: Profitability is negatively related to 
long-term debt 
- 
Capital structure and 
industry influence 
H1d: Lao private enterprises’ capital 
structure has a diverse relationship with 
industry sectors 
+/- 
Firm size and earnings 
management 
H2: Large firms are more likely to engage 
in earnings management than small firms 
+ 
Relationship between 
capital structure and 
earnings management 
H3: Lao private firms with higher financial 
leverage are expected to have higher 
earnings management 
+ 
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observations, the final data-set consists of time series of 224 companies over the period 
of five years (Appendix 3). Although, an attempt has been made to consider the data 
for a ten-year period of 2004-2013 the data is insufficient and unavailable for some 
enterprises from 2004 to 2008. Therefore, this study observes only a five-year period 
of 2009-2013. During the fieldwork, the financial reports of the firms were randomly 
collected from Tax Department, Vientiane Tax Division, and Tax offices at the district 
level. The reports were submitted to the tax offices, division and department for 
taxation purpose. The sample firms are in two forms of enterprises, including sole-
trader enterprise and limited company which are defined by the Law on Enterprises 
(Government, 2005). In Laos, there are 4 forms of business entities comprising of sole-
trader enterprise, an ordinary partnership, limited partnership and limited company.  
  A business enterprise traditionally runs activities in providing goods or 
services, which involve financial, commercial or industrial aspects. In the Law on 
Enterprises in Laos (Government, 2005), a business enterprise refers to “a business 
unit or organisation of private individuals or legal entities that operate business 
activities ranging from production to services by using their own name, capital, office, 
and management for the purpose of seeking profit” (Abell, 1980). A private individual 
or collective people can own the enterprise. Under the law in Laos, enterprises are 
classified into five forms of establishing the business entities: 
• Sole-trader enterprise is a firm registered under one person. This enterprise 
operates under the name of its owner who has responsibility for unlimited 
liability incurred. 
• An ordinary partnership where business is conducted jointly by partners and 
all partners have unlimited responsibility for any liability of the enterprise. 
• A limited partnership is formed under an agreement between two or more 
parties to operate the business under a joint name. Designed partners or 
“general partners” have unlimited responsibility for the enterprise’s liability, 
while other partners or “limited partners” are designated for limited 
responsibility for liability. 
• A limited company is formed by at least two shareholders but not exceeding 30 
shareholders. This type of company is not allowed to sell shares freely to public 
investors. Each share of the firm has equal value. 
• A public company is required a minimum of nine founding shareholders. The 
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company has a free right to transfer shares and entitles to openly sell shares to 
the public.  
  The collected data for statistical analysis is in the form of time-series data. This 
study is based on historical financial information of the private enterprises in Laos for 
five consecutive years in the timeframe of 2009 to 2013. Balance Sheets and Income 
Statements were collected from tax offices under the hierarchy of Ministry of Finance 
in the capital city of Laos, Vientiane.3 The financial reports are formulated under Lao 
Accounting Standards (LAS) and the Law on Enterprises Accounting (National 
Assembly, 2007). The reported data is in the local currency of Laos – the Lao Kip 
(LAK).  
4.4.2 Description of the Sample 
Table 4.2 Distribution of firm type in different industry sectors  
Firm 
type 
Number 
of firm 
Industry Sector 
Consumer 
discretionary 
Consumer 
staples 
Industrials 
 
Materials 
 
Utilities 
 
Limited 
company 
 
123 
 
57 
 
10 
 
46 
 
33 
 
5 
Sole-
trader 
enterprise 
 
101 
 
30 
 
1 
 
36 
 
6 
 
0 
Total 224 84 11 80 39 5 
 
 The financial reports of 224 sample firms collected above are from different 
industries and firm type (Table 4.2). In the sample, there are 123 limited companies 
and 101 sole-trader enterprises. This study does not attempt to make the selected 
sample as a representative of all 98,962 registered enterprises (Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce, 2014) in Laos due to the data is only collected in the capital city of 
Laos.  Even though, enterprises from all the different industry sectors are randomly 
collected to ensure that those firms from each industry sector are representative of the 
                                                 
3Before collecting the data, a Letter of Permission for data collection was first received by the Head of 
Tax Department under the Ministry of Finance, and then a separated copy was handed over to each tax 
offices at district and municipal level for a consideration of data release. 
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real size of each sector. The classification of the industry sectors used in the study is 
based on Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS). Thus, this research is 
considered as a case study in Laos. 
4.4.3 Fieldwork for the Data Collection 
  This study uses only secondary data which are taken from the annual financial 
reports of private enterprises in Laos. The data are the reported accounting information 
collected by taxation offices in Vientiane Capital of Laos. The data collection was 
conducted during the fieldwork for three months from June to August of 2016.  
  To collect the reported data, a huge effort and time had been spent during 
unpredictable and painful processes from document stage until the searching stage of 
getting data from district tax offices, tax division and tax department in the capital city 
of Laos. A Letter of Request for Data Collection (Appendix 1) signed by the Dean of 
the Faculty of Economics and Business Management, National University of Laos, 
was proposed to target tax offices, Tax Division and Tax Department before getting 
permission for the use of data (Appendix 2). The tax office normally brought the letter 
to their general meetings for consideration at least one week or longer before getting 
approval or disapproval. All financial reports of private enterprises in the tax offices 
are not stored electronically but in the form hard-copy format and unsystematically 
classified in a convenient way to collect for five consecutive years from 2009 to 2013. 
Not all taxation offices allowed to release data and the offices’ staff were busy with 
their assigned jobs and did not allow external people to get into the storage room to 
search for the financial reports. Only the recruited staffs were permitted to get into the 
storage rooms. They spent several days to get only a small set of the five-consecutive-
year sample. When the financial reports of any Lao private enterprises were found for 
a period of five years, the reports were scanned in order to converse to PDF file by the 
researcher for future analysis before returning the reports to the storage rooms.   
4.5 Measurement of Variables 
  This study examines the determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management activities of private enterprises in the least-developed country during the 
transitional period from the central-planned mechanism to a market-oriented economy 
by considering Laos as a case of study. According to the research objectives and 
questions mentioned in Chapter 1, this study uses dependent, independent, control 
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variables and their measurements largely adopted by existing literature on capital 
structure and earnings management. This allows the researcher to highlight the 
differences and similarities of the variables used in previous studies. The definitions 
and measurements of each variable are explained below.  
4.5.1 Variables on Capital Structure 
a. Dependent Variables 
  The dependent variable in this study is the financial leverage or debt ratio or 
capital structure of a firm. Previous researchers define financial leverage in various 
alternative ways. Most of them consider some form of a debt ratio in according to the 
use of book measure or market value. Empirically, Bowman (1980) reports that the 
use of book value delivers similar results to market value because two measures are 
interrelated. The leverage can be differently classified total debt and long-term debt. 
Alternatively, one can also consider the interest coverage ratio as a measure of 
financial leverage of the firm (Welch, 2004).4 This study uses book-based value as the 
main measure of capital structure, namely total debt and long-term debt ratio as defined 
in Table 4.3. Short-term debt is not used as a proxy for leverage since the short-term 
debt has a very tiny portion compared to long-term debt in Lao private enterprises.  
Table 4.3 Measurement of dependent variables 
Variable Definition Sample reference 
Total debt ratio 
(TDebt) 
The ratio of book value of total 
debt to total assets 
S. C. Myers (1984), J. J. 
Chen (2004), Artikis, 
Eriotis, Vasiliou, and 
Ventoura-Neokosmidi 
(2007)  
Long-term debt ratio 
(LDebt) 
The ratio of book value of debt 
repayable beyond one year 
divided by total assets 
S. C. Myers (1984), 
Hall et al. (2000), 
Öhman and Yazdanfar 
(2017) 
                                                 
4 The interest coverage ratio is measured as operating income before depreciation divided by interest 
expenses. 
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4.5.2 Variables on Earnings Management  
  This study uses the absolute value of residual coefficient of discretionary 
accruals from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) and the Performance-Augmented 
Model (DAC2+) as measures of earnings management of Lao private firms. The study 
adopts accrual-based earnings management proxies instead of real earnings 
management or cash flows because accrual-basedearnings management is relatively 
easier and less visible to stakeholders than cash flows (Choi & Pae, 2011). The 
Modified Jones Model and the Performance-Augmented Discretionary Accrual Model 
are two methods that are used in this study. 
a. The Modified Jones Model 
  This study employs the absolute value of residuals from modified Jones’ 
abnormal accruals model (Dechow et al., 1995) as a first proxy for earnings 
management. In this model, total accruals are estimated as follows: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 
Where  
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  = total accruals of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑁𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = net profit after tax of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑁𝑂𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡 = net operating cash flows of firm  𝑖 in year 𝑡  
  The following regression model is used to residuals. 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
Where 
𝐴𝑡−1  = asset of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 − 1 
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡  = change in revenue of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡  = change in trade receivables of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡  = gross value of plant, property, and equipment of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝜀𝑖,𝑡  = residual of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
 Credit sales may be a source of earnings management. Therefore, a change in 
trade receivables (∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡) is needed to incorporate in the above regression model. 
  This study estimates the above model cross-sectionally by each industry and 
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financial year using at least 10 observations. Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) is used to form an industry. The residual from this estimation is the 
discretionary accruals (DAC1). Positive and negative residuals indicate income-
increasing and income-decreasing manipulations respectively. This study adopts the 
absolutes value of the residual coefficients  (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) from the Modified Jones Model as a 
measure of earnings management (DAC1+).  
b. Performance-Augmented Model   
  Performance-augmented discretionary accruals model (Kothari et al., 2005) is 
the second measure of earnings management. The reason for adopting this method 
because of the reliable estimation as it is confirmed by Sun and Rath (2011). They 
report that the Performance-Augmented Model tends to have a more reliable 
estimation of discretionary accruals in comparison to other methods. In the model, 
return on assets is included to control performance of the firms. The earnings 
management’s coefficient or abnormal accrual for firm i in year t is the residual 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
from the following regression model: 
𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
= 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 (
1
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼2 (
∆𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 − ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝛼3 (
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1
) + 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
  The independent variable in the Performance-Augmented Model is defined as 
in the previous section in addition to ROA. 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 is the return on asset of firm  in 
year 𝑡 − 1. It is calculated as the earnings before interest and taxed (EBIT) scaled by 
the book value of total assets. The residual from this estimation is the discretionary 
accruals (DAC2). This study adopts the absolute value of the residual coefficients 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
from the Performance-Augmented Model as a measure of earnings management 
(DAC2+). 
  Table 4.4 provides the summary of two variables used to measure earnings 
management of Lao enterprises in this study. DAC1+ is the absolute value of 
winsorised residual coefficients from the Modified Jones Model. DAC2+ is the 
absolute value of winsorised residual coefficients from the Performance-Augmented 
Model. 
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Table 4.4 Variables on earnings management  
Variable Definition Reference 
DAC1+  The absolute value of the residual from the 
Modified Jones Model  
Dechow et al. (1995) 
DAC2+ The absolute value of residual from the 
Performance-Augmented Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) 
 
4.5.3 Independent Variables 
  Independent variables are factors that influence the dependent variable such as 
long-term debt and total debt ratio. Independent variables in this study are considered 
to be the variables on firm-level determinants, industry sectors, and earnings 
management. The independent variables at the firm level are comprised of firm size, 
tangibility and profitability (Table 4.5). The industry sectors are classified in 
accordance with the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) which includes 
consumer discretionary (1), consumer staples (2), industrials (3), materials (4) and 
utilities (5). The variable of measuring earnings management is the residual from the 
discretionary accruals from the Modified-Jones Model and the Performance-
Augmented Model. 
Table 4.5 Independent variables  
Variable Definition Sample reference 
Firm size (Size) The natural logarithm of total 
assets 
Heshmati (2001), J. J. 
Chen (2004), Nguyen and 
Ramachandran (2006) 
Tangibility (Tan) The ratio of the total property, 
plant and equipment to total 
assets 
Chittenden et al. (1996), 
Fama and French (2002), 
J. J. Chen (2004),  Frank 
and Goyal (2009) 
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Variable Definition Sample reference 
Profitability (Pro) The ratio of earnings before 
interest and tax to total assets 
Huang (2006) 
Industry affiliation 
(Ind) 
This study creates a dummy 
variable for each industry 
Chittenden et al. (1996), 
Frank and Goyal (2009),  
Mac An Bhaird and Lucey 
(2010) 
Discretionary 
accruals (DAC) 
The residuals from 
discretionary accruals 
Dechow et al. (1995),  
Kothari et al. (2005) 
 
4.6 Empirical Methodology 
  In order to do statistical analyses, ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regressions are 
employed to test the formulated hypotheses and answer the research questions. All the 
regression equations are estimated by using STATA which is an integrated statistical 
software that allows the computation of time-series data.  The data for analysis are 
drawn from Balance Sheets and Income Statements of private enterprises in Laos for 
five-consecutive yearly observations. 
4.6.1 Relationship between Capital Structure and Other Factors 
a. Estimation of Dependent and Independent Variables 
  This study employs two different proxies for analysing capital structure of Lao 
private enterprises in the next chapter. The proxies consist of long-term and total debt 
ratios which are considered as dependent variables. Debt in this study is measured only 
by the firms’ book value as none of the sample firms are listed on the Lao Securities 
Exchange. Thus, enterprises’ managers have to base their financial decisions on book 
value. 
  This thesis includes firm characteristics as independent variables comprising 
of firm size, tangibility and profitability. The industry classification variables are also 
added to the empirical model to examine their effects on Lao private enterprises’ 
capital structure decision and earnings management activities. 
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b. Model and Method of Analysis 
  To test the hypotheses H1a, H1b, H1c, H1d, H2, and H3 formulated in Chapter 
5, time-series data and multiple regression analysis are utilised to empirically examine 
the hypotheses over the tested five-year period of 2009-2013. Financial leverage of an 
enterprise, measured by the ratio of total debt and long-term debt, is regressed against 
independent variables using the OLS. The results of the regression model will reveal 
whether firm characteristics and enterprises belong to a particular industry sector have 
a persisting effect on capital structure. To do this, the OLS regression model is 
basically formed as follows: 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 𝑓(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 
Where 
𝑖  = vector of observation 
𝑡  = time dimension 
𝛼  = constant 
𝛽  = corresponding coefficient firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = debt ratio of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝐷𝐸𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = determinants of capital structure (firm characteristics, and industry    
classification) of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡  
  The regression model employed for this study is in line with the models used 
by Cassar and Holmes (2003), and Hall et al. (2004) with some modifications for the 
statistical analyses to test the hypotheses as in the following form: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = α + 𝛽1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4 ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 
+𝛽5 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 
Where  
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = size of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = tangibility of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = profitability of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = industry classification of firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 
𝜎𝑖,𝑡  = residual of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
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  The leverage of firm (LEV) includes total debt (TDebt) and long-term debt 
(LDebt), which are dependent variables. Independent variables are firm-specific 
characteristics, industry sectors and year dummies. 
  The analysis process for the determinants of capital structure is divided into 
three stages. The first stage is the regression analysis of all determinants of Lao private 
enterprises’ capital structure. In the second stage, the study focuses on analysing the 
differences in the capital structure across different industry sectors. Firm-specific 
characteristics across the various industries are also examined in this stage. The last 
stage is to investigate year effects on the private enterprises’ capital structure by using 
the same model.  
4.6.2 Relationship between Capital Structure and Earnings Management 
 The following model is developed  to examine the linearity of the relationship 
between capital structure and earnings management. This model is a modification of 
An et al. (2016), Cassar and Holmes (2003), and Hall et al. (2004). 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽6 ∑ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝜎𝑖,𝑡 
Where 
𝛽  = coefficients 
𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡 = debt ratio of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝐷𝐴𝐶𝑖,𝑡 = discretionary accruals of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡 = size of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 = tangibility of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = profitability of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖,𝑡 = industry sector  
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 = year dummy  
𝜎𝑖,𝑡  = residual of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 
 In the above model, dependent variables consisting of discretionary accruals 
(DAC), firm size (Size), tangibility (Tan), profitability (Pro), industry sectors (Ind), 
and year dummy (Year) are tested for earnings management and the relationship with 
leverage (LEV) which is an independent variable. Additionally, total revenue (REV), 
trade receivables (TR), and operating cash flow from operation (OCF) are also 
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included in the additional tests for the main determinants of earnings management, and 
the relationship between leverage and earnings management of Lao private firms. 
4.6.3 Summary of Hypotheses with Related Variables 
  The statistical analyses are conducted by employing the OLS in conjunction 
with the software called “Statistics and Data” (STATA) version 14. The summary of 
related dependent and independent variables are presented in Table 4.6 as follows: 
Table 4.6 Hypotheses and related variables  
Hypothesis 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable 
H1a Firm size is positively related to financial 
leverage of Lao private enterprises 
TDebt 
LDebt 
Size 
H1b Tangibility is positively related capital 
structure of Lao private enterprises 
TDebt 
LDebt 
Tang 
H1c Profitability is negatively related to 
financial leverage of Lao private enterprises 
TDebt 
LDebt 
Pro 
H1d Lao private enterprises’ capital structure 
has a diverse relationship with industry 
sectors 
TDebt 
LDebt 
Ind 
H2 Large private firms are more likely to 
engage in earnings management than small 
firms 
 Size,  
DAC1+, 
DCA2+ 
H3 Lao private firms with higher financial 
leverage are expected to have higher 
earnings management 
TDebt 
LDebt 
Size, Tang, 
Pro, Ind, 
DA1C+, 
DAC2+ 
 
4.7 Bias Issues 
  Data screening is an important stage in research process before conducting data 
analysis. This is to ensure that collected data for this study have an appropriate quality 
because data quality problem potentially leads to a bias of results from the analysis. 
For that reason, this study avoids bias issues from endogeneity problem, 
multicollinearity, and outlier as follows: 
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4.7.1 Endogeneity 
  Potential endogeneity may mask an actual relationship amongst financial 
leverage, capital structure’s determinants, and earnings management. Roberts and 
Whited (2012) define endogeneity as “a correlation between the explanatory variables 
and the error term in a regression”. Endogeneity occurs from the consequence of 
omitted of variables, simultaneity or measurement error. This study adopts year and 
industries dummies and uses a variety of control variables to minimise a possibility of 
endogeneity problem and selection bias. 
a. Year and Industry Dummies 
  Endogeneity issues can be minimised by controlling year and industry fixed 
effects. Industry sector in this study is defined in accordance with the GICS industry 
classifications. Some prior studies, for example, uses year and industry dummies to 
control possible time and industry effects (Hazarika, Karpoff, & Nahata, 2012; Kim, 
Kim, & Zhou, 2017).  
b. Variety of Control Variables 
  Another possible solution to address endogeneity is to use a variety of control 
variables to minimise the omitted variable problem (Y. Chen, Chen, & Shiau-Lan, 
2010; J. N. Myers et al., 2007). In parallel with Huang (2006), De Jong et al. (2008) 
and Drobetz et al. (2013),  this study uses firm size, tangibility, and profitability as 
control variables. 
4.7.2 Multicollinearity   
  Multicollinearity is the condition of independent variables being correlated to 
each other which is not demanding in a regression model. The multicollinearity 
becomes a problem once the correlation among the independent variables (explanatory 
variables) is high or over 0.8 (Gujarati, 2009). Whereas Goodhue, Lewis, and 
Thompson (2011) and Hair Jnr, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) contend that 
multicollinearity becomes a serious concern where variance inflation factor (VIF) in 
extreme cases exceeds a value of 10, which is a common cut-ff threshold. In order to 
detect the multicollinearity problem whether it is existence, the mechanism of 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients is used. 
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4.7.3 Outliers 
  In the population, observation values should have a normal distribution with 
some observations that are different from remainders or overall trend of the data. The 
outliers of the observations can be defined in different ways. He, Xu, and Deng (2003) 
define an outlier as an observation is a different value from remainders. In other words, 
the outlier is any value being significantly different from the overall trend of the data 
(Field, 2009). In this study, the observation values are winsorised at 0.50% level in 
both tails of the observation distribution. This served to replace outliers and the most 
extremely misreported data from the financial reports of Lao enterprises. 
4.8 Chapter Summary 
  This chapter described the method used in this study. It started with explaining 
the conceptual framework of the study. The research questions developed in Chapter 
1 are formulated into the several testable hypotheses in this chapter. Later it explained 
the details of statistical data, description of the sample and data collection process. The 
data used in this study is the financial information taken from annual reports of 224 
unlisted firms, which are collected from tax offices in the capital city of Laos, 
Vientiane Capital. The chapter also described the measurement of dependent and 
independent variables on capital structure and earnings management. Dependent 
variables consist of total debts and long-term debt. Independent (control) variables 
include size, tangibility and profitability. The absolute value of residual coefficients 
from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) and from the Performance-Augmented 
Model (DAC2+) are only two independent variables used to measure earnings 
management of Lao enterprises in this study. In addition, this chapter clarified the 
empirical methodologies used to investigate determinants of capital structure, earnings 
management’s practice, and the relationship between leverage and earnings 
management. This study employs a baseline empirical regression model to investigate 
the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. The investigation 
uses two existing models to measure earnings management of Lao enterprises: the 
Modified Jones Model and the Performance-Augmented Discretionary Accrual 
Model. Finally, the chapter dealt with the controls of potential endogeneity. Year and 
industry dummies as well as various additional controled variables are applied to 
minimise endogeneity bias.  
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CHAPTER 5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This study aims to examine the determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management and the relationship between leverage and earnings management of 
private enterprises in Laos. To achieve the objective, this study employs empirical tests 
in conjunction with theoretical principles and prior studies on corporate financing 
decision and earnings management’s practices.   
This chapter provides a summary of descriptive statistics and discusses the 
results of the statistical tests of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The remainder 
of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of 
dependent and independent variables. Section 5.3 shows and discusses the results of 
the empirical tests on determinants of capital structure and earnings management, and 
the relationship between leverage and earnings management. It also presents 
robustness check on alternative earnings management proxy. Section 5.4 provides the 
summary of the statistical analysis for the formulated hypotheses. Finally, section 5.5 
summarises the contents of this chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
This section quantitatively summarises the main descriptive statistics for all 
variables used in this study. The descriptive features are the mean, standard deviation 
(SD), minimum (Min), maximum (Max) for the full sample of 647 firm-year 
observations (Obs) for the years of 2009-2013. The observations are drawn from the 
annual reports of 224 private enterprises in Laos. This section also shows the 
correlation analysis of all variables. The descriptive features are simplified in a 
reasonable way as in the following subsections. 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The capital structure and earnings management of Lao private enterprises can 
be described in an entire sample of observations as well as classified into five industry 
sectors, comprising of consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, materials 
and utilities. This study excludes financial sector because the financial companies are 
required to report their financial information under IFRS or/and presumptive system 
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set by the central bank of Laos,  while non-financial enterprises are entitled to pay tax 
under the “presumptive” system set by the government. To explain the capital 
structure, two proxies of capital structure are employed in this study namely, the total-
debt ratio (TDebt) and long-term debt ratio (LDebt). Dummy variables of debt are also 
used to distinguish the firms with debt and without debt. The TDebt is used as the main 
measure of leverage while the LDebt is employed for robustness check. This study 
regards the TDebt as a more appropriate measure for financial leverage because of 
following three reasons. First, creditors consider not only long-term debt but also 
current and total liabilities of borrowers. Thus, the portion of other liabilities in 
addition to the long-term debt can affect the debt capacity of the borrowers. Second, 
current liabilities is a quite steady portion of total assets (Gibson, 2001). Third, Lao 
enterprises generally use trade credit as a mean of short-term financing. Therefore, 
account payables are included in the measure of the leverage. 
Table 5.1 (Panel A) presents the descriptive statistics of the capital structure or 
leverage for the overall sample with total observations of 674 over the period 2009-
2013.  When this study classifies the sample firms to firm with debt and without debt 
(Debt-dummy), the majority of Lao private enterprises (81.31%) did not utilise long-
term debt financing, only 18.69% of the sample firms held external debts from banks. 
The evidence can be seen in the table that the average TDebt is 8.15%, which has a 
very slightly different in comparison to LDebt of 7.71%. This result clearly indicates 
that most of the debt on the balance sheet for leveraged enterprises is, therefore, long-
term liability. The short-term debt covers very low percentage of only 0.44% from the 
total debt (the difference between total and long-term debt ratio). The reason behind 
of the tiny percentage is because Lao private firms only report the remaining of short-
term liabilities at the end of each fiscal year but the firms typically use the short-term 
debt financing on a regular basis. 
Table 5.1 (Panel B) reports the descriptive statistics of earnings management’s 
coefficients of the entire sample of 224 enterprises with 674 observations for the years 
of 2009-2013. After testing the Modified Jones Model and the Performance-
Augmented Model to find the coefficients of the residual DAC1 and DAC2 
respectively, this study is unable to detect enough support evidence on earnings 
management activities of Lao private enterprises. Thus, the absolute values of the 
residual coefficients from the two models are employed to measure earnings 
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management of the private firms. The results show that there are slightly different 
between the absolute values of residuals from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) and 
Performance-Augmented Model (DAC2+) of 20% and 21% respectively. The evidence 
strongly indicates that Lao private enterprises manipulate their earnings by using 
discretionary accruals. 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Panel A: Capital structure 
TDebt 674 8.15 21.04 0.00 98.52 
LDebt 674 7.71 20.43 0.00 98.52 
Debt-dummy 674 18.69 39.02 0.00 100.00 
Panel B: Earnings management 
DAC1+ 674 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.68 
DAC2+ 674 0.21 0.23 0.01 0.84 
Note:  The measures of financial leverage are as follows. TDebt is total debt divided by total assets 
(book value). LDebt is debt repayable beyond one year divided by total assets (book value). 
Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for TDebt and LDebt of Lao 
enterprises by classifying industry vice from the period of 2009-2013. The mean 
percentage of the TDebt is 4.89, 2.55, 6.19, 17.18 and 27.87 in consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, industrials, materials and utilities respectively. When this study 
compares the financial leverage among the five different sectors, the enterprises belong 
to utilities have the highest average level of total debt (27.87%) and long-term debt 
(26.22%) while consumer discretionary have the least average TDebt and LDebt of the 
same percentage (2.55%), meaning that firms in the consumer discretionary do not 
report short-term liabilities on their balance sheets for the study period. Whereas the 
firms in consumer discretionary also have an equal level of TDebt and LDebt (4.89%). 
Firms in material sector use more debt than consumer discretionary, consumer staples 
and industrials for their operation, with approximately 17.18% debt to total assets. 
 Table 5.2 also presents the descriptive statistics of earnings management in 
according to industry classifications. When measuring earnings management by using 
the absolute value of the residual coefficients from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) 
and Performance-Augmented Model (DAC2+), this study finds that earnings 
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management is a common practice in all industry sectors of Lao private firms. The 
levels of earnings management across different industry sectors are diverse. The 
material sector employs the highest level of accounting manipulation with DAC1+ and 
DAC2+ of 0.27 and 0.28 respectively,  while consumer discretionary represents the 
second level with the DAC1+ and DAC2+ of 0.20 and 0.24 respectively, industrials 
manage lesser accounting figures with the same value of DAC1+ and DAC2+ (0.19). 
Consumer staples and utilities exercise the least of earnings management at most of 
0.11, but there is a big difference in the value of the DAC1+ and DAC2+ (0.10). 
Table 5.2 Descriptive statistics of leverage and earnings management by industry 
sectors 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Consumer discretionary 
TDebt  
 
249 
4.89 18.57 0.00 98.52 
LDebt 4.89 18.57 0.00 98.52 
DAC1+ 0.20 0.19 0.00 0.68 
DAC2+ 0.22 0.24 0.01 2.83 
Consumer staples 
TDebt  
 
37 
2.55 7.50 0.00 28.83 
LDebt 2.55 7.50 0.00 28.83 
DAC1+ 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.45 
DAC2+ 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.30 
Industrials 
TDebt  
 
241 
6.19 19.75 0.00 98.52 
LDebt 6.05 19.72 0.00 98.52 
DAC1+ 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.68 
DAC2+ 0.19 0.22 0.01 0.84 
Materials 
TDebt  
 
132 
17.18 25.19 0.00 87.43 
LDebt 15.40 23.51 0.00 78.87 
DAC1+ 0.27 0.19 0.00 0.68 
DAC2+ 0.28 0.22 0.01 0.84 
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Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Utilities 
TDebt  
 
15 
27.87 29.65 0.00 70.74 
LDebt 26.22 27.91 0.00 70.74 
DAC1+ 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.41 
DAC2+ 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 
 
 Figure 5.1 shows the average percentage of total-debt ratio for limited 
companies and sole-trader enterprises from 2010 to 2013. In overall, it appears that 
limited companies have more financial leverage from debt than the sole-trader 
enterprises’. The difference of the total-debt ratio between the two types of firms 
increased from around 0.91% in 2010 to larger gap of 2.87% in 2013. The average 
total-debt ratio of the limited companies was 8.22% in 2010, then slightly increased to 
8.27% in 2011 and declined to 8.12% in 2012, and dropped significantly to 6.38% in 
2013. The average debt level of sole-trader enterprises decreased gradually from 
7.31% in 2010 and continued to decrease in 2011 and 2012 but more steeply to 3.52% 
in 2013.  
Figure 5.1 Average percentage of total-debt ratio by firm types 
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Figure 5.2 illustrates the average percentage of total-debt ratio in five different 
industry sectors including consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, 
materials and utilities. It appears that utilities have more leverage than other sectors’ 
with the highest level of 27.87%. By contrast, consumer staples have the lowest-debt 
level of 2.55%. Whereas material sector has approximately three-time higher debt 
(17.18%) in comparison to industrials (6.19%) and consumer discretionary (4.89%) 
over the same period of study. 
Figure 5.2 Average percentage of total-debt ratio by industry sectors 
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(DAC1+) and the absolute residuals from the Performance-Augmented Model 
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environment in Laos to manipulate their earnings, such as unstandardised accounting 
rules, weak legal enforcement, poor audit quality, and income-tax avoidance.  Under 
similar business environment, the empirical results are in line with the empirical 
evidence of private firms in European countries (Burgstahler et al., 2006), suggesting 
that managers exercise more earnings manipulation in the countries with weak legal 
enforcement, and react differently to different tax and accounting rules. Due to part of 
the sample firms used in this study are family firms, the results are also consistent with 
the finding of Abdolmohammadi et al. (2010), reported that private and family 
enterprises have tendencies to manipulate their earnings downward.  
Figure 5.3 Absolute values of earnings management 
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firms have a better operating performance up to 33% of their total assets. 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics of independent variables for the entire sample  
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Size 674 9.55 1.00 6.65 12.34 
Tan 674 0.36 0.31 0.00 1.00 
Pro 674 -0.06 0.16 -0.51 0.33 
 
Table 5.4 shows the descriptive statistics for the three independent variables in 
according to industry classification. On average, Lao private enterprises in all sectors 
were not profitable from their business operation over the period of 2009-2013. Their 
average losses range from 3% in consumer discretionary and materials to 10% in 
utilities. Considering maximum profitability, consumer discretionary and materials are 
the most profitable sectors which have the highest average profit of 33%. Interestingly, 
materials are not only the most profitable sector but also the least risk sector with the 
lowest standard deviation of 14% among the others, while consumer staples and 
industrials perform slightly lower at 25% and 28% respectively. The utility sector is 
the least profitable and riskiest sector among the five sectors, which perform the 
maximum profitability of 6% with the highest standard deviation of 22%. 
The average ratios of tangibility are 38%, 43%, 38%, 28% and 35% in 
consumer discretionary, consumer staples, industrials, materials and utilities 
respectively (Table 5.4).  Consumer staples held the highest level of tangibility while 
materials have the least portion of tangible assets. 
Table 5.4 Descriptive statistics of independent variables by industry sectors 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Consumer Discretionary 
Size 249 9.44 1.03 7.16 11.70 
Tan 249 0.38 0.33 0.00 1.00 
Pro 249 -0.03 0.14 -0.51 0.33 
Consumer Staples 
Size 37 9.37 0.81 8.04 10.45 
Tan 37 0.43 0.37 0.00 1.00 
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Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Pro 37 -0.07 0.19 -0.47 0.25 
Industrials 
Size 241 9.26 0.77 6.65 11.24 
Tan 241 0.38 0.28 0.00 1.00 
Pro 241 -0.09 0.18 -0.51 0.28 
Materials 
Size 132 10.28 0.85 8.34 12.30 
Tan 132 0.28 0.25 0.00 0.98 
Pro 132 -0.03 0.15 -0.51 0.33 
Utilities 
Size 15 10.20 1.79 8.26 12.34 
Tan 15 0.35 0.39 0.00 0.95 
Pro 15 -0.10 0.22 -0.51 0.06 
 
Figure 5.4 shows the comparisons between total-debt and long-term debt ratio 
during the studied period from 2010 to 2013. The average total-debt ratios are 8.05%, 
8.91%, 8.53% and 6.86% for the years of 2010, 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. The 
long-term debt ratios during the period are reported the similar pattern with slightly 
lower in comparison to the total debt ratios in every year. Both total-debt and long-
term debt ratio reached their peak in 2011 and trough in 213. 
Figure 5.4 Total-debt and long-term debt ratio by years 
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  Table 5.5 provides the comparison of the descriptive statistics between sole- 
trader enterprises (STE) and limited companies (LC). The average percentage of total- 
debt ratio between STE and LC is 3.79% and 10.23% respectively. The parametric t-
test and non-parametric Mann-Whitney (MW) test statistics indicate that the 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The above two tests suggest 
that the limited companies in Laos have capacities to raise more debt than sole-trader 
enterprises. The long-term debt between STE and LC are 3.79% and 9.59% 
respectively and the parametric and non-parametric MW test statistics indicate that the 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Turning to earnings management, the absolute value of residual coefficients 
from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) of STE and LC are 0.16 and 0.22 
respectively, which mean that the LC engages in more earnings management than the 
STE. The parametric t-test and non-parametric MW test of statistics confirm that the 
differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. The mean signed earnings 
management proxy (DAC1) of STE and LC are the same value of 0.03, which indicates 
significant differences between these two types of enterprise. This result is only 
confirmed by the parametric t-test but not non-parametric MW test. 
Another measure of earnings management from the Performance-Augmented 
Model (DAC2+) also confirms the same result, suggesting that LC engages in more 
earnings management than STE.  On the other hand, the non-absolute value of earnings 
management measures from the Performance-Augmented Model (DAC2) indicates 
significant differences between these two groups. This result is only confirmed by the 
parametric t-test but not non-parametric MW test. 
Regarding explanatory variables consisting of firm size, tangibility and 
profitability for STE and LC; the parametric t-test and non-parametric MW test of 
statistics indicate that all the variables have statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
firm size measured as the natural logarithm of total assets between STE and LC is 9.19 
and 9.73 respectively, indicating that the limited companies in Laos are bigger than 
sole-trader enterprises on average. In comparison, the STE and LC have an average 
value of tangibility of 0.43 and 0.33 respectively, which mean that the STE has a higher 
proportion of tangible assets than the LC. The STE and LC in Laos have an average 
value of profitability of -7% and -5% respectively, suggesting that both were making 
a loss during the studied period. The LC was making a lesser loss than the STE.   
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Table 5.5 Comparison between sole-trader enterprise and limited company 
Variable 
Sole-trader enterprise Limited company 
t-test 
MW 
test 
Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max 
TDebt 3.79 14.74 0.00 98.52 10.23 23.19 0.00 98.52 50.33*** 4.73*** 
LDebt 3.79 14.74 0.00 98.52 9.59 22.42 0.00 98.52 42.81*** 4.46*** 
DAC1 0.03 0.24 -0.68 0.50 0.03 0.29 -0.68 0.50 12.84*** 0.86 
DAC1+ 0.16 0.18 0.00 0.68 0.22 0.19 0.00 0.68 8.00*** 4.18*** 
DAC2 0.02 0.23 -0.68 0.47 0.02 0.28 -0.68 0.47 13.96*** 0.80 
DAC2+ 0.17 0.22 0.01 0.84 0.23 0.23 0.01 0.84 5.25** 4.19*** 
Size 9.19 0.82 6.65 12.30 9.73 1.03 6.83 12.34 18.05
*** 7.37*** 
Tan 0.43 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.29 0.00 1.00 8.97
*** 3.82*** 
Pro -0.07 0.13 -0.51 0.25 -0.05 0.18 -0.51 0.33 9.77
*** 3.77*** 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
5.2.3 Correlation Analysis  
Table 5.6 reports the correlation between dependent (TDebt and LDebt), 
independent (DAC1+ and DAC2+) and control (Size, Tan and Pro) variables based on 
674 observations for the years of 2009-2013. All the correlation coefficients in the 
table are significantly different from the 1% to 5% level. In order to detect 
multicollinearity problem whether it is in existence among the independent and control 
repressors, the mechanism of Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficients is used 
(Gujarati, 2009). Gujarati (2009) suggests that the multicollinearity becomes a 
problem once the correlation among the independent variables is over 0.8. As can be 
seen in the table, there is no severe correlation among any three of the control variables, 
and none of the correlation coefficients go beyond -0.27 or 0.33. Hence, the 
multicollinearity problem does not exist among the independent variables included in 
the multiple linear regression models of this study.  
In relation to the independent variables, the leverage measures (TDebt and 
LDebt) are negatively associated with tangibility and profitability, but positively 
related to firm size and earnings management variables. The total-debt ratio is highly 
correlated with long-term debt ratio (0.98).  The relationship between financial 
leverage and earnings management shows positive association at a low level. The 
correlation coefficient (0.13) is found between total debt ratio and DAC1+. Whereas, 
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the correlation coefficient between long-term debt ratio and DAC1+ also indicates a 
positive relationship (0.12). This preliminary result indicates that Lao enterprises with 
higher financial leverage engage in higher earnings manipulation. The correlation 
coefficient between financial leverage and firm size is found a positive relationship, 
suggesting that the larger firms have higher leverage level. The firm size and the 
measures of earnings management variables (DAC1+ and DAC2+) have positive-
correlation coefficients. The coefficients between size and DAC1+ and DAC2+ are 0.19 
and 0.15 respectively. This result confirms that larger firms in Laos engage in higher 
earnings management activities due to their higher visibility. Among the control 
variables, firm size is positively correlated to profitability (0.33), suggesting that the 
larger the firms, the greater profitable is the firms, but the size is negatively related to 
tangibility (-0.16). Whilst tangibility is negatively correlated to profitability at -0.27, 
meaning that the greater the tangible assets, the less profitable is the firm. 
Table 5.6 Correlation matrix of leverage and independent variables 
Variable TDebt LDebt DAC1+ DAC2+ Size Tan Pro 
TDebt 1.00 
      
LDebt 0.98*** 1.00 
     
DAC1+ 0.13** 0.13** 1.00 
    
DAC2+ 0.12** 0.12** 0.89*** 1.00 
   
Size 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 1.00 
  
Tan -0.05 -0.04 -0.17*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 1.00 
 
Pro -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.02 -0.03** 0.33*** -0.27*** 1.00 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. DAC1+ is the absolute value of winsorised residual coefficient from the Modified Jones 
Model. DAC2+ is the absolute value of winsorised residual coefficient from the Performance-
Augmented Model. The observation values are winsorised at 0.50% level in both tails of the observation 
distribution. 
5.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
  This section reports the results and discussions of the empirical analysis on the 
determinants of capital structure and earnings management, and the relationship 
between leverage and earnings management of Lao private enterprises. It also provides 
the robustness check of the impact of the earnings management on financial leverage. 
This study separately regresses dependent variables against independent variables 
using the estimation models in Section 4.6 of Chapter 4, where each model represents 
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a different proxy for capital structure and earnings management. The results from the 
statistical tests in each subsection below are interpreted and discussed in according to 
each hypothesis formulated in Chapter 4. 
5.3.1 Determinants of Capital Structure 
 This section reports the statistical tests of the formulated hypotheses on capital 
structure’s determinants, including H1a, H1b, H1c and H1d. The determinants of capital 
structure in the empirical model of this investigation comprise of firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, and industry sectors. The sectors consist of consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, materials, industrials and utilities. In this study, consumer 
discretionary is used as a benchmark for the empirical analysis of other industry 
sectors. This study also regresses year dummies against financial leverage of Lao 
private enterprises. The year 2010 is used as a benchmark for other years of this study 
due to missing data for 2009. Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table 5.9 report the results of 
the statistical tests of firm-specific characteristics and industry sectors that determine 
the total-debt ratio (TDebt) and long-term debt ratio (LDebt). The industry sectors are 
controlled in Model 2, 4, and 6 for the entire sample, limited companies, and sole-
trader enterprises in Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table 5.9 respectively. The following 
subsections interpret the results of the statistical tests of each determinant in relation 
to the capital structure of Lao private enterprises.  
• Impact of Firm Size on Capital Structure 
 The results from Model 1 and 2 in Table 5.7, and Model 3 and 4 in Table 5.8 
indicate that firm size is positively associated with both TDebt and LDebt for the 
overall sample and limited companies at the same level of 1% significance. For sole-
trader enterprises, firm size is also positively significant to both TDebt and LDebt at 
the 1% level from Model 5 but there is a lower level of significance at the 5% level 
from Model 6 after controlling the industry dummies (Table 5.9). In the overall sample, 
these results indicate that larger firms in Laos have the ability and reputation to attract 
the external bodies to borrow more debts than small firms (Huang, 2006).The 
empirical evidence would also imply that the bankruptcy costs associated with 
financial leverage tend to decline as Lao private firms become larger (Ang et al., 1982; 
Gruber & Warner, 1977). Therefore, larger firms can easily access to the leverage. 
This relationship supports the TOT and the hypothesis H1a, which proposes that “firm 
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size is positively related to financial leverage of Lao private enterprises.”  Considering 
the relationship between firm size and LDebt, this study finds that larger firms prefer 
to have higher long-term liabilities. In overall, the result indicates that firm size plays 
a significant impact in explaining the capital structure decision of private enterprises 
in Laos. Thus, this line of reasoning is consistent with the TOT and in line with the 
findings of Booth et al. (2001) and Huang (2006), who suggest that leverage increases 
with the size of the firm. Accordingly, the result is also in line with prior studies of 
firms in Japan and the United States (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and in the transitional 
economy of China (Huang, 2006), reported firm size is positively associated with 
leverage.  However, the result of this study contradicts the capital structure of the firms 
in transitional economies of emerging Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, 
where firm size is negatively associated with long-term debt (Delcoure, 2007).  
 The estimated positive relationship between firm size and long-term debt for 
private enterprises in Laos is not surprising. Despite some progress in the transition 
from a centrally-planned regime to a market-oriented economy, the Lao government 
has periodically directed a number of credit programs to support the financial demands 
to preferred sectors. This may have a significant impact on financing patterns of the 
private firms in the country.  
• Impact of Tangibility on Capital Structure 
 The empirical evidence from all models in Table 5.7, Table 5.8, and Table 5.9 
are mixed with positive and negative relationships between tangibility (Tan) and the 
financial leverage. For the entire sample, the tangibility’s coefficient from Model 1 
and Model 2 has a negative relationship with both TDebt and LDebt but it is not 
significant with the leverage (Table 5.7). On the contrary, the asset tangibility of 
limited companies from Model 2 and 3 has a positive association with the two leverage 
ratios but it is also insignificant (Table 5.8). The coefficients of tangible asset holding 
in the sole-trader enterprises are negatively significant at the 1% level for Model 5 and 
at the 5% level for Model 6 (Table 5.9). The results imply that the sole-trader firms 
with more tangible assets have less financial leverage. Thus, these results for all types 
of enterprises do not support the TOT and are not fully consistent with the formulated 
hypothesis H1b, which proposes that “tangibility is positively related capital structure 
of Lao private enterprises,” but partially supports the POT which recognises that lower 
tangibility has a negative relationship with financial leverage. The results of the sole-
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trader firms and overall sample are in line with V. A. Dang (2013) who reports that 
tangible asset of firms in the UK, France and Germany is negatively related to 
leverage, but contradict to firms in the transitional economy of China (Huang, 2006), 
who argues that leverage increases with fixed assets. Therefore, Lao private firms are 
more internally dependent and less likely to depend on external financing, as 
documented the same evidence by Allen (1995), and Michaelas et al. (1999). 
• Impact of Profitability on Capital Structure 
 The estimation results in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8 show a negative and 
significant correlation between profitability and both total debt and long-term debt at 
the 1% level from all models for the entire sample and limited companies, suggesting 
that financially well-established firms in Laos are less likely to seek the external debt 
and use their internal sources of funds. Differently, the profitability of sole-trader 
enterprises has a negative significance with both TDebt and LDebt at the 5% level from 
Model 5 but there is an insignificant relationship after controlling industry sectors in 
Model 6 (Table 5.9). In overall, the relationship indicates that Lao private enterprises 
with more profitability tend to have lower leverage due to their retained profits 
accumulate overtime and there are more retained earnings available to finance their 
investments. Consequently, the firms are more likely to use internal funds as their 
primary source for investments rather than through accruing external debts. The 
empirical results confirm hypothesis H1c, proposing that “profitability is negatively 
related to financial leverage of Lao private enterprises.” Thus, the empirical evidence 
supports the POT, assuming that retained profit is regarded as the primary source of 
internal fund and then followed by debt and new equity respectively if necessary. The 
negative impact of profitability on leverage in developed and developing countries, for 
example, is confirmed by Kayhan and Titman (2007) and Booth et al. (2001), who 
report that leverage has a negative relationship with profitability because retained 
profits are passively accumulated over the years. The results are also parallel with the 
relationship between profitability and leverage of public firms in the transitional 
economies of China and CEE countries (Delcoure, 2007; Huang, 2006). However, the 
financing choices of private firms in the transitional economy of Laos seem to be more 
limited when compared to those public firms in developed and developing countries 
due to Lao private firms were not able to issue shares in Lao Securities Exchange. In 
addition, bond markets are only restricted to government financing during the period 
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of this study. For that reason, managers of the private firms may perceive retained 
earnings as a first choice of financing and then go for bank borrowing. Therefore, their 
capital structure decisions appear to follow the order–retained earnings, and debt.  
• Impact of Industry Sectors on Capital Structure 
 Regarding the influence of industry sectors on TDebt and LDebt, there are 
mixed in results of no significant association between the leverage levels of Lao 
private firms operating in consumer staples and industrials for the entire sample as 
well as the other two subsamples (Model 2 in Table 5.7, Model 4 in Table 5.8, and 
Model 6 in Table 5.9). In the overall sample, the coefficient of Lao private firms 
operating in the materials and utilities are positively significant to both TDebt and 
LDebt, implying that the firms operating in these two sectors are more likely to have 
leverage (Model 2). In addition, the enterprises belong to utilities are also more likely 
to have external funds than internal financing. This is more relevant for the limited 
companies operating in utilities (Table 5.8) but not for the sole-trader enterprises in 
the same sector (Table 5.9). Interestingly, the sole-trader enterprises operating in the 
material sector are more likely to have long-term debt than the limited companies. The 
findings also indicate that firms in an industry sector relying more on fixed tangible 
assets, such as the utilities, tend to adjust their capital structure faster than firms in 
other sectors with lower tangible assets. The results confirm the hypothesis H1d, which 
proposes that “Lao private enterprises’ capital structure has a diverse relationship 
with industry sectors.” The empirical findings are in line with the consensus evidence 
from a number of the previous studies (Delcoure, 2007; Frank & Goyal, 2009; 
Hovakimian et al., 2001; Lemmon et al., 2008; MacKay & Phillips, 2005), proved that 
leverage level varies across industries. By comparison, the capital structure of private 
firms in Laos has the same patterns of those firms in the transitional economy of China. 
(Huang, 2006), documented that companies in different industries tend to have diverse 
leverage levels. Correspondingly, the estimated results of this study support the TOT, 
stating that firms restructure their debts and equities to seek an optimum level of capital 
structure, and these optimum debt-equity ratios vary across industries. Therefore, Lao 
private enterprises across different industry sectors have diverse capital structures. 
There are some possible reasons behind the various leverage level of the private 
enterprises in different sectors, such as the diverse levels of liquidity and fixed 
investments (Suto, 2003), and the different level of influence from specific 
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characteristics of a given sector (Frank & Goyal, 2009).  
Table 5.7 Determinants of capital structure for the entire sample 
 
Model 1 
Entire sample 
Model 2 
Entire sample 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
-0.4331 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.4057 
(-5.02)*** 
-0.3084 
(-3.57)*** 
-0.3019 
(-3.57)*** 
Size 0.0541 
(6.49)*** 
0.0509 
(6.27)*** 
0.0382 
(4.32)*** 
0.0376 
(4.35)*** 
Tan -0.0434 
(-1.62) 
-0.0323 
(-1.24) 
-0.0327 
(-1.24) 
-0.0233 
(-0.90) 
Pro -0.2549 
(-4.88)*** 
-0.2309 
(-4.54)*** 
-0.2286 
(-4.39)*** 
-0.2077 
(-4.07)*** 
Consumer staples 
 
No 
 
No 
 
-0.0270 
(-0.77) 
-0.0265 
(-0.77) 
Materials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.0895 
(3.93)*** 
0.0729 
(3.27)*** 
Industrials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.0061 
(0.34) 
0.0060 
(0.33) 
Utilities 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.1823 
(3.38)*** 
0.1668 
(3.16)*** 
Y2011 
 
0.0071 
(0.32) 
0.0049 
(0.23) 
0.0090 
(0.42) 
0.0065 
(0.31) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.02) 
-0.0063 
(-0.30) 
0.0022 
(0.10) 
-0.0040 
(-0.19) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0143 
(-0.62) 
-0.0209 
(-0.93) 
-0.0072 
(-0.32) 
-0.0145 
(-0.65) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0672 0.0608 0.0986 0.0840 
F-Statistics 9.08 8.26 8.36 7.18 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 674 674 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test.  
  
  
112 
Table 5.8 Determinants of capital structure for limited company 
 
Model 3 
Limited company 
Model 4 
Limited company 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
-0.3959 
(-3.60)*** 
-0.3702 
(-3.74)*** 
-0.3119 
(-2.72)*** 
-0.3092 
(-2.77)*** 
Size 0.0495 
(4.45)*** 
0.0464 
(4.41)*** 
0.0379 
(3.30)*** 
0.0378 
(3.37)*** 
Tan 0.0019 
(0.05) 
0.0128 
(0.35) 
0.0025 
(0.07) 
0.0155 
(0.42) 
Pro -0.2656 
(-4.10)*** 
-0.2372 
(-3.78)*** 
-0.2448 
(-3.77)*** 
-0.2188 
(-3.47)*** 
Consumer staples 
 
No 
 
No 
 
-0.0144 
(-0.25) 
-0.0140 
(-0.25) 
Materials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.0723 
(2.45)** 
0.0500 
(1.79)* 
Industrials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.0159 
(0.62) 
0.0148 
(0.59) 
Utilities 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.1709 
(2.79)*** 
0.1547 
(2.59)*** 
Y2011 
 
0.0114 
(0.39) 
0.0084 
(0.30) 
0.0122 
(0.42) 
0.0090 
(0.32) 
Y2012 
 
0.0105 
(0.36) 
0.0016 
(0.06) 
0.0105 
(0.36) 
0.0015 
(0.05) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0124 
(-0.40) 
-0.0226 
(-0.75) 
-0.0063 
(-0.20) 
-0.0167 
(-0.55) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0517 0.0468 0.0692 0.0573 
F-Statistics 5.13 4.73 4.38 3.76 
Probability 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
N 456 456 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test.  
 
  
  
113 
Table 5.9 Determinants of capital structure for sole-trader enterprise 
 
Model 5 
Sole-trader enterprise 
Model 6 
Sole-trader enterprise 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
-0.4193 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.4193 
(-3.44)*** 
-0.2101 
(-1.76)* 
-0.2101 
(-1.76)* 
Size 0.0530 
(4.06)*** 
0.0530 
(4.06)*** 
0.0276 
(2.12)** 
0.0276 
(2.12)** 
Tan -0.0887 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.0887 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.0707 
(-2.34)** 
-0.0707 
(-2.34)** 
Pro -0.1692 
(-2.00)** 
-0.1692 
(-2.00)** 
-0.1017 
(-1.24) 
-0.1017 
(-1.24) 
Consumer staples 
 
No 
 
No 
 
-0.0198 
(-0.59) 
-0.0198 
(-0.59) 
Materials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
0.1837 
(5.26)*** 
0.1837 
(5.26)*** 
Industrials 
 
No 
 
No 
 
-0.0044 
(-0.21) 
-0.0044 
(-0.21) 
Utilities 
 
No 
 
No 
 
- 
 
- 
 
Y2011 
 
0.0042 
(0.15) 
0.0042 
(0.15) 
0.0086 
(0.32) 
0.0086 
(0.32) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0102 
(-0.36) 
-0.0101 
(-0.36) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0073 
(-0.25) 
-0.0073 
(-0.25) 
0.0061 
(0.22) 
0.0061 
(0.22) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0690 0.0690 0.1872 0.1872 
F-Statistics 3.68 3.68 6.55 6.55 
Probability 0.0017 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 
N 218 218 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test.  
In addition, this study can identify firm-level determinants of capital structure 
that firm size, tangibility, and profitability vary across different industry sectors (Table 
5.10). For example, firm size has a positive significant relationship with both TDebt 
and LDebt of Lao enterprises belonging to consumer staples and materials, implying 
that larger firms in the two sectors can easily access to the leverage. Thus, size is 
considered as an important factor determining their financing decision, but it is not for 
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firms operating in consumer discretionary, industrials, and utilities. Asset structure 
(Tan) also varies significantly across industry sectors. Whereas firms belong to 
materials and utilities do not take tangible asset as an important determinant for their 
debt financing, the tangibility exhibits a positive significant association with leverage 
of Lao enterprises in consumer discretionary at the 5% level, but it is negatively related 
to both TDebt and LDebt of the firms in consumer staples and industrials at the 5% 
and 1% level of significance respectively. This suggests that firms belonging to 
consumer staples and industrials with more tangibility have less leverage. Meanwhile, 
profitability has a negative relationship with the leverage of Lao firms in all sectors, 
except the utilities.  The coefficients of profitability in consumer discretionary, 
consumer staples, and industrials exhibit negative significant correlations at the 1% 
level with both TDebt and LDebt, implying that the sectors with higher profitability 
tend to use their retained earnings instead of debt financing. The profitability in other 
two sectors has an insignificant association with the leverage levels. 
Table 5.10 Determinants of capital structure across industry sectors 
 
Consumer  
discretionary 
Consumer 
staples 
Materials Industrials Utilities 
 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
 
-0.1162 
(-1.06) 
-0.1162 
(-1.06) 
-0.6132 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.6132 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.9744 
(-3.82)*** 
-0.9679 
(-4.03)*** 
-0.1934 
(-1.08) 
-0.1937 
(-1.09) 
0.3608 
(0.66) 
0.1488 
(0.29) 
Size 0.0150 
(1.33) 
0.0150 
(1.33) 
0.0707 
(3.49)*** 
0.0707 
(3.49)*** 
0.1094 
(4.49)*** 
0.1066 
(4.65)*** 
0.0303 
(1.62) 
0.0301 
(1.62) 
0.0012 
(0.02) 
0.0210 
(0.41) 
Tan 0.0715 
(2.06)** 
0.0715 
(2.06)** 
-0.0789 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0789 
(-2.10)** 
-0.1148 
(-1.29) 
-0.0288 
(-0.34) 
-0.0804 
(-1.72)* 
-0.0843 
(-1.81)* 
-0.3698 
(-1.41) 
-0.3700 
(-1.49) 
Pro -0.3113 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.3113 
(-3.62)*** 
-0.2749 
(-2.80)*** 
-0.2748 
(-2.80)*** 
-0.2346 
(-1.56) 
-0.0556 
(-0.39) 
-0.2671 
(-3.26)*** 
-0.2768 
(-3.39)*** 
0.2829 
(0.52) 
0.1499 
(0.29) 
Y2011 
 
-0.0041 
(-0.13) 
-0.0041 
(-0.13) 
-0.0056 
(-0.18) 
-0.0056 
(-0.18) 
0.0307 
(054) 
0.0212 
(0.40) 
-0.0053 
(-0.15) 
-0.0032 
(-0.09) 
0.1050 
(0.58) 
0.0841 
(0.49) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0256 
(-0.79) 
-0.0256 
(-0.79) 
-0.0161 
(-0.52) 
-0.0161 
(-0.52) 
0.0720 
(1.26) 
0.0525 
(0.98) 
-0.0250 
(-0.71) 
-0.0266 
(-0.76) 
0.0859 
(0.47) 
0.0486 
(0.28) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0300 
(-0.91) 
-0.0300 
(-0.91) 
-0.0153 
(-0.47) 
-0.153 
(-0.47) 
0.0926 
(155) 
0.0598 
(1.07) 
-0.0516 
(-1.37) 
-0.0497 
(-1.32) 
- 
 
- 
 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.0570 0.0570 0.2725 0.2725 0.1428 0.1269 0.0305 0.0342 0.1818 0.1674 
F-Statistics 3.50 3.50 3.25 3.25 4.46 4.17 2.26 2.42 1.62 1.56 
Probability 0.0025 0.0025 0.0140 0.0140 0.0003 0.0007 0.0388 0.0277 0.2487 0.2638 
N 249 37 132 241 15 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%  respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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5.3.2 Determinants of Earnings Management 
 This section reports the statistical testing of the formulated hypothesis H2 for 
the main determinants of earnings management at the firm-specific level as well as 
industry influence. The hypothesis H2 is predicted that “Large private firms are more 
likely to engage in earnings management than small firms.” In addition to firm size 
(Size), this study includes tangibility (Tan), profitability (Pro), total revenue (REV), 
trade receivables (TR), and operating cash flow from operation (OCF) in the additional 
tests for the main determinants of earnings management in this section. The industry 
and year dummies are used as controlled variables. Table 5.11, Table 5.12, and Table 
5.13 show the empirical results on the determinants of earnings management for the 
entire sample and sub-samples of the limited companies and sole-trader enterprises. 
This study uses the winsorised-residual coefficients from the Modified Jones Model 
(DAC1+) and the Performance-Augmented Model (DAC2+) as the earnings 
management proxies. To test the hypothesis H2, this study compares the coefficients 
of firm characteristics and industry sectors in relation to DAC1+ and DAC2+ from 
Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 with the coefficients from Model 2, 4, and 6 under 
industry controls of the entire sample, limited companies and sole-trader enterprises 
respectively. After adding the three new variables into the data set of this study, the 
total remaining number reduces from 674 to 610 observations due to some missing 
data for particular years. The following subsections present the results of each 
determinant in relation to earnings management of Lao private enterprises.  
• Firm Size and Earnings Management 
  The coefficient of firm size (Size) is positively significant to both DAC1+and 
DAC2+ for all models with and without industry controls, suggesting that, in overall, 
larger private firms in Laos are likely to manage their earnings (Table 5.11). When the 
sample firms are split into limited companies and sole-trader enterprises, the results 
also suggest a positively significant association for all models between firm size and 
DAC1+as well as DAC2+ for the limited companies (Table 5.12).  This would mean 
that the limited firms with larger size manage their discretionary accruals upward in 
order to access to more external debts. Meanwhile, size of the sole-trader enterprises 
is positively associated with DAC1+ at the 10% level of significance (Model 5), but it 
is insignificant with DAC2+ under the same model (Table 5.13). This size is positively 
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related with DAC1+ and negatively associated with DAC2+ after controlling industry 
sectors, but the results are insignificant (Model 6).  In overall, the results of firm size 
support the hypothesis H2. Therefore, this study confirms the similar findings of 
Moses (1987) and Michelson et al. (1995), documented that large firms have a bigger 
incentive than small firms in manipulating their earnings. 
• Tangibility and Earnings Management 
 The coefficients of tangibility (Tan) are in the opposite direction to the firm 
size for the entire sample and subsamples. The tangibility is strongly negatively 
associated with DAC1+ and DAC2+ at the 1% level for all models, reflecting that the 
entire sample, as well as the subsamples with more tangible assets, is less likely to 
engage in earnings manipulation (Table 5.11, Table 5.12, and Table 5.13). In overall, 
Lao private enterprises with more visible tangibility manage their discretionary 
accruals downward. 
• Profitability and Earnings Management 
 The profitability (Pro) follows the same pattern of the tangibility. It has a 
negatively significant relationship with DAC1+ and DAC2+ at the 1% level for the 
entire sample and the limited enterprises (Table 5.11 and Table 5.12). Whereas the 
profitability is negatively significant with DAC1+at the 5% and 1% level from Model 
5 and 6 respectively, but it has no enough evidence with DAC2+ for the sole-trader 
enterprises Table 5.13). In overall, Lao private enterprises with more profitability tend 
to have less earnings management.  
• Revenue and Earnings Management 
 The total revenue (REV) of Lao private firms has a mixed relationship with 
DAC1+ and DAC2+ in all models (Table 5.11, Table 5.12, Table 5.13). However, the 
association has no significant level with the measures of earnings management for the 
entire sample and limited enterprises (Table 5.11 and Table 5.12). With regards to 
sole-traders, it is positively and significantly associated with both DAC1+ and DAC2+ 
at the 5% level without industry control (Model 5), and at the 1% level under industry 
control (Model 6) for the sole-trader enterprises Table 5.13). This suggests that the 
sole-trader firms with more revenue engage in more earnings manipulation. 
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• Trade Receivables and Earnings Management 
 The coefficient between trade receivables (TR) and the earnings management’s 
measures (DAC1+ and DAC2+) exhibits a negative and insignificant relationship from 
all models for the entire sample shown in Table 5.11, whereas the trade receivables 
have a mixed and insignificant result from all models with and without industry control 
for limited companies and sole-trader enterprises (Table 5.12 and Table 5.13). In 
summary, the trade receivables have no influence on earnings management of Lao 
private enterprises. 
• Operating Cash Flow and Earnings Management 
 The operating cash flow (OCF) has a mixed relationship with DAC1+ and 
DAC2+ in all models for the entire sample and limited companies (Table 5.11 and 
Table 5.12), whereas the OCF of sole-trader enterprises is positively and significantly 
related at the 1% level to both DAC1+ and DAC2+ from Model 5, and the relationship 
is more robust at the 5% level of significance when industry sectors are controlled in 
Model 6 (Table 5.13), suggesting that the sole-trader firms engage in more earnings 
management when they have more cash flow from operation. In summary, this study 
is unable to find a convincing evidence to satisfy the association between the operating 
cash flow and earnings management for the entire sample and limited companies, but 
the OCF activates earnings manipulation of the sole-trader enterprises in Laos. 
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Table 5.11 Determinants of earnings management for entire sample 
 
Model 1 
Entire sample 
Model 2 
Entire sample 
DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ 
Constant -0.0990 
(-1.23) 
-0.0258 
(-0.27) 
-0.0414 
(-0.49) 
0.0415 
(0.41) 
Size 0.0363 
(4.46)*** 
0.0327 
(3.35)*** 
0.0301 
(3.48)*** 
0.0278 
(2.71)*** 
Tan -0.1182 
(-4.52)*** 
-0.1605 
(-5.10)*** 
-0.1116 
(-4.29)*** 
-0.1549 
(-5.02)*** 
Pro -0.1637 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.1922 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.1661 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.2183 
(-3.60)*** 
REV 
 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
0.0016 
(0.58) 
-0.0004 
(-0.19) 
0.0014 
(0.51) 
TR 
 
-0.0018 
(-0.06) 
-0.126 
(-0.37) 
-0.0056 
(-0.20) 
-0.0151 
(-0.45) 
OCF 
 
0.0055 
(0.54) 
0.0111 
(0.91) 
0.0049 
(0.49) 
0.0110 
(0.93) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.0841 
(-2.42)** 
-0.1397 
(-3.38)*** 
Industrials No No -0.0038 
(-0.21) 
-0.0378 
(-1.77)* 
Materials No No 0.0450 
(1.99)* 
0.0260 
(0.97) 
Utilities No No -0.1043 
(-2.01)** 
-0.2538 
(-4.11)*** 
Y2011 
 
-0.0347 
(-1.63) 
-0.0605 
(-2.36)** 
-0.0354 
(-1.68)* 
-0.0607 
(-2.42)** 
Y2012 
 
0.0009 
(0.04) 
-0.0098 
(-0.39) 
0.0014 
(0.07) 
-0.0095 
(-0.38) 
Y2013 
 
0.0134 
(0.06) 
-0.0083 
(-0.31) 
0.0124 
(0.56) 
-0.0141 
(-0.53) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0651 0.0625 0.0854 0.1056 
F-Statistics 5.71 5.51 5.37 6.53 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 610 610 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.12 Determinants of earnings management for limited company 
 
Model 2 
Limited company 
Model 3 
Limited company 
DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ 
Constant -0.0711 
(-0.73) 
-0.0466 
(-0.40) 
-0.0478 
(-0.47) 
-0.0233 
(-0.19) 
Size 0.0334 
(3.44)*** 
0.0344 
(2.98)*** 
0.0300 
(2.95)*** 
0.0333 
(2.78)*** 
Tan -0.0906 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.1234 
(-3.10)*** 
-0.0865 
(-2.62)*** 
-0.1189 
(-3.06)*** 
Pro -0.1468 
(-2.56)*** 
-0.2010 
(-2.94)*** 
-0.1461 
(-2.56)*** 
-0.2220 
(-3.29)*** 
REV 
 
-0.0009 
(-0.36) 
0.0007 
(0.22) 
-0.0013 
(-0.54) 
0.0006 
(0.19) 
TR 
 
0.0017 
(0.05) 
-0.2000 
(-0.47) 
-0.0088 
(-0.25) 
-0.0289 
(-0.70) 
OCF 
 
-0.0028 
(-0.17) 
0.0062 
(0.31) 
-0.0035 
(-0.21) 
0.0056 
(0.29) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.1051 
(-1.98)** 
-0.1363 
(-2.18)** 
Industrials No No 0.0265 
(1.17) 
-0.0058 
(-0.22) 
Materials No No 0.0487 
(1.89)* 
0.0261 
(0.86) 
Utilities No No -0.1026 
(-1.91)* 
-0.2530 
(-4.00)*** 
Y2011 
 
-0.0310 
(-1.21) 
-0.0560 
(-1.84)* 
-0.0334 
(-1.32) 
-0.0592 
(-1.99)** 
Y2012 
 
0.0005 
(0.02) 
-0.1114 
(-0.37) 
-0.0033 
(-0.13) 
-0.0156 
(-0.52) 
Y2013 
 
0.0081 
(0.29) 
-0.0051 
(-0.15) 
0.0030 
(0.11) 
-0.0186 
(-0.57) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0374 0.0404 0.0631 0.0843 
F-Statistics 2.81 2.96 3.18 3.97 
Probability 0.0033 0.0020 0.0001 0.0000 
N 421 421 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.13 Determinants of earnings management for sole-trader enterprise 
 
Model 5 
Sole-trader enterprise 
Model 6 
Sole-trader enterprise 
DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ 
Constant -0.0621 
(-0.38) 
0.1772 
(0.89) 
0.0885 
(0.52) 
0.3897 
(1.88)* 
Size 0.0311 
(1.79)* 
0.0108 
(0.50) 
0.0173 
(0.93) 
-0.0082 
(-0.36) 
Tan -0.1659 
(-3.76)*** 
-0.2155 
(-3.94)*** 
-0.1718 
(-3.88)*** 
-0.2222 
(-4.13)*** 
Pro -0.2189 
(-1.88)* 
-0.1280 
(-0.89) 
-0.2432 
(-2.03)** 
-0.1693 
(-1.16) 
REV 
 
0.0216 
(2.00)** 
0.0298 
(2.23)** 
0.0282 
(2.59)*** 
0.0386 
(2.92)*** 
TR 
 
-0.0179 
(-0.36) 
0.0008 
(0.01) 
-0.0158 
(-0.32) 
0.0090 
(0.15) 
OCF 
 
0.0247 
(1.67)* 
0.0343 
(1.87)* 
0.0296 
(2.03)** 
0.0410 
(2.31)** 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.0664 
(-1.44) 
-0.1363 
(-2.44)** 
Industrials No No -0.0715 
(-2.37)** 
-0.1066 
(-2.91)*** 
Materials No No 0.0619 
(1.21) 
0.0843 
(1.35) 
Utilities No No - 
 
- 
Y2011 
 
-0.0453 
(-1.16) 
-0.0766 
(-1.59) 
-0.0381 
(-0.99) 
-0.0655 
(-1.41) 
Y2012 
 
0.0043 
(0.11) 
-0.0054 
(-0.12) 
0.0101 
(0.28) 
0.0037 
(0.08) 
Y2013 
 
0.0299 
(0.76) 
-0.0080 
(-0.16) 
0.0401 
(1.04) 
0.0080 
(0.17) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0809 0.0768 0.1217 0.1502 
F-Statistics 2.84 2.74 3.17 3.77 
Probability 0.0038 0.0051 0.0004 0.0000 
N 189 189 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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• Determinants of Earnings Management across Industry Sectors 
 Table 5.14 presents the main determinants of earnings management across four 
different industry sectors, including consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
industrials, and material. The year dummies in this section are also used as controlled 
variables.  
 It can be seen that firm size (Size) has a negative and significant relationship 
with both DAC1+and DAC2+ of Lao firms in consumer staples at the 1% level and 
materials at the 5% level. This means that the larger firms in the two sectors engage in 
more earnings management upward during the years of observation. Whereas the size 
of firms in consumer staples exhibits a negatively significant relationship with DAC1+ 
but it is insignificant with DAC2+, by contrast, the earnings management is not related 
to firm size in the industrials.  
 The tangibility (Tan) is negatively and significantly linked with both 
DAC1+and DAC2+ of Lao enterprises in consumer staples at the 1% level and materials 
at the 5% level for DAC1+ and the 1% level for DAC2+. This suggests that firms with 
more tangible assets in the two sectors are less likely to engage in earnings 
management. The tangibility of enterprises in consumer staples and industrials has a 
mixed and insignificant relationship with both measures of the earnings management. 
  The profitability (Pro) has a negatively significant relationship with both 
DAC1+ and DAC2+ of Lao enterprises in industrials at the 5% level, whereas the factor 
is also negatively related to DAC1+ at the 5% level but DAC2+ at the 1% level for firms 
in materials. This implies that the firms in industrials and materials with more 
profitability tend to have less earnings management. In addition, this study finds no 
enough evidence to support the relationship between profitability and earnings 
management of Lao firms in consumer discretionary, and consumer staples. 
 The total revenue (REV) is negatively and significantly related to both DAC1+ 
and DAC2+ of Lao enterprises in consumer discretionary at the 5% level, reflecting 
that the firms with more revenue are less likely to manipulate their earnings. Whereas 
the revenue of firms in consumer staples is positively and significantly associated with 
DAC2+ at the 10% level but it is positively insignificant with DAC1+. The remaining 
sectors exhibit no linkage between the revenue and the measures of earnings 
management. 
 The trade receivables (TR) are also negatively and significantly associated to 
  
122 
both DAC1+ and DAC2+ in the Consumer discretionary sector at the 5% level, 
suggesting that firms in the sector with more receivables are less likely to engage in 
earnings management. Further, the account receivables of firms in Consumer staples, 
Industrials and Materials have mixed results but they are not significant with the 
earnings management’s measures.  The Operating Cash Flow (OCF) has a mix of 
positive and negative relationships with DAC1+ and DAC2+ of private enterprises in 
all industry sectors, suggesting the cash flow from operation of firms has no influence 
on earnings management in any particular industry sector. 
Table 5.14 Determinants of earnings management across industry sectors 
 
Consumer 
discretionary 
Consumer staples Industrials Materials 
 
DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ DAC1+ DAC2+ 
Constant 
-0.0630 
(-0.57) 
0.0256 
(0.18) 
0.5553 
(1.75)* 
0.3155 
(1.14) 
-0.0620 
(-0.33) 
0.0228 
(0.10) 
-0.1429 
(-0.64) 
-0.1821 
(-0.70) 
Size 0.0430 
(3.72)*** 
0.0410 
(2.71)*** 
-0.0564 
(-1.70)* 
-0.0286 
(-0.99) 
0.0230 
(1.18) 
0.0166 
(0.73) 
0.0456 
(2.12)** 
0.0520 
(2.09)** 
Tan -0.2142 
(-6.12)*** 
-0.2675 
(-5.87)*** 
-0.0443 
(-0.79) 
-0.0686 
(-1.41) 
0.0540 
(1.08) 
-0.0010 
(-0.02) 
-0.1727 
(2.36)** 
-0.2215 
(-2.61)*** 
Pro 0.0604 
(0.67) 
-0.0009 
(-0.01) 
0.2318 
(1.39) 
0.0739 
(0.51) 
-0.2011 
(-2.41)** 
-0.2253 
(-2.30)** 
-0.2386 
(-1.96)** 
-0.4065 
(-2.78)*** 
REV 
 
-0.0162 
(-2.10)** 
-0.0219 
(-2.18)** 
0.0066 
(0.46) 
0.0205 
(1.65)* 
0.0023 
(1.29) 
0.0073 
(0.85) 
0.0004 
(0.12) 
0.0036 
(1.09) 
TR 
 
-0.1078 
(-2.29)** 
-0.1344 
(-2.20)** 
0.0540 
(0.93) 
0.0224 
(0.44) 
0.0603 
(1.29) 
0.0822 
(1.50) 
0.0163 
(0.26) 
-0.0304 
(-0.41) 
OCF 
 
0.0179 
(1.02) 
0.0270 
(1.18) 
-0.0342 
(-1.03) 
-0.0148 
(-0.51) 
0.0117 
(0.83) 
0.0177 
(1.07) 
-0.0459 
(-1.00) 
-0.0198 
(-0.37) 
Y2011 
 
-0.0600 
(-1.84)* 
-0.0835 
(-1.97)** 
0.0836 
(1.87)* 
0.0547 
(1.40) 
-0.0542 
(-1.47) 
-0.0825 
(-1.90)* 
-0.0408 
(-0.88) 
-0.0189 
(-0.35) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0152 
(0.0322) 
-0.0190 
(-0.45) 
0.0984 
(2.33)** 
0.0819 
(2.22)** 
0.0402 
(1.10) 
0.0283 
(0.66) 
-0.0563 
(-1.18) 
-0.0690 
(-1.24) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0491 
(-1.50) 
-0.0688 
(-1.61) 
0.2278 
(5.15)*** 
0.0885 
(2.30)** 
0.0060 
(0.15) 
-0.0122 
(-0.26) 
0.0701 
(1.38) 
0.0728 
(1.24) 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.1982 0.1644 0.4845 0.1666 0.0453 0.0405 0.0925 0.0994 
F-Statistics 7.15 5.90 4.34 1.71 2.14 2.01 2.36 2.47 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0021 0.1435 0.0277 0.0393 0.0177 0.0131 
N 225 33 217 121 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
In summary, the influence of firm size, tangibility, profitability, total revenue, 
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and trade receivables on earnings management vary across industry sectors (Table 
5.14). The variation of industry influence exists due to several possible factors, such 
as competition nature, industry heterogeneity in business risk, asset types, regulation 
and technology (Brander & Lewis, 1986; Chevalier, 1995) 
5.3.3 Relationship between Capital Structure and Earnings Management  
 This section reports the statistical testing of the formulated hypothesis H3, 
proposing that: “Lao private firms with higher financial leverage are expected to have 
higher earnings management.” To test the hypothesis, this study employs both the 
absolute residuals of discretionary accruals from the Modified Jones Model (DAC1+) 
and the Performance-Augmented Model (DAC2+). The dependent variables are the 
total-debt ratio (TDebt) and long-term debt ratio (LDebt) and the main variables of 
intetest in this section are the DAC1+ and DAC2+. This study also includes firm-
specific factors as well as industry and year fixed effects as controlled variables to all 
models used in this section. The results are explained as in the following subsections. 
•  Capital Structure and Modified-Jones earnings management 
 Table 5.15, Table 5.16, and Table 5.17 show the results of the impact of capital 
structure on earnings management of Lao private firms by using the residuals from the 
Modified Jones Model (DAC1+). While the model 1, 3, and 5 shows the results of the 
relationship between leverage (TDebt and LDebt) and DAC1+ for the entire sample 
and subsamples without industry control, Model 2, 4 and 6 presents the linkage under 
industry control for the entire sample, limited companies, and sole-trader enterprises 
respectively.  
  Whereas Model 1 for the TDebt (LDebt) of the entire sample is significant with 
an adjusted R-squared of 7.28% (6.28%), F-statistics of 5.78 (5.08) and P-value of 
0.0000 (0.0000), Model 2 for the TDebt (LDebt) of the sample is also significant with 
an adjusted R-squared of 9.50% (7.91%), F-statistics of 5.57 (4.74) and P-value of 
0.0000 (0.0000) (Table 5.15). In the model 1 and 2, the DAC1+ has a statistically 
positive and significant association with both TDebt and LDebt at the 5% level for the 
entire sample, implying that Lao private firms use financial leverage as a governance 
mechanism to mitigate  opportunistic behaviour of managers, as this is consistent with 
the prediction of  Jensen (1986). In overall, the result supports the hypothesis H3, 
which proposes that firms with higher financial leverage are expected to have higher 
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earnings management. This result is in line with previous studies, which prove that 
leverage is positively associated with income-increasing discretionary accruals (An et 
al., 2016; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; 
Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010; Sweeney, 1994). According to the agency 
theory (Jensen, 1986), the higher leverage is considered as a governance device to 
reduce opportunistic behaviour of managers for two main reasons: 1) repayment of 
debt reduces financial resources available to the managers for non-optimum spending; 
and 2) debt financing undergoes the scrutiny of creditors that is often subjected to 
lender-induced spending restriction.  
  This study runs the same regression models above by splitting the entire sample 
into limited companies and sole-trader enterprises. In Model 3 and 4, Table 5.16 
reports the results of the impact of leverage on earnings management of the limited 
companies in Laos. The coefficient of earnings management measure from the 
Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995) is positively and significantly related to 
both TDebt and LDebt at the 5% level for the limited companies. This result indicates 
that the limited companies are more likely to use financial leverage to control earnings 
management. The finding on limited companies statistically supports the formulated 
hypothesis H3. 
 In Model 5 and 6, Table 5.17 reports the results of the impact of capital 
structure on earnings management for sole-trader enterprises in Laos. As can be seen 
in the table that the coefficients of TDebt in relation to other control variables are equal 
to the coefficients of LDbet. This is because most of the firms did not report short-term 
liabilities in their balance sheets over the period of study. Therefore, the TDebt is 
approximately equal to LDebt, which leads to an insignificant difference in the 
coefficients. In the Model 5, the residual coefficient DAC1+ is positively and 
insignificantly associated to both TDebt and LDebt of the firms, but in the Model 6, 
the DAC1+ exhibits a negative and insignificant relationship with both TDebt and 
LDebt. The results do not support the hypothesis H3. 
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Table 5.15 Leverage and the Modified-Jones earnings management for entire 
sample 
 
Model 1 
Entire sample 
Model 2 
Entire sample 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.3907 
(-4.50)*** 
-0.3627 
(-4.23)*** 
-0.2929 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.2797 
(-3.11)*** 
DAC1+ 0.1052 
(2.39)** 
0.1074 
(2.47)** 
0.0983 
(2.23)** 
0.1020 
(2.34)** 
Size 0.0453 
(5.08)*** 
0.0422 
(4.80)*** 
0.0327 
(3.48)*** 
0.0315 
(3.39)*** 
Tan -0.0107 
(-0.38) 
-0.0006 
(-0.02) 
-0.0043 
(-0.15) 
0.0051 
(0.18) 
Pro -0.2112 
(-3.82)*** 
-0.1905 
(-3.49)*** 
-0.1854 
(-3.34)*** 
-0.1673 
(-3.04)*** 
REV 
 
-0.0007 
(-0.27) 
-0.0002 
(-0.10) 
-0.0017 
(-0.66) 
-0.0011 
(-0.43) 
TR 
 
0.0732 
(2.39)** 
0.0587 
(1.94)* 
0.0650 
(2.14)** 
0.0519 
(1.72)* 
OCF 
 
0.0017 
(0.16) 
0.0031 
(0.29) 
0.0004 
(0.03) 
0.0020 
(0.19) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.0185 
(-0.49) 
-0.0174 
(-0.47) 
Industrials No No 0.0121 
(0.62) 
0.0116 
(0.61) 
Materials No No 0.0778 
(3.18)*** 
0.0662 
(2.73)*** 
Utilities No No 0.01712 
(3.05)*** 
0.1553 
(2.79)*** 
Y2011 
 
0.0061 
(0.27) 
0.0034 
(0.15) 
0.0062 
(0.27) 
0.0035 
(0.15) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0040 
(-0.18) 
-0.0093 
(-0.41) 
-0.0005 
(-0.02) 
-0.0063 
(-0.28) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0207 
(-0.85) 
-0.0252 
(-1.05) 
-0.0121 
(-0.50) 
-0.175 
(-0.73) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0728 0.0628 0.0950 0.0791 
F-Statistics 5.78 5.08 5.57 4.74 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 610 610 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.16 Leverage and the Modified-Jones earnings management for limited 
company 
 
Model 3 
Limited company 
Model 4 
Limited company 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.3695 
(-3.29)*** 
-0.3378 
(-3.06)*** 
-0.3221 
(-2.74)*** 
-0.3063 
(-2.64)*** 
DAC1+ 0.1204 
(2.13)** 
0.1236 
(2.22)** 
0.1275 
(2.22)** 
0.1320 
(2.33)** 
Size 0.0407 
(3.60)*** 
0.0374 
(3.36)*** 
0.0334 
(2.81)*** 
0.0322 
(2.74)*** 
Tan 0.0391 
(1.01) 
0.0527 
(1.38) 
0.0403 
(1.05) 
0.0534 
(1.40) 
Pro -0.2146 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.1899 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.1937 
(-2.90)*** 
-0.1712 
(-2.59)*** 
REV 
 
-0.0005 
(-0.16) 
0.0001 
(0.04) 
-0.0010 
(-0.35) 
-0.0003 
(-0.10) 
TR 
 
0.0985 
(2.42)** 
0.0767 
(1.92)* 
0.0925 
(2.27)** 
0.0731 
(1.82)* 
OCF 
 
0.0108 
(0.57) 
0.0145 
(0.78) 
0.0102 
(0.54) 
0.0143 
(0.77) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No 0.0130 
(0.21) 
0.0128 
(0.21) 
Industrials No No 0.0161 
(0.61) 
0.0151 
(0.58) 
Materials No No 0.0444 
(1.48) 
0.0305 
(1.03) 
Utilities No No 0.01609 
(2.58)*** 
0.1445 
(2.34)** 
Y2011 
 
0.0107 
(0.36) 
0.0069 
(0.24) 
0.0118 
(0.40) 
0.0079 
(0.27) 
Y2012 
 
0.0080 
(0.27) 
-0.0000 
(-0.00) 
0.0096 
(0.32) 
0.0013 
(0.04) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0162 
(-0.05) 
-0.0226 
(-0.71) 
-0.0082 
(-0.25) 
-0.0154 
(-0.48) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0665 0.0573 0.0750 0.0615 
F-Statistics 3.99 3.55 3.43 2.97 
Probability 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 
N 421 421 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.17 Leverage and the Modified-Jones earnings management for sole-
trader enterprise 
 
Model 5 
Sole-trader enterprise 
Model 6 
Sole-trader enterprise 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.4708 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.4708 
(-3.46)*** 
-0.1865 
(-1.38) 
-0.1865 
(-1.38) 
DAC1+ 0.0554 
(0.88) 
0.0554 
(0.88) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
Size 0.0587 
(3.98)*** 
0.0587 
(3.98)*** 
0.0254 
(1.71)* 
0.0254 
(1.71)* 
Tan -0.0874 
(-2.27)** 
-0.0874 
(-2.27)** 
-0.0704 
(-1.92)* 
-0.0704 
(-1.92)* 
Pro -0.1838 
(-1.86)* 
-0.1838 
(-1.86)* 
-0.0890 
(-0.92) 
-0.0890 
(-0.92) 
REV 
 
-0.0188 
(-2.04)** 
-0.0188 
(-2.04)** 
-0.0131 
(-1.49) 
-0.131 
(-1.49) 
TR 
 
-0.0149 
(-0.36) 
-0.0149 
(-0.36) 
-0.0016 
(-0.04) 
-0.0016 
(-0.04) 
OCF 
 
-0.0197 
(-1.57) 
-0.0197 
(-1.57) 
-0.0152 
(-1.30) 
-0.0152 
(-1.30) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.0205 
(-0.56) 
-0.0205 
(-0.56) 
Industrials No No 0.0073 
(0.30) 
0.0073 
(0.30) 
Materials No No 0.2236 
(5.46)*** 
0.2236 
(5.46)*** 
Utilities No No - - 
 
Y2011 
 
0.0100 
(-0.30) 
0.0100 
(-0.30) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0100 
(-0.32) 
-0.0100 
(-0.32) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
-0.0013 
(-0.05) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0055 
(-0.17) 
-0.0055 
(-0.17) 
0.0105 
(0.34) 
0.0105 
(0.34) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0748 0.0748 0.2125 0.2125 
F-Statistics 2.52 2.52 4.90 4.90 
Probability 0.0074 0.0074 0.0000 0.0000 
N 189 189 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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• Capital Structure and Performance-Augmented earnings management 
Table 5.18, Table 5.19, and Table 5.20 report the effect of capital structure on 
earnings management. The dependent variables are total debt ratio (TDebt) and long-
term-debt ratio (LDebt), and the main independent variable is earnings management 
proxy (DAC2+) based on the Performance-Augmented Model proposed by Kothari et 
al. (2005). While Models 1, 3, and 5 show the results of the relationship between 
leverage (TDebt and LDebt) and DAC2+ for the entire sample and subsamples without 
industry control; Models 2, 4 and 6 present the association under industry control for 
the entire sample, limited companies, and sole-trader enterprises respectively.  
In the Table 5.18, the residual coefficient of DAC2+ is positively and 
significantly associated with both TDebt and LDebt at the 5% level for the entire 
sample. The coefficient is also positively associated with both TDebt and LDebt at the 
same level of significance for the limited companies (Table 5.19), but it is not 
significant for the sole-trader enterprises (Table 5.20). For the overall sample and 
limited companies, the result supports the hypothesis H3. This finding is compatible 
with previous studies, which note that leverage is positively associated with income-
increasing discretionary accruals (An et al., 2016; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 
2002; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Rodríguez-Pérez & van Hemmen, 2010; Sweeney, 
1994). In comparison, both DAC1+ and DAC2+ of the entire sample and limited 
companies exhibit the same positive and significant relationship with leverage at the 
same 5% level. 
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Table 5.18 Leverage and the Performance-Augmented earnings management for 
entire sample 
 
Model 1 
Entire sample 
Model 2 
Entire sample 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.3991 
(-4.60)*** 
-0.3711 
(-4.33)*** 
-0.3004 
(-3.31)*** 
-0.2877 
(-3.20)*** 
DAC2+ 0.0785 
(2.15)** 
0.0857 
(2.37)** 
0.0840 
(2.26)** 
0.0918 
(2.50** 
Size 0.0465 
(5.26)*** 
0.0433 
(4.96)*** 
0.0333 
(3.57)*** 
0.0320 
(3.46)*** 
Tan -0.0106 
(-0.37) 
0.0005 
(0.02) 
-0.0022 
(-0.08) 
0.0079 
(0.28) 
Pro -0.2134 
(-3.86)*** 
-0.1916 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.1834 
(-3.30)*** 
-0.1642 
(-2.98)*** 
REV 
 
-0.0008 
(-0.32) 
-0.0004 
(-0.15) 
-0.0018 
(-0.40) 
-0.0013 
(-0.51) 
TR 
 
0.0740 
(2.42)** 
0.0596 
(-0.15) 
0.0657 
(2.16)** 
0.0527 
(1.75)* 
OCF 
 
0.0014 
(0.13) 
0.0028 
(0.26) 
-0.0001 
(-0.01) 
0.0015 
(0.14) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No -0.0151 
(-0.40) 
-0.0132 
(-0.35) 
Industrials No No 0.0149 
(0.77) 
0.0147 
(0.77) 
Materials No No 0.0800 
(3.28)*** 
0.0684 
(2.83)*** 
Utilities No No 0.1823 
(3.22)*** 
0.1679 
(2.99)*** 
Y2011 
 
0.0072 
(0.31) 
0.0049 
(0.22) 
0.0078 
(0.34) 
0.0054 
(0.24) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0032 
(-0.14) 
-0.0084 
(-0.37) 
0.0004 
(0.02) 
-0.0053 
(-0.24) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0187 
(-0.77) 
-0.0230 
(-0.96) 
-0.0097 
(-0.40) 
-0.0149 
(-0.62) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0711 0.0620 0.0952 0.0803 
F-Statistics 5.66 5.03 5.58 4.80 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
N 610 610 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.19 Leverage and the Performance-Augmented earnings management for 
limited company 
 Model 3 
Limited company 
Model 4 
Limited company 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.3738 
(-3.33)*** 
-0.3419 
(-3.09)*** 
-0.3256 
(-2.77)*** 
-0.3097 
(-2.67)*** 
DAC2+ 0.0905 
(1.98)** 
0.1007 
(2.15)** 
0.1116 
(2.29)** 
0.1218 
(2.53)** 
Size 0.416 
(3.69)*** 
0.0380 
(3.43)*** 
0.0335 
(2.82)*** 
0.0321 
(2.73)*** 
Tan 0.0393 
(1.01) 
0.0539 
(1.41) 
0.0425 
(1.10) 
0.0565 
(1.48) 
Pro -0.2141 
(-3.21)*** 
-0.1878 
(-2.86)*** 
-0.1876 
(-2.79)*** 
-0.1634 
(-2.46)** 
REV 
 
-0.0006 
(-0.22) 
-0.0001 
(-0.02) 
-0.0012 
(-0.43) 
-0.0005 
(-0.19) 
TR 
 
0.1005 
(2.47)** 
0.0790 
(1.97)** 
0.0946 
(2.32)** 
0.0755 
(1.88)* 
OCF 
 
0.0099 
(0.52) 
0.0135 
(0.73) 
0.0091 
(0.48) 
0.0131 
(0.71) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No 0.0149 
(0.24) 
0.0000 
(0.00) 
Industrials No No 0.0201 
(0.76) 
0.0156 
(0.26) 
Materials No No 0.0477 
(1.60) 
0.0337 
(1.14) 
Utilities No No 0.1761 
(2.78)*** 
0.1617 
(2.59)*** 
Y2011 
 
0.0120 
(0.41) 
0.0087 
(0.30) 
0.0141 
(0.48) 
0.0107 
(0.37) 
Y2012 
 
0.0091 
(0.30) 
0.0012 
(0.04) 
0.0110 
(0.37) 
0.0028 
(0.09) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0147 
(-0.46) 
-0.0211 
(-0.66) 
-0.0057 
(-0.18) 
-0.0127 
(-0.40) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0644 0.0566 0.0757 0.0638 
F-Statistics 3.89 3.52 3.46 3.04 
Probability 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 0.0002 
N 421 421 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.20 Leverage and the Performance-Augmented earnings management for 
sole-trader enterprise 
 
Model 5 
Sole-trader enterprise 
Model 6 
Sole-trader enterprise 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant -0.4824 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.4824 
(-3.54)*** 
-0.1828 
(-1.34) 
-0.1828 
(-1.34) 
DAC2+ 0.0462 
(0.91) 
0.0462 
(0.91) 
-0.0096 
(-0.19) 
-0.0096 
(-0.19) 
Size 0.0600 
(4.10)*** 
0.0600 
(4.10)*** 
0.0253 
(1.71)* 
0.0253 
(1.71)* 
Tan -0.0867 
(-2.24)** 
-0.0867 
(-2.24)** 
-0.0725 
(-1.97)** 
-0.0725 
(-1.97)** 
Pro -0.1901 
(-1.93)* 
-0.1901 
(-1.93)* 
-0.0905 
(-0.95) 
-0.0905 
(-0.95) 
REV 
 
-0.0189 
(-2.05) 
-0.0189 
(-2.05) 
-0.0127 
(-1.44) 
-0.0127 
(-1.44) 
TR 
 
-0.0159 
(-0.38) 
-0.0159 
(-0.38) 
-0.0016 
(-0.04) 
-0.0016 
(-0.04) 
OCF 
 
-0.0199 
(-1.58) 
-0.0199 
(-1.58) 
-0.0148 
(-1.26) 
-0.0148 
(-1.26) 
Consumer staples No 
 
No 
 
-0.0217 
(-0.59) 
-0.0217 
(-0.59) 
Industrials No No 0.0063 
(0.26) 
0.0063 
(0.26) 
Materials No No 0.2244 
(5.47)*** 
0.2244 
(5.47)*** 
Utilities No No - - 
 
Y2011 
 
0.0110 
(0.33) 
0.0110 
(0.33) 
0.0006 
(0.02) 
0.0006 
(0.02) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0096 
(-0.30) 
-0.0096 
(-0.30) 
-0.0013 
(-0.04) 
-0.0013 
(-0.04) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0035 
(-0.10) 
-0.0035 
(-0.10) 
0.0106 
(0.34) 
0.0106 
(0.34) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0751 0.0751 0.2127 0.2127 
F-Statistics 2.53 2.53 4.91 4.91 
Probability 0.0072 0.0072 0.0000 0.0000 
N 189 189 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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• Industry Classifications 
 This part provides the results of the additional tests of the impact of earnings 
management on leverage by regressing the absolute residuals from the Modified-Jones 
Model and the Performance-Augmented Model against total-debt and long-term debt 
ratio of Lao firms across different industry sectors. The firm-specific factors as well 
as industry and year-fixed effects are also used as controlled variables.  
Table 5.21 Leverage and the Modified-Jones earnings management across 
industry sectors 
 
Consumer  
discretionary 
Consumer  
staples 
Industrials Materials Utilities 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
 
-0.0739 
(-0.64) 
-0.0739 
(-0.64) 
-0.9704 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.9704 
(-3.81)*** 
-0.1406 
(-0.73) 
-0.1411 
(-0.74) 
-1.1870 
(-4.61)*** 
-1.1100 
(-4.25)*** 
-0.6935 
(-0.98) 
-0.7100 
(-1.15) 
DAC1+ 
 
0.1370 
(1.96)** 
0.1370 
(1.96)** 
0.0481 
(0.31) 
0.0481 
(0.31) 
0.2136 
(2.97)*** 
0.2088 
(2.91)*** 
-0.1037 
(-0.95) 
-0.0494 
(-0.45) 
0.5354 
(0.80) 
0.5421 
(0.94) 
Size 0.0043 
(0.35) 
0.0043 
(0.35) 
0.1100 
(4.15)*** 
0.1100 
(4.15)*** 
0.0210 
(1.04) 
0.0210 
(1.05) 
0.1275 
(5.08)*** 
0.1179 
(4.63)*** 
0.0668 
(1.05) 
0.0679 
(1.23) 
Tan 0.1297 
(3.32)*** 
0.1297 
(3.32)*** 
-0.1159 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.1159 
(-2.71)*** 
-0.1034 
(-2.00)** 
-0.1049 
(-2.03)** 
-0.0934 
(-1.08) 
-0.0133 
(-0.15) 
-0.5264 
(-2.47)** 
-0.4891 
(-2.65)*** 
Pro -0.2216 
(-2.39)** 
-0.2216 
(-2.39)** 
-0.4597 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.4597 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.2418 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.2561 
(-2.93)*** 
-0.0938 
(-0.64) 
0.0543 
(0.37) 
-1.1289 
(-1.44) 
-1.0786 
(-1.58) 
REV 
 
0.0183 
(2.28)** 
0.0183 
(2.28)** 
0.0078 
(0.72) 
0.0078 
(0.72) 
-0.0032 
(-0.43) 
-0.0032 
(-0.42) 
-0.0052 
(-1.58) 
-0.0038 
(-1.15) 
0.2621 
(2.57)*** 
0.2439 
(2.76)*** 
TR 
 
0.0047 
(0.10) 
0.0047 
(0.10) 
-0.0656 
(-1.47) 
-0.0656 
(-1.47) 
0.0580 
(1.19) 
0.0601 
(1.24) 
0.2017 
(2.75)*** 
0.1344 
(1.81)* 
-0.0177 
(-0.06) 
-0.0150 
(-0.06) 
OCF 
 
0.0147 
(0.81) 
0.0147 
(0.81) 
0.0108 
(0.42) 
0.0108 
(0.42) 
-0.0045 
(-0.31) 
-0.0046 
(-0.32) 
-0.1365 
(-2.58)*** 
-0.1178 
(-2.19)** 
0.2560 
(2.24)** 
0.2821 
(2.85)*** 
Y2011 
 
-0.0058 
(-0.17) 
-0.0058 
(-0.17) 
0.0013 
(0.04) 
0.0013 
(0.04) 
-0.0003 
(-0.01) 
-0.0005 
(-0.01) 
0.0458 
(0.86) 
0.0381 
(0.07) 
-0.2013 
(-1.04) 
-0.1881 
(-1.12) 
Y2012 
 
-0.0203 
(-0.61) 
-0.0203 
(-0.61) 
-0.0036 
(-0.10) 
-0.0036 
(-0.10) 
-0.0341 
(-0.90) 
-0.0376 
(-0.99) 
0.0658 
(1.19) 
0.0569 
(1.02) 
0.0093 
(0.07) 
0.0100 
(0.09) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0261 
(-0.77) 
-0.0261 
(-0.77) 
-0.0290 
(-0.59) 
-0.0290 
(-0.59) 
-0.536 
(-1.27) 
-0.0534 
(-1.28) 
0.0785 
(1.34) 
0.0587 
(0.99) 
- - 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.0750 0.0750 0.3702 0.3702 0.0664 0.0707 0.2313 0.1611 0.6945 0.7323 
F-Statistics 2.82 2.82 2.88 2.88 2.54 2.64 4.61 3.30 4.28 4.95 
Probability 0.0027 0.0027 0.0185 0.0185 0.0067 0.0047 0.0000 0.0009 0.9060 0.0691 
N 225 33 217 121 14 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
 Table 5.21 reports the effects of earnings management on total-debt and long-
term debt ratio by industry classifications. This study finds a positive and significant 
relationship between DAC1+and both TDebt and LDebt of firms in consumer 
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discretionary (5%) and industrials (1%). Therefore, enterprises in consumer 
discretionary and industrials use external debt as a governance mechanism to minimise 
opportunistic behaviour by managers. Whereas DAC1+ of Lao enterprises operating in 
consumer staples and utilities are positively and insignificantly related to both TDebt 
and LDebt, it exhibits a negative and insignificant relationship for the firms in 
materials. In sum, the results indicate clear evidence that this association between 
earnings management and leverage is diverse across industry sectors.  
Table 5.22 Leverage and the Performance-Augmented earnings management 
across industry sectors 
 
Consumer 
discretionary 
Consumer  
staples 
Industrials Materials 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 
 
-0.0858 
(-0.75) 
-0.0858 
(-0.75) 
-0.9241 
(-3.76)*** 
-0.9241 
(-3.76)*** 
-0.1575 
(-0.82) 
-0.1578 
(-0.82) 
-1.1778 
(-4.56)*** 
-1.0982 
(-4.20)*** 
DAC2+ 
 
0.1252 
(2.33)** 
0.1252 
(2.33)** 
-0.0621 
(-0.34) 
-0.0621 
(-0.34) 
0.1633 
(2.65)*** 
0.1666 
(2.72)*** 
-0.308 
(-0.33) 
0.0260 
(0.27) 
Size 0.0051 
(0.42) 
0.0051 
(0.42) 
0.1054 
(4.14)*** 
0.1054 
(4.14)*** 
0.0232 
(1.15) 
0.0230 
(1.15) 
0.1244 
(4.94)*** 
0.1143 
(4.49)*** 
Tan 0.1339 
(3.45)*** 
0.1339 
(3.45)*** 
-0.1223 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.1223 
(-2.78)*** 
-0.0918 
(-1.77)* 
-0.0934 
(-1.18) 
-0.0823 
(-0.95) 
0.0010 
(0.01) 
Pro -0.2133 
(-2.31)** 
-0.2133 
(-2.31)** 
-0.4440 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.4440 
(-3.51)*** 
-0.2479 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.2606 
(-2.98)*** 
-0.0816 
(-0.45) 
0.0767 
(0.51) 
REV 
 
0.0189 
(2.35)** 
0.0189 
(2.35)** 
0.0094 
(0.83) 
0.0094 
(0.83) 
-0.0039 
(-0.52) 
-0.0039 
(-0.52) 
-0.0051 
(-1.54) 
-0.0040 
(-1.18) 
TR 
 
0.0068 
(0.14) 
0.0068 
(0.14) 
-0.0616 
(-1.41) 
-0.0616 
(-1.41) 
0.0575 
(1.17) 
0.0590 
(1.21) 
0.1991 
(2.70)** 
0.1343 
(1.80)* 
OCF 
 
0.0138 
(0.76) 
0.0138 
(0.76) 
0.0082 
(0.33) 
0.0082 
(0.33) 
-0.0049 
(-0.33) 
-0.0051 
(-0.35) 
-0.1324 
(-2.50)** 
-0.1150 
(-2.14)** 
Y2011 
 
-0.0035 
(-0.10) 
-0.0035 
(-0.10) 
0.0087 
(0.25) 
0.0087 
(0.25) 
0.0016 
(0.04) 
0.0020 
(0.05) 
0.0495 
(0.93) 
0.0410 
(0.75) 
Y2012 
 
-0.200 
(-0.60) 
-0.200 
(-0.60) 
0.0062 
(0.18) 
0.0062 
(0.18) 
-0.0301 
(-0.79) 
-0.0339 
(-0.89) 
0.0695 
(1.26) 
0.0615 
(1.10) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0243 
(-0.72) 
-0.0243 
(-0.72) 
-0.0126 
(-0.34) 
-0.0126 
(-0.34) 
-0.0503 
(-1.19) 
-0.0501 
(-1.19) 
0.0734 
(1.25) 
0.0534 
(0.90) 
Adjusted  
R-squared 
0.0818 0.0818 
 
0.3709 0.3709 0.0585 0.0659 0.2257 0.1602 
F-Statistics 3.00 3.00 2.89 2.89 2.34 2.52 4.50 3.29 
Probability 0.0015 0.0015 0.0183 0.0185 0.0123 0.0069 0.0000 0.0009 
N 225 33 217 121 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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  Table 5.22 reports the impact of earnings management on the capital structure 
of Lao firms across industry sectors after adding return on asset ratio (ROA) to the 
Modified Jones Model, which is regarded as the Performance-Augmented Model 
(DAC1+). This study finds a positive relationship between the DAC1+ and TDebt as 
well as LDebt on consumer discretionary at the 5% level, and industrials at the 1% 
level of significance, but it is negatively and insignificantly for firms operating in 
consumer staples and materials, which have a mixed relationship.  In summary, the 
statistical results also confirm a diverse association between earnings management and 
leverage of Lao enterprises across different industry sectors. 
 In comparison between the result from the Modified Jones Model and the 
Performance-Augmented Model in relation to total-debt and long-term debt ratio, there 
are slightly different in the values of residual coefficients of the relationship, but the 
significant levels are not different. Therefore, the consistently empirical results from 
both models confirm the diverse impact capital structure on earnings management of 
Lao enterprises across different industry sectors. 
5.3.4 Robustness Checks 
  This study conducts additional tests to provide valid conclusions by re-
estimating the relationship between earnings management and capital structure in 
according to leveraged firms or firms with debt, and signed-values effects of the 
association as follows. 
• Leveraged Firms 
This study re-runs the regression on the relationship between earnings 
management and capital structure for a reduced sample of firms by considering only 
leveraged firms, which are separated into leveraged limited companies and leveraged 
sole-traders enterprises (Table 5.23). By comparison, the average total-debt ratio of 
the entire leveraged firms is around five times higher than the total-debt ratio for the 
entire sample over the period of study.  The total-debt ratio of the entire leveraged 
firms is between 34.85% and 42.23% (Appendix 4), whereas the total-debt ratio for 
the entire sample ranges from 6.86% to 8.91% (Figure 5.4). In the annual balance 
sheets of Lao private firms, there is a blank for reporting long-term and short-term 
debts which are commonly used as an external source of funds for their business 
operation. From the regression presented in the table, this study finds two interesting 
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results from the reduced sample of the enterprises. First, as this reported earlier in 
Table 5.15 and Table 5.18, the effect of earnings management on leverage for the entire 
sample is positive and significant. The result from Table 5.23 also shows a positive 
and significant association between DAC1+ and debt (TDebt and LDebt) of leveraged 
firms at the 5% level. These consistent findings for the entire sample and the entire 
leveraged firms confirm that Lao private enterprises have more debt financing or long-
term leverage when they are likely to engage in earnings manipulation. Second, there 
is a high positive relationship at the 1% level between earnings management and TDebt 
(0.3124) as well as LDebt (0.3626) for the leveraged limited companies, reflecting that 
the firms use external debt as a governance mechanism to mitigate corporate 
managers’ opportunistic behaviours (Jensen, 1986). However, the coefficient between 
earnings management’s measure and leverage is positively insignificant for the 
leveraged sole-trader enterprises. 
The similar impact of Performance-Augmented earnings management 
(DAC2+) on leverage is also found in Table 5.24. The DAC2+ of the entire leveraged 
firms is positively and significantly related to TDebt at the 10% level, and to LDebt at 
the 5% level. Meanwhile, the DAC2+ of the leveraged limited companies has a positive 
and significant relationship with TDebt at the 5% level, and to LDebt at the 1% level, 
the DAC2+ exhibits no significant association with the leverage measures for leveraged 
sole-trader enterprises. 
In a comparison of the results from Table 5.23 and Table 5.24, this study finds 
slightly different levels of significance between the coefficient values of earnings 
management’s measures (DAC1+and DAC2+ ) and TLdebt for the entire leveraged 
firms and the leveraged limited company. Whereas the DAC1+ exhibits the positive 
relationship at the 5% level, the DAC2+ is positively significant at the 10% level. 
However, these consistent findings confirm that both measures from the Modified 
Jones Model and the Performance-Augmented Model provide enough support 
evidence of the relationship between earnings management and debt of leveraged 
enterprises, particularly the leverage limited companies in the transitional economy of 
Laos. By contrast, this study is unable to find enough evidence of the association for 
the leveraged sole-trader enterprises. 
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Table 5.23 Leverage and the Modified-Jones earnings management for entire 
leveraged firms and subsamples 
 
Leveraged firm 
Leveraged limited  
company 
Leveraged sole-
trader enterprise 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 0.8776 
(3.08)*** 
0.8365 
(2.78)*** 
0.7050 
(2.17)** 
0.6388 
(1.87)* 
1.7990 
(0.84) 
1.7990 
(0.84) 
DAC1+ 0.2372 
(2.14)** 
0.2830 
(2.40)** 
0.3124 
(2.62)*** 
0.3626 
(2.90)*** 
0.8194 
(0.57) 
0.8194 
(0.57) 
Size -0.0730 
(-2.47)** 
-0.0689 
(-2.21)** 
-0.0603 
(-1.88)* 
-0.0538 
(-1.60) 
-0.1815 
(-0.65) 
-0.1815 
(-0.65) 
Tan 0.3917 
(3.99)*** 
0.4425 
(4.27)*** 
0.4430 
(4.35)*** 
0.4940 
(4.61)*** 
0.3725 
(0.40) 
0.3725 
(0.40) 
Pro -0.6924 
(-4.29)*** 
-0.6064 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.6922 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.6122 
(-3.56)*** 
-0.7673 
(-0.56) 
-0.7673 
(-0.56) 
REV 
 
0.0231 
(1.68)* 
0.0266 
(1.84)* 
0.0267 
(1.97)** 
0.0309 
(2.16)** 
-0.3817 
(-1.45) 
-0.3817 
(-1.45) 
TR 
 
0.1158 
(1.38) 
0.0455 
(0.51) 
0.1043 
(1.23) 
0.0375 
(0.42) 
1.2365 
(1.65)* 
1.2365 
(1.65)* 
OCF 
 
-0.0412 
(-0.91) 
-0.0314 
(-0.66) 
0.0276 
(0.56) 
0.0428 
(0.83) 
-0.1846 
(-1.00) 
-0.1846 
(-1.00) 
Consumer staples 0.0434 
(0.31) 
0.0717 
(0.49) 
0.0492 
(0.36) 
0.0757 
(0.52) 
- - 
Industrials -0.0684 
(-1.02) 
-0.0624 
(-0.88) 
-0.1005 
(-1.45) 
-0.0986 
(-1.35) 
0.1556 
(0.31) 
0.1556 
(0.31) 
Materials 0.0616 
(0.88) 
0.0432 
(0.58) 
0.0472 
(0.63) 
0.0202 
(0.26) 
0.1056 
(0.30) 
0.1056 
(0.30) 
Utilities 0.1756 
(1.59) 
0.1516 
(1.30) 
0.1908 
(1.75)* 
0.1646 
(1.43) 
- - 
Y2011 
 
0.0784 
(1.27) 
0.0641 
(0.98) 
0.0810 
(1.27) 
0.0667 
(1.00) 
0.1310 
(0.52) 
0.1310 
(0.52) 
Y2012 
 
0.0490 
(0.78) 
0.0141 
(0.21) 
0.0601 
(0.92) 
0.0232 
(0.34) 
0.1603 
(0.77) 
0.1603 
(0.77) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0700 
(-1.03) 
-0.0993 
(-1.39) 
-0.0698 
(-0.96) 
-0.1020 
(-1.33) 
-0.0913 
(-0.29) 
-0.0913 
(-0.29) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3277 0.2926 0.3851 0.3613 0.2720 0.2720 
F-Statistics 5.00 4.40 5.38 4.96 1.50 1.50 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.3733 0.3733 
N 116 99 17 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.24 Leverage and the Performance-Augmented earnings management 
for entire leveraged firms and subsamples 
 
Leveraged firm 
Leveraged limited  
company 
Leveraged sole-
trader enterprise 
TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt TDebt LDebt 
Constant 0.8676 
(3.01)*** 
0.8173 
(2.70)*** 
0.7501 
(2.28)** 
0.6669 
(1.94)* 
0.7973 
(0.61) 
0.7973 
(0.61) 
DA2+ 0.1698 
(1.72)* 
0.2382 
(2.30)** 
0.2183 
(2.02)** 
0.2978 
(2.65)*** 
0.0035 
(0.00) 
0.0035 
(0.00) 
Size -0.0712 
(-2.39)** 
-0.0672 
(-2.15)** 
-0.0632 
(-1.94)* 
-0.0564 
(-1.66)* 
-0.0440 
(-0.27) 
-0.0440 
(-0.27) 
Tan 0.3908 
(2.91)*** 
0.4500 
(4.29)*** 
0.4335 
(4.18)*** 
0.4920 
(4.55)*** 
-0.1173 
(-0.12) 
-0.1173 
(-0.12) 
Pro -0.6746 
(-4.05)*** 
-0.5681 
(-3.25)*** 
-0.6568 
(-3.85)*** 
-0.5526 
(-3.11)*** 
-0.9441 
(-0.60) 
-0.9441 
(-0.60) 
REV 
 
0.0214 
(1.54) 
0.0243 
(1.67)* 
0.0243 
(1.77)* 
0.0280 
(1.95)* 
-0.2848 
(-1.07) 
-0.2848 
(-1.07) 
TR 
 
0.1261 
(1.50) 
0.0544 
(0.61) 
0.1172 
(1.37) 
0.0484 
(0.54) 
1.2013 
(1.46) 
1.2013 
(1.46) 
OCF 
 
-0.0476 
(-1.04) 
-0.0385 
(-0.81) 
0.0178 
(0.36) 
0.0322 
(0.62) 
-0.2411 
(-1.44) 
-0.2411 
(-1.44) 
Consumer staples 0.0399 
(0.28) 
0.0777 
(0.53) 
0.0436 
(0.31) 
0.0812 
(0.55) 
- - 
Industrials -0.0595 
(-0.88) 
-0.0496 
(-0.70) 
-0.0865 
(-1.23) 
-0.0803 
(-1.09) 
-0.0670 
(-0.12) 
-0.0670 
(-0.12) 
Materials 0.0646 
(0.91) 
0.0479 
(0.65) 
0.0543 
(0.71) 
0.0294 
(0.37) 
-0.0508 
(-0.20) 
-0.0508 
(-0.20) 
Utilities 0.2054 
(1.78)* 
0.1984 
(1.64) 
0.2289 
(1.99)** 
0.2217 
(1.85)* 
- - 
Y2011 
 
0.0814 
(1.31) 
0.0692 
(1.06) 
0.0877 
(1.34) 
0.0788 
(1.16) 
0.1729 
(0.47) 
0.1729 
(0.47) 
Y2012 
 
0.0486 
(0.76) 
0.0140 
(0.21) 
0.0579 
(0.87) 
0.0219 
(0.32) 
0.1729 
(0.75) 
0.1729 
(0.75) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0669 
(-0.98) 
-0.0977 
(-1.36) 
-0.0679 
(-0.92) 
-0.1019 
(-1.32) 
0.0466 
(0.16) 
0.0466 
(0.16) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.3172 0.2887 0.3656 0.3516 0.2130 0.2130 
F-Statistics 4.82 4.33 5.03 4.80 1.36 1.36 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4143 0.4143 
N 116 99 17 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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• Signed-Values Effects 
 The additional tests in this section use signed-positive and negative values of 
the residual coefficient from the Modified Jones Model and the Performance-
Augmented Model as earnings management proxies for the limited companies and 
sole-trader enterprises (Figure 5.5). Whereas the signed-positive values contain 374 
observations, the signed-negative values consist of 236 observations from the total 
number of 610. In the additional tests, firm-specific factors, industry sectors, and year 
dummies are used as control variables. 
Figure 5.5 Observations of earnings management on leverage by firm types 
 
  
 Table 5.25 shows the effects of earnings management from the Modified Jones 
Model (DAC1) on total-debt ratio by splitting into positive and negative-signed 
earnings management.  On the negative sign of earnings management, this study can 
only find a negative and significant relationship between negative signed earnings 
management and total-debt ratio at the 5% level for the limited companies, indicating 
that the firms with higher leverage are less likely to engage in income-increasing 
earnings through the use of discretionary accruals. This result contradicts the main 
finding using the absolute residuals from the Modified-Jones Model (DAC1+) in Table 
5.16 of section 5.3.3. This study also finds a positive relationship between negative-
signed earnings management and the total-debt ratio for the sole-trader enterprises, but 
Positive  
Earnings management 
(374) 
Negative  
Earnings management 
(236) 
Earnings management 
(610) 
Limited 
company (257) 
Limited 
company (164) 
Sole-trader 
enterprise (72) 
Sole-trader 
enterprise (117) 
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the evidence is insignificant. On the positive sign of earnings management, this study 
finds a positive relationship between positive-signed earnings management and total 
debt for the limited company but there is a negative association for the sole-trader 
enterprises, both coefficients are not significant to the total-debt ratio.  
 Table 5.26 presents the impact of the Performance-Augmented positive and 
negative values of earnings management (DAC2) on total-debt for the limited 
companies and sole-trader enterprises. On the negative sign of earnings management 
for the limited companies, a negative relationship at 5% level is reported between the 
negative sign of the Performance-Augmented earnings management and total-debt 
ratio. On the positive sign, a positive relationship is found between the positive values 
of the Performance-Augmented earnings management and total-debt ratio for sole-
trader enterprises, but this study has no enough evidence support the impact. 
 In comparison from the two additional tests, the results in the Table 5.25 and  
Table 5.26 have a slight difference in coefficient values for both sole-trader enterprises 
and limited companies but there is no difference at significant levels. In summary, the 
results are not only in opposite direction but they are unable to support the main 
findings of the relationship between earnings management and capital structure of Lao 
private enterprises.  
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Table 5.25 Signed-values effects of total debt on the Modified-Jones earnings 
management 
 
Total debt 
Limited company Sole-trader enterprise 
Negative  DAC1 Positive DAC1 Negative DAC1 Positive DAC1 
Constant -0.1150 
(-0.60) 
-0.4747 
(-3.14)*** 
-0.0198 
(-0.17) 
-0.2429 
(-1.13) 
DAC1 -0.1960 
(-2.40)** 
0.0475 
(0.54) 
0.0335 
(0.73) 
-0.0108 
(-0.09) 
Size 0.0053 
(0.27) 
0.0541 
(3.58)*** 
-0.0082 
(-0.65) 
0.0353 
(1.49) 
Tan 0.0700 
(1.01) 
0.0693 
(1.45) 
0.0460 
(1.46) 
-0.1297 
(-2.31)** 
Pro -0.2553 
(-2.23)** 
-0.1561 
(-1.82)* 
0.1408 
(1.65)* 
-0.1983 
(-1.35) 
REV 
 
0.0008 
(0.11) 
-0.0004 
(-0.14) 
-0.0076 
(-0.95) 
-0.0079 
(-0.49) 
TR 
 
0.1427 
(20.4)** 
0.0306 
(0.06) 
0.0429 
(1.09) 
-0.0155 
(-0.25) 
OCF 
 
-0.0059 
(-0.19) 
0.0306 
(1.25) 
-0.0073 
(-0.75) 
-0.0312 
(-1.13) 
Consumer staples 0.0606 
(0.55) 
-0.0189 
(-0.26) 
-0.0094 
(-0.35) 
-0.0421 
(-0.58) 
Industrials 0.0793 
(1.79)* 
-0.0446 
(-1.35) 
0.0013 
(0.05) 
0.0088 
(0.25) 
Materials 0.0614 
(1.12) 
0.0240 
(0.67) 
0.4360 
(12.17)*** 
0.9990 
(1.61) 
Utilities 0.2599 
(3.15)** 
0.0292 
(0.26) 
- - 
Y2011 
 
0.0070 
(0.14) 
0.0032 
(0.09) 
0.0396 
(1.52) 
-0.0073 
(-0.15) 
Y2012 
 
0.0346 
(0.63) 
-0.0078 
(-0.22) 
0.0898 
(3.01)*** 
-0.0193 
(-0.49) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0061 
(-0.11) 
-0.0124 
(-0.31) 
0.0505 
(1.81)* 
0.0138 
(0.31) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1203 0.0605 0.7750 0.0089 
F-Statistics 2.59 2.18 19.81 1.08 
Probability 0.0022 0.0092 0.0000 0.3846 
N 164 257 72 117 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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Table 5.26 Signed-values effects of total debt on the Performance-Augmented 
earnings management 
 
Total debt 
Limited company Sole-trader enterprise 
Negative DAC2 Positive DAC2 Negative AC2 Positive DAC2 
Constant -0.1374 
(-0.71) 
-0.4606 
(-3.04)*** 
0.0287 
(0.24) 
-0.2494 
(-1.13) 
DAC2 -0.1874 
(-2.29)** 
-0.0568 
(-0.69) 
0.0351 
(0.76) 
0.0077 
(0.06) 
Size 0.0069 
(0.35) 
0.0550 
(3.64)*** 
-0.0091 
(-0.72) 
0.0357 
(1.49) 
Tan 0.0863 
(1.22) 
0.0655 
(1.37) 
0.0461 
(1.48) 
-0.1290 
(-2.29)** 
Pro -0.2682 
(-2.35)** 
-0.1624 
(-1.91)** 
0.1415 
(1.66)* 
-0.1948 
(-1.34) 
REV 
 
0.0005 
(0.07) 
-0.0006 
(-0.19) 
-0.0075 
(-0.94) 
-0.0077 
(-0.48) 
TR 
 
0.1369 
(1.96)** 
0.0301 
(0.59) 
0.0442 
(1.13) 
-0.0149 
(-0.24) 
OCF 
 
-0.0091 
(-0.30) 
0.0293 
(1.20) 
-0.0071 
(-0.73) 
-0.0317 
(-1.15) 
Consumer staples 0.0686 
(0.61) 
-0.0279 
(-0.38) 
-0.0112 
(-0.41) 
-0.0413 
(-0.56) 
Industrials 0.0879 
(1.99)** 
-0.0446 
(-1.35) 
0.0013 
(0.05) 
0.0094 
(0.27) 
Materials 0.0695 
(1.27) 
0.0286 
(0.80) 
0.4380 
(12.12)*** 
0.1002 
(1.61) 
Utilities 0.2754 
(3.26)*** 
0.0197 
(-0.02) 
- - 
Y2011 
 
0.0126 
(0.26) 
-0.0008 
(-0.02) 
0.0393 
(1.51) 
-0.0066 
(-0.14) 
Y2012 
 
0.0427 
(0.78) 
-0.113 
(-0.32) 
0.0899 
(3.02)*** 
-0.0196 
(-0.49) 
Y2013 
 
-0.0014 
(-0.03) 
-0.0117 
(-3.04)*** 
0.0490 
(1.76)* 
0.0132 
(0.30) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1174 0.0612 0.7752 0.0088 
F-Statistics 2.55 2.19 19.84 1.08 
Probability 0.0027 0.0087 0.0000 0.3850 
N 164 257 72 117 
Note: ***, **, and * represent the level of significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively, based on two-
tailed test. 
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5.4 Summary of the Statistical Analysis 
  This section summarises the main findings in accordance with the six 
hypotheses formulated in Chapter 5. The results of the tested hypotheses are presented 
in Table 5.27. The results from the statistical analyses in this Chapter indicate that five 
of the six hypotheses are empirically accepted, only the hypothesis H1b on the impact 
of tangibility on capital structure is rejected. 
Table 5.27 Summary of the hypotheses and related statistical analyses 
Hypothesis Test result 
H1a Firm size is positively related to financial leverage of Lao 
private enterprises 
Accepted 
H1b Tangibility is positively related capital structure of Lao 
private enterprises 
Rejected 
H1c Profitability is negatively related to financial leverage of 
Lao private enterprises 
Accepted 
H1d Lao private enterprises’ capital structure has a diverse 
relationship with industry sectors 
Accepted 
H2 Large private firms in Laos are more likely to engage in 
earnings management than small firms 
Accepted 
H3 Private firms with higher financial leverage are expected to 
have higher earnings management 
Accepted 
 
5.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presented the details of statistical tests undertaken to investigate 
all hypotheses developed in this study to observe Lao private enterprises’ capital 
structure decision and earnings management activities during the years of 2009-2013. 
These include descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, empirical results of dependent 
and independent variables from multivariate regression analyse. The statistics include 
the characteristics of dependent and independent variables within the entire sample 
and subsamples across different industry sectors. Further, this chapter also provided 
robustness check for the impact of earnings management on financial leverage of the 
limited companies and sole-trader enterprises.  
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  The empirical results were presented in sequential orders in according to each 
hypothesis. First, it revealed the determinants of capital structure of Lao private 
enterprises. This study found evidence consistent with prior empirical studies that firm 
size, tangibility, and profitability influence the financing decisions of the companies. 
Theoretically, the POT and the TOT of capital structure can partially explain the 
determinants of capital structure of private enterprises in Laos. In addition, this study 
also discovered that size, tangibility, and profitability have a diverse influence on 
financing decision of Lao firms across different industry sectors. Second, the firm size, 
tangibility, and profitability are not only the determinants of capital structure, but also 
considered as the main factors of earnings management for Lao private enterprises. 
Further, cash flow from operation for sole-trader enterprises is also another important 
determinant of earnings manipulation. When classifying the sample firms into 
different sectors, this study found that the influence of firm size, tangibility, 
profitability, total revenue, and trade receivables on earnings management varies 
across industry sectors. Third, the result showed that earnings management has an 
influence on the capital structure decisions of limited companies but it has no impact 
on the earnings management of sole-trader enterprises. Furthermore, this study also 
discovered significant evidence that earnings manipulation through the use of 
discretionary accruals were diverse across industry sectors. 
  The next chapter will provide the conclusion of the empirical results in 
according to the three research questions of this study as well as limitations and the 
possible application or extension for potential research in the future. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
  The general objective of this  study is to provide an insight into the business 
financing decisions and earnings management activities of Lao private enterprises by 
using firm-level data taken from their annual reports over a five-year period.  To 
achieve the objective, this study employs related prior empirical studies in conjunction 
with theoretical principles to explain capital structure decision and earnings 
management practices of the firms.   
 This thesis contains six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces to the background of 
capital structure decision, earnings management, determinants of earnings 
management, and the relationship between leverage and earnings management. It also 
presents the research objectives, research questions, motivations, contributions, scope 
and delimitation of this study. Chapter 2 briefly provides the institutional background 
of Laos. This includes a country overview, an insight into politics and government, as 
well as macroeconomic conditions, capital markets, portfolio investments, private 
sector, financial sectors and business financing in the country. It also describes 
auditing standards, financial reporting, and a profile of the auditing and accounting 
profession. Chapter 3 reviews the theoretical principles underlying capital structure 
decisions and also presents agency theory as it applies to business. The principles of 
capital structure include the POT and TOT. Chapter 3 also reviews prior literature on 
capital structure decisions, earnings management, determinants of earnings 
management, and the impact of leverage on earnings management. The review leads 
to the identification of a research gap and formulates a theoretical and empirical 
foundation for the hypotheses of this study. Chapter 4 describes the conceptual 
framework, formulates hypotheses, and explains research data and data collection. It 
also provides the measurement of dependent and independent variables used in this 
project. Importantly, it also presents the empirical methodology as well as the bias 
issues of this study. Chapter 5 provides descriptive statistics of all variables and 
presents the empirical results and discussions in conjunction with reviewed theoretical 
principles and the findings from prior studies. Additionally, it explains the results of 
robustness checks for the impact of earnings management on financial leverage of Lao 
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private enterprises. 
 This final chapter comprises of five main sections. The next section (6.2) 
summarises the main empirical results in according to each research question of this 
study.  Section 6.3 features the research and policy implications. Section 6.4 describes 
the contributions of the empirical results found in this investigation. Section 6.5 
explains the limitations of this study. Finally, Section 6.6 highlights the potential 
avenues for future research related to the private enterprises used in this study. 
6.2 Summary of the Empirical Findings 
  This section draws summaries  from the empirical findings in terms of capital 
structure decision and earnings management of Lao private firms. The empirical 
summaries are derived from the statistical testing of six formulated hypotheses to 
answer three research questions developed in Chapter 4. The hypotheses have been 
statistically tested by using multiple linear regression models. The dataset used in the 
statistical analyses were taken from annual reports of 224 private enterprises in the 
capital city of Laos. The dataset contains 674 observations over the five-year period 
of 2009-2013. The summaries of the main empirical results are presented in according 
to each research question as in the following subsections.   
6.2.1 Research Question One 
 The first research question of this study is “What are the firm-specific 
characteristics and industry sectors that influence capital structure decision of Lao 
private enterprises?” To answer the question, this study formulated four hypotheses on 
the influence of the firm-specific factors on financing decision of the enterprises. The 
following four hypotheses are formulated in according to the POTor TOT and the 
empirical supports from prior studies: 
1). Hypothesis H1a: Firm size is positively related to long-term debt 
2). Hypothesis H1b: Asset tangibility is positively related long-term debt 
3). Hypothesis H1c: Profitability is negatively related to long-term debt 
4). Hypothesis H1d: Lao private enterprises’ capital structure has a diverse 
relationship with industry sectors 
 The empirical results of this study on the influence of firm-specific 
characteristics on capital structure are partially consistent with the predictions of the 
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POT or TOT. Although Laos is a least developed country during the economic 
transition from a command regime to a market-oriented mechanism, certain firm-
specific factors that affect capital structure of firms in developed and developing 
countries also influence financing decision of Lao private enterprises. This has 
reflected that private firms in Laos have followed the basic rules of a market-oriented 
economy despite the centrally-planned regime. The business operation of the 
enterprises has shown a profit-oriented nature. Based on the statistical analyses of this 
study, the hypotheses H1a, H1c and H1d are accepted but the hypothesis H1b is rejected. 
 The result showed that firm size is positively significant to long-term debt, 
implying that larger firms can easily access to financial leverage because bankruptcy 
cost associated with carrying debt are likely to decline as Lao firms become larger 
(Ang et al., 1982; Gruber & Warner, 1977).  Thus, firm size is a very important factor 
that influences the accessibility to debt finance. Particularly, firm size of limited 
companies has a stronger relationship with long-term debt than the sole-trader 
enterprises’. The evidence is in agreement with the prior studies of listed companies 
in Japan and the United States (Rajan & Zingales, 1995) and in the transitional 
economy of China (Huang, 2006). Correspondingly, the explanatory power of the TOT 
is also applicable with regard to the size of Lao private enterprises. Therefore, the 
hypothesis H1a is statistically accepted. 
 Empirically, the results are mixed with both positive and negative association 
between tangibility and leverage of limited companies and sole-trader enterprises as 
well as the entire sample. The tangibility is positively insignificant to long-term debt 
of limited companies but negatively significant to long-term liabilities of sole-trader 
enterprises. This indicates that the tangible assets, which are commonly considered as 
collaterals for firms to access to debt finance, do not play an important role to Lao 
private enterprises in their financing decisions. It also means that whether the firms 
have high or low tangibility in their asset structures, the tangible assets will not affect 
their capital structure. The result of sole-trader enterprises is in line with V. A. Dang 
(2013) who reports that tangible assets of firms in the UK, France and Germany are 
negatively related to leverage, but contradicted for firms in the transitional economy 
of China (Huang, 2006), noted that tangibility has a positive association with debt. The 
result is not in agreement with the TOT but support the Pecking-Order perspective. 
Therefore, there hypothesis H1b is statistically rejected. 
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 Profitability has a negatively significant relationship with long-term debt of 
limited companies but it is insignificant with the leverage of sole-trader enterprises. 
The results indicate that the limited companies that are more profitable tend to have 
low leverage because retained earnings increase over time and there is more retained 
profit available to finance investments. As a result, firms are more likely to use retained 
earnings as their primary source on investment than external debt. In the overall 
sample, the result is not only in line with the prior findings of firms in developed and 
developing countries (Booth et al., 2001; Kayhan & Titman, 2007) but also with the 
transitional economy of China (Huang, 2006) and emerging Central and Eastern 
European countries (Delcoure, 2007). The empirical result confirms the prediction of 
POT. Therefore, the hypothesis H1c is statistically accepted. 
 The empirical analyses of industry effects on capital structures reveal that the 
material and utility sectors have a positive significance to leverage, but consumer 
staples are negatively insignificant to debt, whereas industrials have a mixed and 
insignificant relationship with leverage. The results indicate that Lao private 
enterprises adjust their debt-equity ratios to seek an optimum capital structure and the 
firms in different industry sectors exhibit diverse degrees of leverage. Firms in the 
industry sectors relying more on fixed tangible assets, such as utilities, tend to adjust 
their capital structures faster than firms in other sectors that have lower levels of 
tangible assets. This is in line with the prediction of the TOT on a given industry’s 
influence on capital structure. The statistical results are theoretically and empirically 
plausible for the private enterprises in Laos. The results are also consistent with 
previous studies of firms in developed and developing countries (Delcoure, 2007; 
Frank & Goyal, 2009; Hovakimian et al., 2001; Lemmon et al., 2008; MacKay & 
Phillips, 2005) as well as in transitional economy of China (Huang, 2006). Therefore, 
the hypothesis H1d is empirically accepted.   
6.2.2 Research Question Two 
 The second research question of this study is: “What are the main determinants 
of earnings management of Lao private enterprises?” To answer the question, this 
study formulated the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis H2:  Large private firms in Laos are more likely to engage in 
earnings management than small firms 
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 The empirical result of the influence of size on earnings management of Lao 
firms indicate that size is positively significant to earnings management. This implies 
that large firms are more likely to engage in earnings management through the use of 
discretionary accruals than small firms. The result is in line with Moses (1987) and 
Wootton (1995). Based on the statistical finding of the overall sample, the hypothesis 
H2 is statistically accepted.  
 In addition to the firm size, this study finds that tangibility and profitability 
also have a negative and significant relationship with earnings management of Lao 
private firms, implying that the firms with higher tangibility and profitability tend to 
have less earnings manipulation. In addition, operating cash flow is positively and 
significantly associated with earnings management of sole-trader enterprises, 
indicating that firms engage in more earnings management when they have more cash 
flow from operation. Furthermore, this study found that the influence of firm size, 
tangibility, profitability, total revenue, and trade receivables on earnings management 
varies across industry sectors. The variation of industry influence exists due to several 
possible factors, such as competition nature, industry heterogeneity in business risk, 
asset types, regulation and technology (Brander & Lewis, 1986; Chevalier, 1995). 
6.2.3 Research Question Three 
 The third research question of this study is “What are the relationships between 
earnings management and financial leverage of Lao private enterprises?” To answer 
the question, this study formulated the following hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis H3:  Lao private firms with higher financial leverage are expected 
to have higher earnings management 
 The empirical result indicates that earnings management has a positively 
significant impact on financial leverage of Lao private firms. This means that the firms 
use leverage as a governance mechanism to mitigate the opportunistic behaviour of 
managers because debt repayments reduce the financial resources available to them 
for non-optimum spending, and the debt financing undergoes the scrutiny of creditors 
that is often subjected to lender-induced spending restriction (Jensen, 1986). The 
finding is in agreement with the argument of prior studies (An et al., 2016; DeFond & 
Jiambalvo, 1994; Klein, 2002; Othman & Zeghal, 2006; Rodríguez-Pérez & van 
Hemmen, 2010; Sweeney, 1994). Based on this analysis, the hypothesis H3 is 
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statistically accepted. In addition to the main finding, this study also reveals a 
significant evidence that the earnings manipulation through the use of discretionary 
accruals of Lao enterprises across industry sectors are diverse.  
6.3 Implications 
 This study has several implications for owners or financial managers of Lao 
private enterprises, as well as academics, regulators and financial institutions. The 
results from this investigation support a number of earlier studies and can help improve 
an awareness of the determinants of capital structure, the existence of earnings 
management, the determinants of earnings management, and the impact of earnings 
manipulation on financial leverage of private firms in Laos.  
 As the determinants of capital structure are suggested to influence financing 
decision of the firms, users of this study may find the empirical results useful with 
regards to debt policy. Total-debt seems to be linked to several independent variables 
in various ways. It also seems to be that Lao private firms with low collateral ratios 
suffer the most from information asymmetry. These firms may benefit from starting to 
cooperate with commercial banks in their early stages of business life cycles to create 
good track records and reputations for long-term operation.  Such close cooperation 
may help both Lao firms and banks reduce possible problems related to agency 
conflicts and information asymmetry.  
 Given that capital structure of Lao private firms is a significant basis for credit 
policy formulation, the current results of this study could also be useful for regulators. 
As a limitation of suitable financing sources during the time of economic transition in 
Laos, it could be beneficial to encourage the development of new or more flexible 
financial products to stimulate the circulation of financial resources to Lao private 
enterprises in contribution to overall economic development.  
  The result in this study empirically confirmed that Lao private enterprises 
engage in income-decreasing management to avoid taxable income by reporting 
regative earnings or low taxable income. The earnings management results in a 
negative effect on tax collection of tax authorities in Laos.  In response, regulators can 
set strict controls  in conjuction with accounting rules and standards into an 
enforcement to ensure the earnings quality or limit earnings frauds in their financial 
reports before submitting to tax authorities for taxation purpose. Conseqently, Lao 
government will be able to retain negative earnings management of private firms and 
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also capable to collect more revenues from business tax to finance public spendings. 
6.4 Contributions of the Study 
 This study contributes to the existing literature on corporate financial 
management. It also provides an insight for corporate’s owners or financial managers, 
academics, and regulators due to the following reasons:  
 The results from this study enrich an extended empirical evidence of corporate 
financing and earnings management in least developed countries, such as Laos. The 
country has a unique status of least developed economy during transitional period from  
centrally-planned regime to one based on a market-oriented mechanism. An 
accessiblitily to financial data of private firms in Laos is very  difficult and limited due 
to an unavailability of digital data and few requirements for publication.  In addition, 
the financing decision and earnings management activities of the firms are always been 
in concern of Lao government and have never been empirically explored. Therefore, 
the results of this study are important and even more valuable as the financial data 
accessed may not be available to researchers in the future. 
  This study also contributes to the ongoing research in accounting or finance 
literature. It provides a quantitative insight knowledge of capital structure decision and 
earnings management for private firms’ managers, policymakers and other 
stakeholders. The results on firm-specific determinants and industry factors benefit 
financial managers in their financing decision to maximise firms’ profitability. This 
study may also help policymakers to set appropriate rules and regulations in the future 
for business financing and to retrain negative earnings management. In addition, 
creditors of Lao private enterprises can minimise credit risks arising from their 
lendings by considering  more determinants of capital structure and earnings 
management. 
6.5 Limitations of the Study 
 This current study has a number of limitations. One of the concerns is the 
generalization of the results. The sample private enterprises only operate in five 
industry sectors, indicating that the extent to which the results can be generalised to 
other sectors as a whole can be questioned. The lack of extensive sample and longer 
period prevents this study from investigating the capital structure decision and 
earnings management activities over the generalization and a longer time horizon.  
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 Secondly, financial data used in this study is not in the form of balanced panel 
data. Accordingly, the study has to seek for an appropriate tool to analyse the financial 
information in the case of Lao private enterprises. Most of the data is only in the form 
of hard copy and not electronically available. Not all financial reports of firms 
registered to each tax office are available to collect for five consecutive years from 
2009 to 2013. In addition, some specific firms did not only report their financial 
information to a single tax office but also submitted to other offices during the period 
of study. For example, some firms submitted their annual reports for 2009 and 2010 to 
the Vientiane Tax Office but their financial information for 2011-2013 was collected 
by the Tax Department. This means that some missing data exist for some particular 
years in the statistical analysis. Therefore, the existence of missing reports in different 
tax offices is impossible to fullill five consecutive years for some enterprises.  
 Thirdly, as far as the concerns about quality of financial reports used in this 
study goes, the results in this study are based on the accepted financial reports under 
Lao accounting manuals and instructions. Due to the reports were submitted for 
taxation purposes, the reported figures were manipulated by using discretionary 
accruals, as this proven in Chapter 5, section 5.3.2 on earnings management of Lao 
firms. Therefore, the eimpirical results of this study are not fully comparable to prior 
studies of firms with financial reports under different accounting standards, such as 
IFRS or GAAP. 
 Finally, since a majority of private enterprises in Laos does not rely on equity 
market, the firms have fewer incentives to disclose their internal information. In 
addition, there is a little obligation for them to release their financial data to public 
users under the Law on Enterprise (Government, 2005). Thus, financial reports of the 
taken sample cannot be found in any publication or on the internet. Furthermore, their 
boards of director might simply be there because the law prescribes their existence. 
6.6 Recommendations for Future Research 
 The study on financing decisions and earnings management activities of private 
firms in least-developed country with transitional economy is relatively new in Laos. 
In addition, there are vast issues within the undiscovered areas that remain for future 
researchers. Further theoretical and empirical examination is still required. This study 
raises several questions for future investigation.  
 Firstly, why do Lao private firms have fairly low leverage ratios, despite the 
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large tax advantage enjoyed by debt? As reviewed, the banking sector in Laos is in a 
relatively early period of development and is unsophisticated by international 
standards. The country’s commercial banks are still small in size and have limited 
services. In such environment, there would be some shortages in the capacity of their 
services to enhance the financial resources available for private firms.  
 Secondly, do institutional factors within Laos affect the financing decisions of 
Lao private enterprises? Further research is required to develop new hypotheses in 
regarding financing decisions and the design of new testable variables to investigate 
the institutional influence on capital structure of the firms. The institutional factors 
would include such factors as: state ownership or institutional ownership (Li et al., 
2009), relationship with main banks (Hirota, 1999), political patronage (Donald R 
Fraser & Chek, 2006), and country-specific factors (De Jong et al., 2008).   In addition 
to the institutional factors, a larger sample of private firms from major provinces in 
Laos is also required for further detailed study and generalisation of capital structure 
choices.  
 Lastly, what are the incentives for managers of Lao enterprises to use 
accounting procedures or discretionary accruals to minimise their earnings? Some 
potential incentives would be in existence, such as unstandardised accounting rules, 
weak legal enforcement (Burgstahler et al., 2006), low levels of  audit quality (L. 
Dang, 2004), and income-tax avoidance (Lin et al., 2012). Those causalities can be 
empirically examined by acquiring related data with more testable details.   
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Appendix 1: Request for data collection (Lao version) 
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Request for data collection (Translation from the Lao version) 
 
Lao’s People Democratic Republic 
Peace Independence Democracy Unity Prosperity 
 
 
 
Ministry of Education and Sports 
National University of Laos 
Faculty of Economics and Business Management 
  
 
 
Request for Data Release 
To:  The director general of Tax Department 
Purpose: To request for the use of business enterprises’ financial reports in Tax 
Department from the year 2009 to 2013 
  On behalf of the Faculty of Economics and Business Management (FEBM), I am 
pleased to request for the collection of financial information of business enterprises taxed 
under tax regulations of the Taxation Department, Ministry of Finance, for Somephiane 
KEOKHOUNSY, one of our lecturers. He is currently conducting a research for his doctoral 
study, majoring in Business Administration at the Southern Queensland University in 
Australia. The requested financial reports include Balance Sheet and Income Statement of 100 
enterprises from the year 2009 to 2013 in Tax Department. The financial information will be 
investigated as his doctoral thesis under the topic: “Capital Structure and Earnings 
Management of Business Enterprises: Evidence from Transitional Economy Laos”. All 
financial information requested to obtain will be solely used for this research and not to be 
shared with other researchers or private or public body for different purposes.  
  Therefore, this letter is made and proposed to you for your kindest consideration in 
response to our government policy on supporting academic research in Laos.  
Dean of the Faculty of Economics and Business Administration 
(Signature and stamp) 
 
 
(Contact person: Somephiane KEOKHOUNSY, Phone: 020 22222902, Email: u1077037@umail.usq.edu.au) 
Dongdok Campus, Xaythany, Vientiane, P.O.Box: 7322, Tel.: +856 21 770067, Fax: +856 21 720160 
No.:_____________/FEBM.16 
Vientiane, date: _____________ 
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Appendix 2: Permission for use of data 
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Appendix 3: List of the private firms in the analysis 
 Name of the firm 
1 889 Construction Machanics and Trade Co. Ltd 
2 AAS (Sole) 
3 AAS Co. Ltd 
4 ACA Co. Ltd 
5 AIF Service (Sole) 
6 ALPI Lao International Co. Ltd 
7 Arda Language Centre Co. Ltd 
8 Argryn Consulting Service (Sole) 
9 ARI Co. Ltd 
10 ASC Construction (Sole) 
11 Asia Zafari Travel (Sole) 
12 Asia-Trade Net-Boncafe (Lao) Co. Ltd 
13 AT Lao Co. Ltd 
14 BECS Co. Ltd 
15 Better Service (Sole) 
16 Beungkayong Construction (Sole) 
17 BioNet Lao (Sole) 
18 BKN Co. Ltd 
19 BL Industry Planting and Livestock Co. Ltd 
20 BL Poverty Reduction Support (Sole) 
21 Bounpee Consultant (Sole) 
22 CALAO Vientiane Hotel Ltd 
23 CAMC's Machinary Service Lao Co. Ltd 
24 Chalern TT Motor Export-Import (Sole) 
25 Charoen Phattana Group Co. Ltd 
26 Chitnapha Construction (Sole) 
27 Codupha Lao Co. Ltd 
28 Construction Component Manufacturing (Sole) 
29 Dansavanh Vientiane Hotel Ltd 
30 DB Co. Ltd 
31 DM Construction-Trading Co. Ltd 
32 DST Factory Steel Co. Ltd 
33 Earn and Young Lao Co. Ltd 
34 Eurotech Co. Ltd 
35 Gateway Enterprise Ltd 
36 GEOMAP Lao Co. Ltd 
37 Great Lao Garments Co. Ltd 
38 Green Indochina Mining Co. Ltd 
39 Guanming-Vientiane Joint Development Steel Co. Ltd 
40 HECI (Sole) 
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 Name of the firm 
41 Hi-Tech Lao Apparel Co. Ltd 
42 Homsombat Accounting Service (Sole) 
43 Hong Livestock and farming (Sole) 
44 Hongsana Bridge Construction (Sole) 
45 Hoon Travel Co. Ltd 
46 Human Technical Development School (Sole) 
47 Indochina Consulting Co. Ltd 
48 Inter Spirit (Lao) (Sole) 
49 Investment Consulting Co. Ltd 
50 IT APIS Co. Ltd 
51 I-Tech Construction Co. Ltd 
52 Jaikampang Electrical Store Co. Ltd 
53 Jansy Transport Service Co. Ltd 
54 JB Trading (Sole) 
55 Jompet Mine Manufacturing Export-Import (Sole) 
56 Kempone Aircon Assembly (Sole) 
57 Keokhounsarb Construction and Real Estate (Sole) 
58 Keota Wood Processing Co. Ltd 
59 KFS (Sole)  
60 Khounthavong Lao Construction Co. Ltd 
61 Kolao Developing Co. Ltd 
62 Kongkeo Kamlai Co. Ltd 
63 Kongphet Havy Equipment and Part (Sole) 
64 KP Co. Ltd 
65 KPMG Lao Co. Ltd 
66 KPS Wood Products Co. Ltd 
67 Lanexang Petroleum Co. Ltd 
68 Lanxang Garments Co. Ltd 
69 Lao ASEAN High-Tech Industry Industrial Co. Ltd 
70 Lao Bio Energy Group Co. Ltd 
71 Lao BSS Co. Ltd 
72 Lao Cement Industry Co. Ltd 
73 Lao Charcoal Development Co. Ltd 
74 Lao GIS (Sole) 
75 Lao Home Mart Import-Export (Sole) 
76 Lao KaiYuan Mining (Sole) 
77 Lao May Petroleum Co. Ltd 
78 Lao Modern Consulting Co. Ltd 
79 Lao Paking Product Co. Ltd 
80 Lao Pu Ying Mining Co. Ltd 
81 Lao SPG CMC Mining Co. Ltd 
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 Name of the firm 
82 Lao Sport Travel Co. Ltd 
83 Lao Stanley Co. Ltd 
84 Lao Syuen Tour Co. Ltd 
85 Lao Taixing Mining Co. Ltd 
86 Lao Tonglian Mining Co. Ltd 
87 Lao Vang Vieng Cement Co. Ltd 
88 Lao Yamaki Co. Ltd 
89 Lao Yong Chaleon Trading Export-Import Co. Ltd 
90 Lao Yun Co. Ltd 
91 Lao-China Friendship Furniture Co. Ltd 
92 Lao-China Joint Development TIN Co. Ltd 
93 Lao-China Pump Fixing Service Co. Ltd 
94 Lao-Indochina group Co. Ltd 
95 Lao-Lidu Mining Co. Ltd 
96 Lao-Viet Hungheaung Co. Ltd 
97 Lao-Viet Trade Export-Import (Sole) 
98 Leamthong Trading (sole) 
99 LEDC Investment Co. Ltd 
100 Leighton Constractor (Laos) 
101 Leudnilan Agricultural Promotion (Sole) 
102 Leuxay Hotel Ltd 
103 Lotus Consulting (Sole) 
104 LT Computer Co. Ltd 
105 LTCSV Trade and Service 
106 Manivone Plant Development for Export-Import (Sole) 
107 Manivorn Planting (Sole) 
108 MB Export-Import (Sole) 
109 MBMC Consulting and Investment (Sole) 
110 Meely Haisork Travel (Sole) 
111 Mekong Commerce Building Co. Ltd 
112 Mekong Consultant and Investment (Sole) 
113 Mekong Trading and Investment Import-Export (Sole) 
114 MEX Consultant Co. Ltd 
115 Milsearch-BPKP EOD Joint Venture Co. Ltd 
116 Mit Lao Electric (Sole) 
117 Mitvieng Co. Ltd 
118 MJ Auto Trading Export-Import (Sole) 
119 Mouan Sone Ninhom Co. Ltd 
120 MP Tour Co. Ltd 
121 MSA Trading Import-Export (Sole) 
122 Nakonesack Hotel Ltd 
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 Name of the firm 
123 Namlik 1-2 Power Co. Ltd 
124 Namngum 5 Power Co. Ltd 
125 Namsi_Lao (Maestria) Co. Ltd 
126 NCX Co. Ltd 
127 New Chip Xeng Co. Ltd 
128 Nhonkeelek Wood Processing Co. Ltd 
129 NorConsult Laos (Sole) 
130 Novotel Vientiane Ltd 
131 NP Equipment (Sole) 
132 NVN Service (Sole) 
133 Office Ref: KAMUDABERHAD Ltd 
134 PA Service Co. Ltd 
135 Participatory Development Training Centre (PADETC) Ltd 
136 Pasongsouk Construction (Sole) 
137 Pasongsouk Thavixay Construction (Sole) 
138 Pattamawat Petroleum Co. Ltd 
139 Peeza Mortor Co. Ltd 
140 Peng Lamphanh Construction Co. Ltd 
141 Petsamay Petroleum Co. Ltd 
189 TPS Co. Ltd 
190 Trimax Co. Ltd 
191 Trio Lao Export Co. Ltd 
192 Tri-S Co. Ltd 
193 TTC Construction (Sole) 
194 Unicity Lao (Sole) 
195 Urai Phanich Co. Ltd 
196 Vast Mining Co. Ltd 
197 Venture International (Lao) 
198 Vieng Champa Travel Co. Ltd 
199 Vieng Motor (Sole) 
200 Viengchan Career Development College Ltd 
201 Viengchan XiewTang Co. Ltd 
202 Viengkham Construction Co. Ltd 
203 Viengnakhone Hotel Ltd 
204 Viengnakorn Export-Import (Sole) 
205 Viengthong Phamarcy Export-Import (Sole) 
206 Vientiane Agricultural Trading Export-Import Co. Ltd 
207 Vientiane Carton Factory Co. Ltd 
208 Vientiane Cement Co. Ltd 
209 Vientiane Cleaning Co. Ltd 
210 Vientiane Steel Industry Co. Ltd 
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 Name of the firm 
211 Vietiane Construction Co. Ltd 
212 Vietin Lao Co. Ltd 
213 Vilazama Import-Export Co. Ltd 
214 VPG Lao-Viet Joint Stock Company Co. Ltd 
215 VPP Electrical Installation and Fixing (Sole) 
216 Wonderful Cartons MFG Co. Ltd 
217 Wonderful Garments Co. Ltd 
218 Xang Chiang Co. Ltd 
219 Xaybouatong Construction Co. Ltd 
220 Xeaman 3 Power Co. Ltd 
221 Xokxai Agricultural Promotion Export-Import Co. Ltd 
222 Yin Zing Co. Ltd 
223 Yumy Business Centre (Sole) 
224 Zheng Liang Jiangshen Trading and Mining Co. Ltd 
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Appendix 4: Total-debt ratio of leveraged limited company and sole-trader 
enterprise 
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Appendix 5: Summary of empirical findings on capital structure decision of firms in developed countries 
Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
The Choice 
between Equity 
and Debt: An 
empirical study 
Marsh 
(1982) 
The Journal of 
Finance 
748 UK listed 
firms for the 
period of 
1959-1974 
Size, asset composition, 
bankruptcy risk, Beta, 
standard deviation of 
EBIT, standard deviation 
of returns 
- Firms are heavily influenced by market 
conditions and the past history of security 
prices in choosing between debt and equity. 
- Firms appear to make their choice of 
financing instrument as if they have target 
levels of debt in mind. 
- Target debt levels are themselves a function 
of company size, bankruptcy risk, and asset. 
Testing Capital 
Structure 
Theories using 
Error Correction 
Models: 
Evidence from 
the UK, France 
and Germany 
V. A. Dang 
(2013) 
Applied 
Economics 
1,340 UK, 446 
German, and 
316 French 
firms for the 
period of 
1980-2007 
Collateral value of assets, 
non-debt tax shields, 
profitability, growth, 
cash flow deficit 
- UK, French and German firms adjust 
towards target leverage quickly in both the 
partial adjustment and error correction models, 
which is consistent with the TOT. 
- The TOT explains the firms’ financing 
decisions better than the POT. 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
The 
Determinants of 
Debt Maturity 
Structure: 
Evidence from 
France, Germany 
and the UK 
Antoniou et 
al. (2006) 
European 
Financial 
Management 
All non-
financial firms 
listed in 
France, 
Germany and 
the UK for the 
years 1969-
2000, 1983-
2000, and 
1987-2000 
respectively 
Lagged maturity, 
effective tax rate, interest 
rate, term structure, 
leverage, liquidity, firm  
quality, earnings, 
volatility, market to book 
ratio, size, asset maturity, 
share price, market 
equity  premium 
- The applicability of most theories of debt 
maturity structure for the UK firms. 
- The debt maturity structure of a firm is 
determined by firm-specific factors and the 
country’s financial systems and institutional 
traditions in which it operates. 
Capital Structure 
Around the 
World: The roles 
of firm-and 
country-specific 
determinants 
De Jong et 
al. (2008) 
Journal of 
Banking & 
Finance 
11,845 firms 
from 42 
countries  
worldwide for 
the years of 
1997-2001 
Tangibility, business risk, 
size, tax, growth, 
profitability, liquidity, 
bond market structure, 
stock market structure, 
capital formation 
- Firm-specific determinants of leverage 
differ across countries. 
- There is an indirect impact because country-
specific factors also influence the roles of firm-
specific determinants of leverage. 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
Capital Structure 
and Institutional 
Setting: A 
decompositional 
and international 
analysis 
López-
Iturriaga and 
Rodriguez-
Sanz (2008) 
Applied 
Economics 
A large 
number of 
firms from 10 
countries for 
the years of 
1997-2002 
Market-to-book value, 
sales, profitability, 
tangibility 
- The performance and size of the firm, the 
assets tangibility and the growth opportunities 
have a relevant but differential effect across 
the different institutional systems. 
- The legal and institutional system of each 
country does not only affect firms’ capital 
structure but also creates the conditions to 
explain a differential effect of the common 
determinants of firms’ financial choices. 
What Do We 
Know about 
Capital 
Structure? Some 
evidence from 
international data 
Rajan and 
Zingales 
(1995) 
The Journal of 
Finance 
8,000 firms 
from 31 
countries for 
the years of 
1987-1991 
Market-to-book value, 
sales, profitability, 
tangibility, return on 
assets 
- Factors identified by previous studies as 
correlated in the cross-section with firm 
leverage in the United States, are similarly 
correlated in other countries as well. 
- A deeper examination of the US and foreign 
evidence suggests that the theoretical 
underpinnings of the observed correlations are 
still largely unresolved. 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
Capital Structure 
Decisions of 
Globally-listed 
Shipping 
Companies 
Drobetz et 
al. (2013) 
Transportation 
Research Part 
E: Logistics and 
Transportation 
Review 
115 listed 
shipping 
companies 
from G7 
countries for 
the years of 
1992-2010 
Book leverage, market 
leverage, tangibility, 
market-to-book ratio, 
profitability, size, 
operating leverage, asset 
risk, dividend payer, 
rating profitability 
- When compared with industrial firms from 
the G7 countries, shipping companies exhibit 
higher leverage ratios and higher financial risk. 
- Standard capital structure variables exert a 
significant impact on the cross-sectional 
variation of leverage ratios in the shipping 
industry. 
- Asset tangibility is positively related to 
corporate leverage, and its economic impact is 
more pronounced than in other industries. 
- Profitability, asset risk, and operating 
leverage are all inversely related to leverage. 
- The speed of adjustment after deviations 
from the target leverage ratio is lower during 
economic recessions. 
- The capital structure adjustment speed in the 
maritime industry is higher compared with the 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
G7 benchmark sample. 
Capital Structure 
Determinants in 
Real Estate 
Limited 
Partnerships 
Allen (1995) The Financial 
Review 
376 real estate 
firms for the 
years of 1980-
1989 
Total leverage, long-term 
leverage, debt-equity 
ratio, real estate assets, 
growth, non-debt tax 
shields, volatility, 
TRA86 
- There is a positive relationship between 
leverage and the proportion of real estate assets 
held, and a negative relationship between 
leverage and both growth rates and non-debt 
tax shields. 
- Changes resulting from the Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 are positively related to partnership 
leverage. 
Financial Policy 
and Capital 
Structure Choice 
in UK SMEs: 
Empirical 
evidence from 
company panel 
data 
Michaelas et 
al. (1999) 
Small Business 
Economics 
3,500 UK 
small firms for 
the years of 
1986-1995 
Size, age, profitability, 
growth, growth 
opportunities, risk, asset 
structure, stock level, 
non-debt tax shields, 
marginal tax rate, net 
debtors 
- Most of the determinants of capital structure 
presented by the theory of finance appear 
indeed to be relevant for the UK small 
business sector.  
- Size, age, profitability, growth and future 
growth opportunities, operating risk, asset 
structure, stock turnover and new debtors all 
seem to have an effect on the level of both the 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
short and long term debt in small firms. 
- Capital structure of small firms is time and 
industry dependent; time and industry effects 
influence the maturity structure of debt raised 
in SMEs. 
- Average short-term debt ratios appear to be 
increasing during periods of economic 
recession and decrease as the economic 
conditions in the marketplace improve. 
- Average long-term debt ratios exhibit a 
positive relationship with changes in economic 
growth. 
An Empirical 
Test of the 
Impact of 
Managerial Self‐
Interest on 
Friend and 
Lang (1988) 
The Journal of 
Finance 
984 NYSE 
firms for the 
years of 1979-
1983 
Debt/asset ratio, 
tangibility, mean of 
earnings/asset ratio, 
Standard deviation of 
earnings/assets ratio, 
- The debt ratio is negatively related to 
management's shareholding, reflecting the 
greater non-diversifiable risk of debt to 
management than to public investors for 
maintaining a low debt ratio. 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
Corporate 
Capital Structure 
total assets, market value 
of equity, fraction of 
equity held by dominant 
managerial insider, 
fraction of equity held by 
dominant non-managerial 
stockholder 
- Unless there is a non-managerial principal 
stockholder, no substantial increase of debt can 
be realised, which may suggest that the 
existence of large non-managerial stockholders 
might make the interests of managers and 
public investors coincide. 
Firms’ Histories 
and their Capital 
Structures 
Kayhan and 
Titman 
(2007) 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
Firms listed in 
the Compustat 
Industrial 
Annual Files at 
any point 
between 1960 
and 2003 
Financial deficit, yearly 
timing, long-term timing, 
stock returns, leverage 
deficit, change in target, 
book leverage, market 
leverage, market to book 
ratio, profitability, selling 
expense, research and 
development, size 
- Cash flows, investment expenditures, and 
stock price histories have a substantial 
influence on changes in capital structure. 
- Stock price changes and financial deficits 
(i.e., the amount of external capital raised) 
have strong influences on capital structure 
changes. 
- Although firms’ histories strongly influence 
their capital structures, over time their capital 
structures tend to move towards target debt 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
ratios that are consistent with the Trade-Off 
theories of capital structure. 
How Firm 
Characteristics 
Affect Capital 
Structure: An 
international 
comparison 
Wald (1999) Journal of 
Financial 
research 
4,404 firms 
(313 French, 
316 German, 
1,350 
Japanese, 
1,096 UK, 
1,329 US) for 
the year 1991 
or 1992 
Costs of financial 
distress, moral hazard, 
non-debt tax shields,  
risk, tangibility, 
inventories, research and 
development, 
depreciation, 
profitability, sales 
growth, size 
- Differences appear in the correlation 
between long-term debt/asset ratios and the 
firm’s riskiness, profitability, size, and growth; 
these correlations may be explained by 
differences in tax policies and agency 
problems, including differences in bankruptcy 
costs, information asymmetries, and 
shareholder/creditor conflicts. 
The Debt-Equity 
Choice 
Hovakimian 
et al. (2001) 
Journal of 
Financial and 
Quantitative 
analysis 
39,387 firm 
years covering 
1979-1997 
Total assets, debt/assets, 
leverage deficit, DTLD-
DTLE, three-year mean 
ROA, NOLC, two year 
stock return, market-to-
book ratio, fraction of 
- Firms may face impediments to movements 
toward their target ratio, and that the target 
ratio may change over time as the firm's 
profitability and stock price change. 
- A separate analysis of the size of the issue 
and repurchase transactions suggests that the 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
debt in three years, R&D 
expenditures/sales, 
selling expenditures/ 
sales, tangible asset ratio, 
firm size 
deviation between the actual and the target 
ratios plays a more important role in the 
repurchase decision than in the issuance 
decision. 
How Does 
Industry Affect 
Firm Financial 
Structure? 
MacKay and 
Phillips 
(2005) 
The Review of 
Financial 
Studies 
Active and 
inactive firms 
from the 
merged 
COMPUSTAT
- CRSP for the 
years 1981-
2000 
Leverage, capital/labour, 
risk, natural hedge, 
profitability, size 
- In addition to standard industry fixed 
effects, the financial structure also depends on 
a firm's position within its industry. 
- Competitive industries, a firm's financial 
leverage depends on its natural hedge (its 
proximity to the median industry capital-labour 
ratio), the actions of other firms in the 
industry, and its status as an entrant, 
incumbent, or exiting firm. 
- Financial leverage is higher and less 
dispersed in concentrated industries, where 
strategic debt interactions are also stronger, but 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
a firm's natural hedge is not significant. 
- Financial structure, technology, and risk are 
jointly determined within industries. 
Partial 
Adjustment 
toward Target 
Capital 
Structures 
Flannery 
and Rangan 
(2006) 
Journal of 
financial 
economics 
All firms 
included in the 
Compustat 
Industrial 
Annual tapes 
between the 
years 1965 and 
2001 
Earnings before interest 
and tax, market-to-book 
ratio of assets, total 
assets, depreciation, fixed 
asset proportion, industry 
median debt ratio, 
research and 
development expenses  
- Firms do have target capital structures. 
- The typical firm closes about one-third of 
the gap between its actual and its target debt 
ratios within one year. 
- “Targeting” behaviour explains far more of 
the observed changes in the capital structure 
than market timing or pecking order 
considerations. 
Capital Structure 
Decisions: 
Which factors are 
reliably 
important? 
Frank and 
Goyal 
(2009) 
Financial 
Management 
A sample of 
US publicly 
traded 
American 
firms from 
1950 to 2003 
Leverage measures, 
profitability, firm size,  
growth, industry, nature 
of assets, taxes, risk, 
supply-side factors, stock 
market conditions, debt 
- The most reliable factors for explaining 
market leverage are: median industry leverage 
(+ effect on leverage), market-to-book assets 
ratio (−), tangibility (+), profits (−), log of 
assets (+), and expected inflation (+). 
- Dividend-paying firms tend to have lower 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
market conditions, 
macroeconomic 
conditions 
leverage. 
- When considering book leverage, somewhat 
similar effects are found. 
- For book leverage, the impact of firm size, 
the market-to-book ratio, and the effect of 
inflation are not reliable. 
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Appendix 6: Summary of empirical findings on capital structure decision of firms in developing countries 
Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
Capital 
Structures in 
Developing 
Countries 
Booth et al. 
(2001) 
The Journal of 
Finance 
Firms from 10 
developing 
countries for 
the years of 
1985-1991 
Total debt ratio, long-
term book-debt ratio, 
long-term market-debt 
ratio, average tax rate, 
tangibility, business risk, 
size, return on assets, 
market to book ratio 
- Although some of the insights from modern 
finance theory are portable across countries, 
much remains to be done to understand the 
impact of different institutional features on 
capital structure choices. 
Institutional, 
Macroeconomic 
and Firm-specific 
Determinants of 
Capital Structure 
Lemma and 
Negash 
(2013) 
Management 
Research 
Review 
986 firms from 
nine African 
countries for 
the years of 
1999-2008 
Size, earnings volatility, 
profitability, growth, 
tangibility, dividend 
payout, tax shield, 
taxation, inflation, size of 
overall economy, growth 
rate of real GDP, income 
group, stock market size, 
stock market liquidity, 
- The legal and financial institutions, the 
income level of the country in which a firm 
operates, the growth rate of the economy and 
inflation matter in capital structure choices of 
firms in the sample countries. 
- Capital structure choice of firms in the 
sample countries was affected by industry and 
firm-specific characteristics. 
- The findings signify the role that probability 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
size of banking sector, 
creditor, creditor rights, 
shareholder rights, rule of 
law, origin 
of bankruptcy, agency costs, transaction costs, 
tax issues, information asymmetry problems, 
access to finance and market timing play in 
capital structure decisions of firms in Africa. 
Capital Structure 
in an Emerging 
Stock Market: 
The case of India 
Chakraborty 
(2010) 
Research in 
International 
Business and 
Finance 
1,169 listed 
firms for the 
years of 1995-
2008 
Debt, profitability, 
tangibility, size, growth, 
non-debt tax shields, 
uniqueness 
- Among the three alternative theories of 
capital structure, the POT and the static TOT 
both seem to explain Indian firms’ decisions. 
- There is little evidence to support the 
agency cost theory. 
Capital Structure 
and Investment 
Behaviour of 
Malaysian Firms 
in the 1990s: A 
study of 
corporate 
governance 
Suto (2003) Corporate 
Governance: An 
International 
Review 
375 non-
financial listed 
companies 
during fiscal 
years 1995–99 
Return on investment, 
tangibility, leverage, 
bank dependency, 
internal fund, non-debt 
tax shield, collateral 
value, corporate size, 
business risk, TOP10, 
Bumiputera 
- The commitment of banks to finance 
corporate debt as well as lending obviously 
increased debt ratios.  
- Increasing ownership by native Malays, 
both the direct and indirect holding of 
corporate shares, played no significant role in 
disciplining corporate management. 
- Ownership concentration mitigated conflict 
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Title Author Journal 
Sample & 
period 
Variable Finding 
before the crisis shareholding, foreigners 
shareholdings 
between managers and owners. 
- Foreign ownership also contributed to a 
reduction in the agency cost of equity 
financing in financial liberalisation. 
- High dependency on debt led to excessive 
corporate investment before the crisis. 
  
  
192 
Appendix 7: Summary of empirical findings on capital structure decision of firms in transitional economies 
Title Author Journal 
Data &  
period 
Variable Finding 
The 
Determinants of 
Capital Structure: 
Evidence from 
China 
Huang 
(2006) 
China 
Economic 
Review 
1,200 Chinese 
listed 
companies for 
the period of 
1994-2003 
Profitability, tangibility, tax, 
size, non-debt tax shields, 
growth, volatility, ownership 
structure and managerial 
shareholdings, institution, 
industry 
- Leverage increases with size and 
tangibility, and decreases with profitability, 
non-debt tax shields, growth opportunity, 
managerial shareholdings and correlates with 
industries. 
The 
Determinants of 
Capital Structure 
in Transitional 
Economies 
Delcoure 
(2007) 
International 
Review of 
Economics 
and Finance 
22 Czech, 61 
Polish, 33 
Russian and 13 
Slovak listed 
firms from 
1996-2002 
Size, risk, growth, 
profitability, non-debt tax 
shields, tax 
- The POT and TOT partially explain 
financing decision in Central and Eastern 
Europe countries. 
- Leverage decisions are affected by the 
differences and financial constraints of 
institutional factors. 
Determinants of 
Capital Structure 
of Chinese-listed 
Companies 
J. J. Chen 
(2004) 
Journal of 
Business 
Research 
88 Chinese 
listed 
companies for 
the period of 
Profitability, size, growth, 
tangibility, cost of financial 
distress, non-debt tax shields 
- Neither the Trade-Off model nor the 
Pecking-Order hypothesis provides 
convincing explanations for the capital 
choices of the Chinese firms. 
  
193 
1995-2000 - The capital choice decision of Chinese 
firms seems to follow a ‘‘new Pecking-
Order’’- retained profit, equity, and long-
term debt. 
Capital Structure 
in Small and 
Medium-sized 
Enterprises: The 
case of Vietnam 
Nguyen 
and 
Ramachan
dran 
(2006) 
ASEAN 
Economic 
Bulletin 
558 SMEs for 
the period of 
1998-2001 
Growth, tangibility, business 
risk, profitability, size, 
ownership, relationship with 
banks, networking 
- Leverage is positively related to growth, 
business risk, firm size, networking, and 
relationships with banks but negatively 
related to tangibility. 
- Profitability seems to have no significant 
impact on the capital structure of Vietnamese 
SMEs. 
Back to the 
Beginning: 
Persistence and 
the cross‐section 
of corporate 
capital structure 
Lemmon et 
al. (2008) 
The Journal 
of Finance 
Firm-year 
observations in 
the annual 
Compustat 
database 
between 1995 
and 2003 
Book leverage, market 
leverage, sales, market-to-
book ratio, profitability, cash 
flow volatility, median 
industry book leverage, 
intangible assets 
- The majority of variation in leverage 
ratios is driven by an unobserved time-
invariant effect that generates surprisingly 
stable capital structures: High (low) levered 
firms tend to remain as such for over two 
decades. 
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Appendix 8: Summary of empirical findings on earnings management 
Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Political Cost 
Incentives for 
Earnings 
Management in the 
Cable Television 
Industry 
Key (1997) Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
Firms in 
cable 
industry for 
the years of 
1989-1995 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment), gross 
intangible assets, 
revenue, basic 
service price 
- Firms for which proposed 
regulations are expected to be more 
harmful have greater income-
decreasing accruals. 
- Firms for which cable television 
operations are more important have 
greater income-decreasing accruals. 
Earnings 
Management and the 
Underperformance 
of Seasoned Equity 
Offerings 
Teoh et al. 
(1998b) 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
6,386 
seasoned 
equity issues 
between 
1976 to 1990 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Firm size, book-to-
market ratio, 
discretionary 
current accruals, 
Discretionary long-
term accruals, non-
discretionary 
current accruals, on-
discretionary long-
- Issuers who adjust discretionary 
current accruals to report higher net 
income prior to the offering have 
lower post-issue long-run abnormal 
stock returns and net income. 
- The relation between 
discretionary current accruals and 
future returns (adjusted for firm size 
and book-to-market ratio) is 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
term accruals, 
change in capital 
expenditures 
stronger and more persistent for 
seasoned equity issuers than for 
non-issuers. 
Earnings 
Management by 
Acquiring Firms in 
Stock for Stock 
Mergers 
Erickson and 
Wang (1999) 
Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
78 firms 
involved in a 
negotiated 
stock for 
stock merger 
during the 
period 1985-
1990 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, 
change in revenues, 
total assets, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment), 
unexpected 
accruals, deal ratio 
(DR), stock owned 
by management 
(OWN) 
- Acquiring firms manage earnings 
upward in the periods prior to the 
merger agreement. 
- The degree of income increasing 
earnings management is positively 
related to the relative size of the 
merger. 
On the Association 
between Voluntary 
Disclosure and 
Earnings 
Kasznik 
(1999) 
Journal of 
Accounting 
Research 
Point and 
range 
estimates of 
annual 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, 
discretionary 
current accruals, 
non-discretionary 
- Managers use positive 
discretionary accruals to manage 
reported earnings upward when 
earnings would otherwise fall below 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Management earnings 
appearing on 
the Nexis 
News File 
during 1987-
1991 
current accruals, 
adjusted 
discretionary 
current accruals 
management's earnings forecast. 
- The extent of earnings 
management activity is positively 
associated with proxies for the 
increased likelihood and cost of 
litigation associated with 
management earnings forecast 
errors. 
 
Management of 
Earnings and 
Analysts' Forecasts 
to Achieve Zero and 
Small Positive 
Earnings Surprises 
Burgstahler 
and Eames 
(2006) 
Journal of 
Business 
Finance & 
Accounting 
Actual and 
forecast 
annual EPS 
values for 
the years 
1986 through 
2000 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Earnings before 
extraordinary items 
(TAC),  total asset, 
change in revenue, 
PPE (property plant 
and equipment), 
industry 
- Managers avoid reporting 
earnings lower than analyst 
forecasts and provide new evidence 
of actions contributing to this 
phenomenon. 
- Both the operating cash flow and 
discretionary accruals components 
of earnings are managed. 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Debt-covenant 
Violations and 
Managers' 
Accounting 
Responses 
Sweeney 
(1994) 
Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
130 firms in 
the years 
1977-1990 
Empirical study Magnitude of 
earnings effect, net 
worth, liquidity,  
- Managers of firms approaching 
default respond with income-
increasing accounting changes and 
that the default costs imposed by 
lenders and the accounting 
flexibility available to managers are 
important determinants of 
managers’ accounting responses. 
- Private lending agreements are 
the first violated, that net worth and 
working capital restrictions are the 
most frequently violated 
restrictions, and that in 52 percent 
of the cases lenders require 
concessions from borrowers to 
resolve default. 
The Effect of Cahan (1992) The Accounting 48 Discretionary Depreciation, - Managers adjust earnings in 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Antitrust 
Investigations on 
Discretionary 
Accruals: A refined 
test of the political-
cost hypothesis 
Review investigated 
firms 
between 
1970-1983 
accruals inventory, account 
payable, taxes 
payable, deferred 
tax expense, change 
in sales, FIXASSET 
(property plant and 
equipment) 
response to monopoly-related 
antitrust investigations. 
Debt Covenant 
Violation and 
Manipulation of 
Accruals 
DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 
(1994) 
Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
94 firms that 
reported debt 
covenant 
violation in 
annual 
reports 
during the 
fiscal years 
1985 through 
1988 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
assets, change in 
revenues, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment) 
- In the year prior to violation, both 
models indicate that ‘abnormal’ 
total and working capital accruals 
are significantly positive. 
- In the year of violation, there is 
evidence of positive abnormal 
working capital accruals after 
controlling for management changes 
and auditor going concern 
qualifications. 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Earnings 
Management: New 
evidence based on 
deferred tax expense 
Phillips et al. 
(2003) 
The Accounting 
Review 
2,252 to 
2,782 firm-
years for the 
years of 
1994-2000 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
assets, change in 
revenues, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment), sales 
- Deferred tax expense is generally 
incrementally useful beyond all 
three accruals-based measures with 
regard to detecting earnings 
management to avoid an earnings 
decline and to avoid a loss. 
- Deferred tax expense is 
significantly more accurate than any 
of the accrual measures in 
classifying firm-years as 
successfully avoiding a loss, 
whereas no one measure is 
relatively more accurate than the 
others in classifying firm-years that 
successfully avoid an earnings 
decline. 
Deferred Taxes, Kasipillai and Journal of 221 Earnings Total accruals, total - Malaysian public listed 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Earnings 
Management, and 
Corporate 
Governance: 
Malaysian evidence 
Mahenthiran 
(2013) 
Contemporary 
Accounting & 
Economics 
Malaysian 
public listed 
companies 
for the years 
2005-2008 
distribution assets, change in 
revenues, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment), return 
on assets 
companies use both the accrual and 
valuation allowance components of 
net deferred tax liabilities to avoid a 
decline in earnings. 
- Ownership structure and board 
structure affect the extent to which 
earnings management is associated 
with a deferred tax component. 
Earnings 
Management, 
Surplus Free Cash 
Flow, and External 
Monitoring 
Chung et al. 
(2005) 
Journal of 
Business 
Research 
22,576 
company 
year 
observations 
over the 
period 1984-
1996 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
current accruals, 
discretionary 
accrual, non-
discretionary 
accruals, total 
assets, sales 
revenues, PPE 
(property plant and 
- Big 6 auditors and institutional 
investors with substantial 
shareholdings moderate the SFCF-
DAC relation, which suggests that 
external monitoring by these two 
outside stakeholders is effective in 
deterring managers’ opportunistic 
earnings management. 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
equipment), return 
on assets, account 
receivables, size, 
debt, big 6 
Socioemotional 
Wealth and Earnings 
Management in 
Private Family Firms 
Stockmans et 
al. (2010) 
Family 
Business 
Review 
295 family 
firms for the 
years of 
1998-2006 
Empirical study Institutional 
ownership, annual 
market adjusted 
returns, average 
monthly volume, 
market value of 
equity, beta, 
standard deviation 
of market model 
Residuals, leverage, 
dividend yield, 
earning-price ratio, 
book-price ratio, 
- Institutional investors avoid 
investments in family firms. 
- Financial regulation can mitigate 
external investors’ concerns. 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
sales growth, S&P 
stock rating  
The Importance of 
Reporting 
Incentives: Earnings 
management in 
European private 
and public firms 
Burgstahler 
et al. (2006) 
The Accounting 
Review 
298,290 
firm-year 
observations 
from non-
financial 
private and 
public firms 
in 15 EU 
countries for 
the years of 
1997-2001 
Empirical study Earnings 
management, Size, 
leverage, growth, 
return on assets, 
industry, PUBL 
(publicly traded 
debt or equity 
securities), legal 
variable 
- Earnings management is more 
pervasive in private firms and that 
both public. 
- Private firms exhibit more 
earnings management in countries 
with weak legal enforcement. 
- Private and public firms respond 
differentially to differences in the 
tax and accounting rules in the EU. 
Audit Committee, 
Board of Director 
Characteristics, and 
Earnings 
Klein (2002) Journal of 
Accounting and 
Economics 
All firm-
years listed 
on the S&P 
500 as of 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, non-
discretionary 
accruals, total 
assets, change in 
- A negative relation is found 
between audit committee 
independence and abnormal 
accruals. 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Management March 31, 
1992 and 
1993 with 
annual 
shareholder 
meetings 
between July 
1, 1991 and 
June 30, 
1993. 
revenues, PPE 
(property plant and 
equipment), 
abnormal accruals, 
net income, 
operating cash flows 
- A negative relation is also found 
between board independence and 
abnormal accruals. 
- Reductions in board or audit 
committee independence are 
accompanied by large increases in 
abnormal accruals. 
- Boards structured to be more 
independent of the CEO are more 
effective in monitoring the 
corporate financial accounting 
process. 
 
 
The Effect of Audit 
Quality on Earnings 
Management 
Becker et al. 
(1998) 
Contemporary 
Accounting 
Research 
10,379 Big 
Six and 
2,179 non-
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
assets, revenues, 
PPE (property plant 
- Clients of non-Big Six auditors 
report discretionary accruals that 
are, on average, 1.5-2.1% of total 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
Big Six firm 
years for the 
period of 
1989 to 1992 
and equipment), 
discretionary 
accruals, operating 
cash flows 
assets higher than the discretionary 
accruals reported by clients of Big 
Six auditors. 
- The mean and median of the 
absolute value of discretionary 
accruals are greater for firms with 
non-Big Six auditors. 
- Lower audit quality is associated 
with more “accounting flexibility”. 
On the Association 
between Institutional 
Ownership and 
Aggressive 
Corporate Earnings 
Management in 
Australia 
Koh (2003) The British 
Accounting 
Review 
107 firm-
year 
observations 
of Australian 
firms for the 
years of 
1993-1997 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Income increasing 
discretionary 
accruals, 
institutional 
ownership, firm 
size, leverage, 
managerial 
ownership, auditor, 
- A positive association is found at 
the lower institutional ownership 
levels, consistent with the view that 
transient (short-term oriented) 
institutional investors create 
incentives for managers to manage 
earnings upwards. 
- A negative association is found at 
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Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
total accruals, 
control entity, 
mining companies 
the higher institutional ownership 
levels, consistent with the view that 
long-term oriented institutional 
investors’ monitoring limits 
managerial accruals discretion. 
- Institutional investors can act as a 
complementary corporate 
governance mechanism in 
mitigating myopic aggressive 
earnings management by 
corporations when they have a 
sufficiently high ownership level. 
The Balance Sheet 
as an Earnings 
Management 
Constraint 
Barton and 
Simko (2002) 
The Accounting 
Review 
3,649 firms 
during 1993-
1999 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
assets, change in 
revenues, change in 
account receivables, 
PPE (property plant 
- The likelihood of reporting larger 
positive or smaller negative 
earnings surprises decreased with 
the proxy for overstated net asset 
values. 
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and equipment), 
signed EPS surprise, 
NOA (overstated 
net assets) 
Organizational 
Structure and 
Earnings 
Management 
K. W. Lee et 
al. (2007) 
Journal of 
Accounting, 
Auditing & 
Finance 
31,263 firm-
year 
observations 
spanning the 
years 1991 to 
2004 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, total 
assets, sales change, 
PPE (property plant 
and equipment), 
abnormal accruals, 
Organizational 
relatedness, 
insiders’ ownership, 
institutional 
ownership, 
proportion of board 
members, long-term 
debt, market value 
- Intrafirm collusion toward a 
common organizational goal is more 
prevalent in highly related 
organizational structure because the 
economic welfare of economic 
agents is highly independent. 
- Earnings management is 
positively associated with 
organizational relatedness. 
- For firms with high 
organizational relatedness, those 
with a high proportion of outside 
directors and high institutional 
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Title Author Journal 
Data & 
period 
Research 
method 
Variable Finding 
of equity, cash from 
operations, net 
income,  
equity ownership have less 
pronounced earnings management. 
- Collectively, an interaction 
between corporate governance 
structure and organizational 
relatedness in affecting earnings 
quality. 
 
The Effect of 
Leverage Increases 
on Earnings 
Management 
Jelinek 
(2007) 
The Journal of 
Business and 
Economic 
Studies 
2,239, 2,246, 
2,285, 2,382, 
2,467, and 
2,703 for 
samples for 
the period 
1992-2002 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total accruals, 
income before 
extraordinary items, 
cash flows from 
operations, 
extraordinary items 
and discontinued 
operations 
- Increased leverage is associated 
with a reduction in earnings 
management, and that growth and 
free cash flow levels are factors 
influencing this relationship; 
leverage changes and leverage 
levels may have differing impacts 
on earnings management. 
Earnings An et al. Journal of 25,777 firms Empirical study Market leverage, Under strong institutional 
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Data & 
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Research 
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Management, 
Capital Structure, 
and the Role of 
Institutional 
Environments 
(2016) Banking & 
Finance 
across 37 
countries for 
the years 
1989-2009 
earnings 
management 
variable, size, 
profitability, 
tangibility, market-
book ratio, industry-
median leverage, 
GDP per capita, 
stock market 
capitalization to 
GDP, GDP growth,  
macro-level 
institutional-
environment 
variable 
environment, firms with high 
earnings management activities are 
associated with high 
financial leverage: 
- Both corporate debt and 
institutional environments can be 
served as external control 
mechanisms to alleviate the agency 
cost of free cash flow. 
- It is less costly to rely on 
institutional environments than debt. 
Debt, Diversification 
and Earnings 
Rodríguez-
Pérez and 
Journal of 
Accounting and 
443 firms for 
the years 
Empirical study Discretionary 
accrual, debt, 
- For less-diversified firms, debt 
reduces positive discretionary 
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Data & 
period 
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Management van Hemmen 
(2010) 
Public Policy 1992-2002 change in revenue, 
tangibility, IDEBT,  
GROU, effective 
tax rate, the big six 
auditors 
accruals, whereas in relatively 
more-diversified firms the impact of 
debt becomes positive. 
- Marginal increases in debt 
provide the incentives for managers 
to manipulate earnings, and 
diversification provides the needed 
context for this accounting practice 
to be possible. 
A Study of Earnings-
Management 
Motives in the 
Anglo-American and 
Euro-Continental 
Accounting Models: 
The Canadian and 
French cases 
Othman and 
Zeghal 
(2006) 
The 
International 
Journal of 
Accounting 
1674 
Canadian 
and 1470 
French firm-
year 
observations 
for the years 
1996-2000 
Empirical study Debt, size, 
tangibility, tax, 
industry, manager’s 
ownership, audit 
quality, foreign 
stock exchange 
listing, small loss 
avoidance, 
- Incentives for earnings 
management for French firms are 
specifically linked to contractual 
debt costs and effective tax rate. 
- Canadian firms show specific 
incentives matched with a dynamic 
capital market. 
- Issuing equity is a strong motive 
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Data & 
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Variable Finding 
smoothing reported 
operating earnings 
for earnings management in 
Canadian firms. 
The Effect of 
Monitoring by 
Outside 
Blockholders on 
Earnings 
Management 
Zhong et al. 
(2007) 
Quarterly 
Journal of 
Business and 
Economics 
Ownership 
data on 
Compact 
Disclosure 
from 1994 to 
2003 
Discretionary 
accruals 
Total assets, pre-
managed earnings, 
operating cash 
flows, discretionary 
accruals, 
blockholders, debt, 
size, growth 
- Outside blockholders ownership 
is positively associated with 
discretionary accruals for firms that 
face declining pre-managed 
earnings. 
- Outside blockholders are not 
effective monitors of income-
increasing earnings management 
that is generally with the bounds of 
GAAP. 
 
